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The world’s most powerful frenemies talk nuclear weapons

19 November 2026 at 23:15
Putin, Xi, and Trump around a large table
From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and President Donald Trump take part in a trilateral meeting in Shenzhen, China. | Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images

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President Donald Trump is on his way back from China after a four-day Asia trip that included taking in a surreal cover of “Y.M.C.A.,” heaping praise on a noted kleptocrat, and making earnest — if slightly cringe! — declarations of star-crossed presidential friendship. 

But the highlight of the trip was surely Trump’s unprecedented trilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the first between those countries’ leaders. 

The three men sat around a comically large and reflective roundtable to discuss issues like reforming the United Nations, increasing the world’s supply of petroleum, and reducing the risk of nuclear war, which they all thankfully agree would be a bad idea.

A major nuclear treaty between the US and Russia lapsed nine months ago, and China has been a sticking point to negotiating a new one. In fact, all three countries are — in one realm or another — major obstacles to each other’s geopolitical ambitions. 

Accordingly, no breakthroughs were reached during their hour-long chat. But they did agree to keep chatting…including about nuclear proliferation.

Go a little deeper

I was surprised to learn that there’s currently no nuclear arms control treaty between Russia and the US. The two countries had agreed to mutual limits on their nuclear arsenals under a series of arms-control agreements dating back to the early 1970s. But when the latest one lapsed in February, nothing replaced it. (This despite Trump’s decades-long enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament.) 

How, exactly, did we get here? To find out, I reached out to Rose Gottemoeller, the chief negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START — that US-Russia nuclear deal that just recently expired.

The original START was signed in 1991, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the first time, the two countries agreed not just to stop growing their nuclear arsenals, but to actively reduce their strategic weapons. 

New START slashed their stockpiles even further: to 700 missiles, 800 launchers, and 1,550 deployed warheads, Gottemoeller said. (When you consider that the world had roughly 70,000 nuclear warheads at the peak of the Cold War, it’s a pretty massive accomplishment.)

But New START was negotiated during a brief, shining, Obama-era moment of optimism for nuclear arms control. Then Russia started getting grabby in Ukraine, and that optimism curdled. 

The treaty was extended once, in 2021, about a year before Putin began a full-scale invasion. Since then, neither country has been in a particularly diplomatic mood. On the contrary, both Trump and Putin have at times signaled they might be a little nuke-curious. 

The good news, of course, is that neither president ever acted on that curiosity. And in fact, the lapse of New START earlier this year hasn’t triggered a buildup. “So far Russia and the United States are sticking with the status quo limits,” Gottemoeller told Vox.

The bad news is that either country could reverse course, and there are complications to negotiating firmer limits in the future. One of the biggies is China, which is rapidly building up its own nuclear stockpile — and thus disincentivizing Russia and the US from cutting theirs back further. 

That’s the context for this morning’s trilateral, where Trump spoke explicitly about nuclear arms control before heading into the closed-door meeting. Gottemoeller, for her part, said she was “hopeful” the summit would “be a catalyst for new talks with the Russians [and] also nudge open the door to first talks with the Chinese.” 

We’ll have to wait and see about all that. But the three leaders did release a vague post-summit statement that reaffirmed “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” That, crucially, is a callback to a statement that US and Russian leaders released in 1985 after a summit that reinvigorated nuclear arms-control talks.

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The US helped the world rein in nuclear weapons. Could it do the same for AI?

18 November 2026 at 14:00
The unfinished work of nuclear governance offers an important lesson for those struggling with the risk of AI now: learning to live with a dangerous technology is not the same as eliminating its threat.  | Daniel Gnap/NurPhoto/Getty Images

When Illinois Gov. JB Pritzker talks about the threat of artificial intelligence, he offers an increasingly common point of comparison: it is a danger “on the level of nuclear weapons.” 

The comparison is not far-fetched. If the international community found ways to constrain a potentially catastrophic technology once before, perhaps those arrangements can help us constrain another. 

The trouble is that while nuclear nonproliferation may be a useful framework for thinking about regulating AI, it isn’t necessarily a good one. Not because the technologies are too different, but because nuclear nonproliferation hasn’t actually freed us from the prospect of nuclear war. 

Nevertheless, the unfinished work of nuclear governance offers an important lesson for those struggling with the risk of AI now: learning to live with a dangerous technology is not the same as eliminating its threat. 

What we might be able to do, however, is eliminate uncertainty about who’s building AI, what AI is capable of, and when AI puts people at risk. The US has done exactly that with nuclear weapons by declassifying information about the size and condition of its own arsenal, encouraging other nuclear powers to do the same.

Prioritizing transparency about AI wouldn’t eliminate the dangers altogether, but it might help us move forward more collectively as we strive to manage the very real risks of this emerging technology.

What the nuclear-AI analogy gets right… and wrong

Comparisons between AI and nuclear weapons have emerged not just from politicians and commentators but from those at the very top of the frontier AI food chain. For some AI leaders, nuclear weapons also represent an ideal model for oversight.

In a 2023 essay, OpenAI’s Sam Altman, Greg Brockman, and Ilya Sutskever called for “something like an [International Atomic Energy Agency] (IAEA) for superintelligence efforts.” Their proposed international authority would “inspect systems, require audits, test for compliance with safety standards,” and restrict how the most powerful systems could be deployed.

The goal of such measures is to make the development of superintelligence safe, rather than prevent it, much as nonproliferation regimes stop short of banning nuclear weapons outright. Altman and his colleagues argue that the technology could deliver enormous benefits, while stopping its creation would be “unintuitively risky and difficult.” 

Not everyone invoking nuclear governance draws the line in the same place. In September, AI researcher Yoshua Bengio told the UN Security Council that “frontier AI should be licensed like… medicine, aviation, and nuclear energy to incentivize safe development.” He also called for a universal constraint on AI development, one more expansive than those imposed on nuclear weapons: “No one, no company and no country, should develop an AI system that could cause large-scale harm.”

The real problem with such schemes may be figuring out how they would be enforced — and by whom. Sure, there are fewer states with nuclear weapons today than there could have been if nonproliferation had not become a policy priority for the US. However, this was not the result of diplomatic prowess or good-faith restraint. In the most important cases, it was a result of coercion by the US and its allies. 

As Christopher David LaRoche and Ankit Panda, two nuclear experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained in Foreign Affairs: “South Korea and Taiwan gave up nascent weapons programs after intense pressure from the United States…and a threat to pull military support if they did not comply. Israeli airstrikes took out the Iraqi and Syrian programs; Libya surrendered its own under sustained U.S. and British pressure.” 

In other words, unless the US seeks to go to war to prevent countries around the world from getting hands on frontier AI, nuclear nonproliferation is not the ideal mold for AI regulation. Plus, even in the face of a robust nonproliferation regime, a few states managed to slip through the cracks — India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan each acquired nuclear weapons. 

Despite that, there are still fewer nuclear weapons in the world today than there were at the peak of the Cold War. But even the best-laid plans might not last forever. The arms control agreements that made such disarmament possible have all crumbled — whether due to cheating, repudiation, or expired treaties. Moreover, in addition to the increased number of states in possession of nuclear weapons, China has tripled its number of nuclear weapons just this decade.

These are the consequences of a regime built to manage a technology, rather than eliminate it. A similar frontier AI nonproliferation regime would govern who may build the most powerful systems, while leaving unaddressed the question of whether anyone should have that option in the first place.

A similar frontier AI nonproliferation regime would govern who may build the most powerful systems, while leaving unaddressed the question of whether anyone should have that option in the first place.

The greatest lesson is for the US

Today, the threat of nuclear war persists. However, nuclear nonproliferation offers us one powerful takeaway: the United States, in particular, has a tremendous role to play in shaping the future of regulating frontier AI. 

“In the nuclear domain specifically, the US historically has had a powerful norm-entrepreneurship function,” Panda told me. “What the United States does when it comes to nuclear weapons does get noticed by other countries and often gets adopted by other countries.”

This has historically involved leadership in transparency, Panda said. “The US, to its credit, is much more transparent than every other nuclear country when it comes to talking about things like command and control and what we do and don’t do.” For example, the US regularly declassifies and publishes data regarding the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, fissile material inventories, and production facilities.

In a similar way, the US could lead the world in transparency about the frontier AI it is pursuing, the limits it might impose on that technology, and the safeguards in place to keep it under control. 

This could take shape in a few ways, beginning with the US government’s own use of AI:

  • Before deploying a powerful and risky AI system, the government could disclose what risks it tested for, the conditions under which the system is considered reliable, its known limitations, and what findings would prevent deployment. 
  • The US could explain which military decisions AI may contribute to and which require human authorization. This might, for example, involve distinguishing intelligence analysis from authority to initiate an attack. The government could also identify military applications of AI that it rules out altogether.
  • The US could publish accounts of failures or unexpected behavior, explaining whether a system was withdrawn, restricted, or retested after something went wrong.

These transparency measures should also extend to the private sector, and the government could require companies to:

  • Disclose dangerous-capability testing: This would involve requiring frontier developers to publish standardized summaries of tests for risks such as assisting cyberattacks, contributing to biological weapons development, or operating autonomously beyond intended limits.
  • Report serious incidents and near misses: Developers and deployers could be required to notify a regulator of significant safety failures, breaches, or unexpected dangerous behavior.
  • Publish the conditions for pausing development or withholding release: Companies could disclose in advance which findings would trigger additional safeguards, delay product launches, or halt further development.

As AI continues to reshape the world we live in, prioritizing transparency around the technology’s achievements — and limits — is one way to ensure that safety and security remain central.

As AI continues to reshape the world we live in, prioritizing transparency around the technology’s achievements — and limits — is one way to ensure that safety and security remain central. Panda suggested that such measures could reassure adversaries that the US is not going to implement frontier AI models in ways that might be dangerous or irresponsible. 

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