The Republican Party is once again asking the Supreme Court to change the rules governing US elections in order to make it easier for GOP candidates to prevail in future elections. And this Court, with its 6-3 Republican majority, will likely give the GOP what it is asking for.

National Republican Congressional Committee v. Brown concerns a federal statute that requires broadcast television and radio stations to allow candidates to buy campaign ads at a highly discounted rate. 

The question in Brown is whether political party committees such as the DNC or the RNC are also entitled to this discounted rate. A federal appeals court determined that they are not, as the relevant statute only extends this rate to “a legally qualified candidate for any public office,” and not to that candidate’s political party. The GOP now wants the justices to give its party committees this discounted rate anyway. If the justices agree, that would give Republicans an advantage in future elections, because the GOP tends to raise more money through its party organizations than Democrats do.

While individual Democratic candidates often outraise their Republican opponents, Republican donors tend to be much more generous to party committees than their Democratic counterparts. As of late June, for example, the RNC had nearly $130 million in cash, while the DNC was in debt.

A Republican victory in the case would also increase the significance of another win the Supreme Court handed the GOP in June 2025, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC (2026). Federal law previously placed strict limits on a party organization’s ability to coordinate with candidates on messaging, ad placement, and similar tactical decisions. NRSC abolished many of those limits, thus making money raised by party committees more potent because those committees may now work closely with candidates to plan how that money is spent.

Brown, meanwhile, could make any dollar that a party committee spends on ads stretch much further than it otherwise would.

The GOP’s argument that federal law allows party committees to buy ads at a discount is not persuasive. Again, the relevant federal statute gives a discount to candidates and not to parties. 

But that’s unlikely to matter because the GOP’s brief to the Court does make a plausible procedural argument that would allow the justices to wipe away the lower court decision ruling against the Republican Party. If that happens, it would leave the question of whether parties may buy ads at a discount to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which Republicans control.

It will be fairly easy, in other words, for the Court’s Republican majority to rule in favor of their political party in Brown, in the likely event that those six justices are inclined to do so. And that means that the RNC’s money advantage over Democratic groups is about to matter a whole lot more.

A GOP victory in Brown would augment the party’s recent victory in NRSC

Brown is part of a broader Republican Party legal strategy, which seeks to make money donated to the party itself as fungible as possible with money given to individual Republican candidates. The GOP’s recent victory in NRSC is also part of this strategy.

Federal law limits the amount of money donors may give directly to candidates — the cap on these donations is currently $3,500. It also restricts how much money donors may give to party committees such as the DNC or the RNC, but that cap is much higher. It is $44,300 per donor per year in the current election cycle.

Campaign finance law also used to prevent party committees from coordinating their political spending with individual campaigns — the idea was to prevent big donors from laundering donations that exceed the $3,500 cap on donations to candidates through party committees like the RNC. But, in NRSC, the Republican justices repealed most of the restrictions on coordination between party committees and individual candidates. 

So the upshot of that decision is that party organizations may still seek donations from wealthy donors that are an order of magnitude larger than what candidates may raise from those same donors. But now, there are far fewer restrictions on these party organizations’ ability to work with candidates to devise a joint strategy for spending their combined funds.

But, because party organizations are not themselves candidates, the language of the statute at issue in Brown indicates that these organizations must pay significantly higher rates to run these ads than the campaigns the party hopes to coordinate with. 

This statute essentially requires broadcast stations to charge their lowest ad rate to candidates. Often, major advertisers buy ads in bulk, and receive a significant discount for doing so. By law, broadcast stations must give the same discount to candidates for public office that they give to advertisers who buy ads at the cheapest rate offered by that station. So, if a local TV station allows Budweiser to buy ads at a 50 percent discount because the beer maker runs hundreds of ads on that station, then it must give this same 50 percent discount to political candidates, even if those candidates only run a handful of ads.

The legal term for this discounted rate is the “lowest unit charge” or “LUC rate,” and these discounts can be quite substantial. A somewhat dated report by the Congressional Research Service estimates that bulk ad discounts are as high as 30 percent, while a more recent news article by the congressional newspaper Roll Call estimates that occasional ad buyers may pay “two or three times” as much per ad as an advertiser who secures the best discount.

So, the Supreme Court has already given the GOP greater ability to coordinate strategy and tactics with individual campaigns. And now it wants the much-larger donations that party committees can raise from wealthy donors to go even further than they already do.

Republicans want Trump’s FCC, and not the courts, to decide who gets the discounted rate

The Republican Party’s primary argument in Brown is that two procedural quirks in this case work together to prevent federal courts from enforcing the statute as it is written (although the GOP does also argue that the statute gives party committees the same discounted rate as candidates).

Last March, while NRSC was still pending before the justices, Trump’s FCC issued a “Public Notice” declaring that political parties are, in fact, entitled to the discounted ad rates that federal law guarantees to candidates. Four Democratic candidates, including US Senate candidates Sherrod Brown, Roy Cooper, and Jon Ossoff formally asked the FCC to reverse that policy in April, but the FCC sat on their request without acting on it.

With the 2026 election looming and no action from the FCC, these candidates then asked the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to intervene in late June, and, in a late August decision, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Democratic candidates that the FCC’s interpretation of the law governing ad rates is wrong.

Republicans, meanwhile, argue that the Fourth Circuit decided this case prematurely. If the Supreme Court agrees with the GOP’s argument, that would mean that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute would go back into effect — and party committees would be allowed to buy ads at a discount, at least during the 2026 election.

The Republican Party’s jurisdictional argument is plausible, but far from airtight. While a federal law does permit the Fourth Circuit to review the FCC’s “final orders,” the GOP argues that the FCC’s Public Notice does not count as a final order, and the Fourth Circuit cannot hear this case until after the FCC rules on the Democratic candidates’ April request to reverse the policy announced in that notice.

There is some legal support for the Republican Party’s position. Among other things, a different federal appeals court, the DC Circuit, said in a 2013 opinion that a federal agency’s “statements of policy” that do not go through the rigorous rulemaking process that agencies must conduct before they issue a new regulation are typically not subject to judicial review. So that decision cuts in favor of the Republican Party’s position, even though a DC Circuit decision is not binding on the Supreme Court.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Brown, meanwhile, offers a strong rebuttal to this argument. It points to the FCC’s failure to act on the Democratic candidates’ April request, and it cites a different DC Circuit decision establishing that, “when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief,” then a federal court is allowed to intervene.

If this rule did not exist, then the GOP-led FCC could effectively prevent courts from hearing Brown forever, simply by refusing to take any action at all on the Democratic candidates’ April filing.

In any event, it is safe to say that the question of whether these Democratic candidates must wait until the FCC acts before they can seek relief in federal court is not definitively resolved by prior precedents. Both the Republican Party and the Democratic candidates can cite court decisions that favor their position, and that means that the justices can choose whichever outcome they prefer.

The Supreme Court’s Republican majority, moreover, often hands down dubious jurisdictional rulings that benefit Republicans or other conservative causes. Just this week, for example, five of the Republican justices ruled that Trump may build his White House ballroom — even though a federal statute prohibits Trump from doing so. They reached this result by claiming, on far-fetched legal grounds, that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the challenge to Trump’s ballroom in the first place.

The Republican Party’s jurisdictional argument in Brown is hardly a slam dunk, but it is much stronger than the argument the Court just used to deny jurisdiction in the ballroom case. So, if the Court’s Republican majority wants to let Republican organizations buy ads at a discounted rate, they’ll probably find it easy to write an opinion that reaches their preferred outcome.

For a brief moment last week, it appeared that an ICE officer, who allegedly shot a man during the early 2026 occupation of Minneapolis and then lied about it, might actually face legal consequences for his actions.

Christian Castro, the now-suspended ICE officer in question, was confined to a Texas jail and potentially faced two sets of criminal charges. Minnesota prosecutors charged him with four felony counts of assault and one count of falsely reporting a crime, and sought his extradition from Texas, where he ordinarily lives, to Minnesota. Federal prosecutors, meanwhile, were reportedly planning to charge Castro with a criminal violation of a federal civil rights law.

Castro’s case was on track to become an encouraging example of how the American system can bring rogue law enforcement officers to account — a federal officer facing clear consequences for allegedly breaking the law in the unpopular and violent wave of ICE raids in Minnesota.

But all of that now appears to be in limbo. According to the New York Times, the federal charges, which had to be approved by officials in Washington, DC, “fell apart in the final hours for reasons that remain unclear.” Castro, meanwhile, may never return to Minnesota — and may even flee to Mexico — thanks to a federal court decision permitting Texas’s Republican Gov. Greg Abbott to effectively sit on Minnesota’s request to extradite Castro until after a state law required Castro’s release.

It’s the latest chapter in an ongoing saga where Trump administration officials, federal courts eager to shield federal law enforcement officers from justice, and now Texas state officials all work together to ensure that ICE and other law enforcement personnel involved in Trump’s violent crackdown in Minnesota face no legal consequences for their actions. 

If Castro gets off scot-free, he will owe his freedom to an unusual combination of federal and state officials who appear to have taken extraordinary measures to shield Castro from accountability. But while his case is unusually dramatic, it is hardly unique. An array of MAGA sympathizers and movement conservatives in state governments, the federal judiciary, and the Trump administration have all pushed to place ICE and similar agencies above the law.

What is the legal fight over Castro about?

Castro allegedly fired his gun through the door of Julio Sosa-Celis’s Minneapolis home in January, striking him in the leg. Although the Trump administration initially claimed that Sosa-Celis and his roommate attacked ICE officers with a broom and shovel, that allegation fell apart after prosecutors viewed video of the incident. Castro was suspended from his job at ICE without pay.

In May, a Minnesota prosecutor filed charges against Castro, and Castro was later arrested in Texas pursuant to an arrest warrant arising out of those charges.

That arrest should have guaranteed that Castro would be returned to Minnesota for trial. The Constitution provides that “a Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz formally sought Castro’s extradition on June 2.

Rather than comply with this request, however, Abbott took two actions that may prevent Castro from ever being tried for his alleged crimes. Abbott initiated an investigation, claiming, on dubious legal grounds, that he may not be able to extradite Castro because Castro does not meet the legal definition of a “fugitive.” Abbott also sent his lawyers to federal court to argue that the court could not order Texas to comply with the Constitution’s mandatory extradition provision.

Meanwhile, a deadline loomed over Minnesota’s request. Though Castro was incarcerated in a Texas jail, Texas law only permitted the jail to hold Castro for 90 days, at least without an order from Abbott saying that Castro must be extradited. During his incarceration, Castro also made several phone calls to his romantic partner in Mexico, and they discussed Castro’s desire to move to that country. 

So Minnesota quite reasonably feared that, if the 90 days were allowed to expire, Castro would flee the country.

Nevertheless, last Wednesday a Trump-appointed Judge Fernando Rodriguez Jr. backed Abbott’s play. His opinion in Walz v. Abbott rests on an extraordinarily credulous interpretation of Abbott’s treatment of Castro.

Briefly, Rodriguez’s opinion claims that it is too soon for a court to order Abbott to extradite Castro because Abbott has not yet formally “denied the request for a rendition warrant.” Instead, Rodriguez notes that Abbott asked Texas’s secretary of state to investigate whether Castro should be surrendered to Minnesota, and suggests that Minnesota must wait for that “investigation” to play out.

Oddly, Rodriguez’s opinion also includes a footnote indicating that he believes Abbott’s supposed investigation is baseless. The premise of that investigation is that Castro may not count as a “fugitive” because he moved to Texas after ICE directed him to do so. But, as Rodriguez notes, the Supreme Court defined who counts as a fugitive more than a century ago, and the Court’s definition does not exclude people who move because of a job, federal or otherwise.

So, to summarize Rodriguez’s decision, he ruled that Texas may delay complying with Minnesota’s extradition request, based on an investigation into a legal question that the Supreme Court has already resolved, and that it may delay compliance until state law requires Texas to release Castro. Castro was released on Thursday.

Thanks to this decision, it is now unclear whether Castro will ever face charges. Even if he remains in Texas, and even if Abbott eventually decides to comply with the extradition request, Texas authorities will now have to find Castro again and rearrest him. And Castro may flee to Mexico. While Minnesota can formally request Castro’s extradition from Mexico, that process could take years.

And, in case there is any doubt, there’s now strong evidence that Abbott’s “investigation” was a sham, and that Abbott was always motivated by hostility toward Minnesota’s attempt to prosecute Castro. One day after Rodriguez issued his decision, Abbott posted on X mocking Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, which said that Ellison and his legal team “are such bad lawyers.”

The post also labeled Minnesota a “sanctuary state” and threatened to bus immigrants from Texas to Minnesota.

Even if Abbott had complied with the Constitution, Minnesota prosecutors faced an uphill battle in their case against Castro

Even if Castro had been delivered to Minnesota authorities without incident, or even if he is arrested in Minnesota at some point in the future, it’s far from clear whether state prosecutors may bring charges against a federal law enforcement officer who allegedly violated Minnesota’s criminal law while carrying out his official duties. And the biggest obstacle standing against such a prosecution is a fairly sensible Supreme Court decision that long predates modern political fights over immigration enforcement.

The Court’s decision in In re Neagle (1890) arose from a wild incident where a former chief justice of the state of California attempted to kill a sitting Supreme Court justice. David Terry, the former state justice, married a woman who claimed that she was entitled to a share of a US senator’s fortune. After Justice Stephen Field ruled against Terry’s wife, Terry threatened Field’s life, and so Field was assigned a deputy US Marshal named David Neagle as his bodyguard.

Some time after Field’s decision against Terry’s wife, the justice was traveling by train in California, and he was attacked by Terry. Neagle shot and killed Terry. And California attempted to charge Neagle, the federal bodyguard, with murder. 

The Supreme Court tossed out this prosecution, and that decision has long been read to limit state governments’ power to prosecute federal officers who commit a state law crime while engaged in their official duties.

That said, the Court’s more recent decision in Martin v. United States (2025) suggests that Neagle may not be a total bar to state prosecutions of ICE officers. Martin read Neagle fairly narrowly, to say that federal officials are protected from state prosecutions only when their actions “were ‘necessary and proper’ in the discharge of their federal responsibilities.”

So that suggests that, if Castro is tried for violating Minnesota law, the question of whether he is immune from prosecution is likely to turn on whether courts determine that his alleged decision to fire a shot through Sosa-Celis’s door (and, potentially, to lie about Sosa-Celis’s actions) was a “necessary and proper” way for Castro to carry out his responsibilities as an immigration enforcement officer.

It’s hard to predict, however, how the courts would rule on this question. The Martin decision is fairly new, and the rule Martin seems to apply to federal officers charged with state crimes is vague. 

Federal law also provides that Castro’s trial, should it happen, must occur in federal court — although this federal court may still hear a state-law prosecution. And that means that any decision allowing Castro’s prosecution to move forward would appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which is one of the most conservative appeals courts in the federal system.

Of course, if Minnesota lost in the Eighth Circuit, it could potentially bring the question of whether Castro may be charged with violating a Minnesota criminal law to the Supreme Court. But, while the Martin decision suggests that Minnesota may have a chance of prevailing before the justices, several of the Court’s other precedents indicate that this Court is unlikely to rule against a federal law enforcement officer.

The slow death of Bivens

Separately from the legal question of whether someone like Castro can be charged with a crime, there is also the question of whether the victim could sue. It used to be the case that people who are victimized by federal law enforcement officers could sue those officers directly, but the current Supreme Court has virtually shut down these suits. The Court’s treatment of this question is a window into their expansive view of immunity for federal law enforcement.

More than five decades ago, the Supreme Court established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents (1971) that federal officers who violate the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures” may be sued and potentially ordered to compensate their victim.

But the Court’s current majority is extremely hostile to Bivens, and has walked right up to the edge of overruling it. In Hernández v. Mesa (2020), the Court’s Republican majority held that a Border Patrol agent who allegedly fatally shot a Mexican teenager in the face was immune from a lawsuit brought by the teenager’s family. More recently, in Egbert v. Boule (2022), the Court declared that federal law enforcement officers are immune from suit if there is “any rational reason (even one)” to justify giving them immunity.

In November, the Court will hear the Nielsen v. Watanabe that could potentially overrule what little remains of Bivens.

The Supreme Court’s Republican majority, in other words, has spent the last several years immunizing federal law enforcement officers like Castro from civil lawsuits. That doesn’t necessarily mean that it will also immunize Castro from criminal charges brought under state law, should his case somehow wind up before the justices, but it isn’t a hopeful sign for Minnesota prosecutors.

And that’s, of course, assuming that Minnesota law enforcement somehow manages to take custody of Castro. Abbott’s gamesmanship, and Rodriguez’s decision to bless that gamesmanship, may ultimately mean that Castro is never apprehended by Minnesota officials.

Welp, the Supreme Court has decided that President Donald Trump gets to build his ballroom. The decision in National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation is 5-4, with Republican Chief Justice John Roberts joining the three Democratic justices in dissent.

Notably, no member of the Court argued that Trump’s ballroom, an enormous structure that the president plans to build on the former site of the White House’s East Wing, is legal. As Roberts points out in dissent, a federal law prohibits the construction of any “building or structure … on any reservation, park, or public grounds of the Federal Government in the District of Columbia without express authority of Congress.” And, as Roberts writes, “Congress has not passed any law resembling ‘express authority’ for the Executive’s construction of” Trump’s ballroom.

Nevertheless, the five Republicans in the majority manage to rule in favor of Trump by effectively immunizing his ballroom from federal lawsuits.

Their opinion highlights two of the most troubling things about the current Supreme Court: its reluctance to impose limits on Trump’s imperial-style presidency, and the frequent incoherence of its reasoning, especially in Trump cases.

Their opinion suggests that no one is allowed to sue to challenge Trump’s decision to destroy and replace much of the White House. But it is short, does not explain key points of its argument, and relies on several distinctions that do not make any sense.

As a general rule, no one is allowed to file a federal lawsuit unless they can show that they were injured in some way by the defendant they are suing — a requirement known as “standing.” But the Court has long held that plaintiffs suing under conservationist laws that seek to preserve a pristine, sacred, historical, or otherwise beautiful site have standing to bring a suit enforcing such laws against defendants who would damage or destroy such a site’s beauty.

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), for example, the Court said that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest” that can be asserted in federal court. Similarly, the Court held in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (2000) that “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.’”

So that’s how standing worked right up until Monday afternoon, when the Court handed down its latest opinion. The new rule is…well, it is difficult to parse.

The plaintiff in National Park Service is a conservationist organization whose members include a retired professor who would frequently walk by the White House and who admired its beauty. Under decisions like Lujan and Friends of the Earth, that was enough to give her standing to sue in order to challenge the ballroom.

The five Republicans in the majority, however, falsely claim that this individual merely argued that she is offended by Trump’s construction project, and that past decisions have involved “more than mere offense.” The Republicans note that, in Friends of the Earth, the plaintiffs not only wanted to view a river, but also to fish and swim in it and to camp nearby. But they don’t really even attempt to distinguish Lujan beyond a vague statement that Lujan requires a plaintiff’s injury to be “concrete and particularized.”

Thus, because the majority opinion is so poorly explained, it is hard to tell what its implications will be. If the Court had explicitly overruled its past decisions holding that a plaintiff may often sue to challenge the destruction of something beautiful, that would be an existential threat to countless environmental, conservationist, and historical preservation laws that all exist to preserve natural or historic beauty. 

But the Court’s failure to explain why Lujan does not require them to rule against Trump leaves lawyers and judges to guess at what the Court just did to the rules governing standing. Perhaps this is a one-off decision intended solely to do a favor for Trump. Or maybe it’s the harbinger of a future decision setting much of America’s environmental protection regime on fire. The five justices in the majority barely explain themselves, so we cannot yet know what National Park Service means.

But one thing that is clear is that the decision makes no sense. As Roberts writes in dissent, “it now is the case that ‘I want to look at a crocodile’ can adequately answer the ever-critical ‘what’s it to you?’ question of Article III standing, while ‘I want to look at the White House’ cannot.” But the justices in the majority couldn’t even be bothered to explain why.