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The single market is the EU’s greatest strength

The EU is searching for ways to strengthen its competitiveness with the likes of the United States and China. But one of its greatest advantages is already within reach: a single market of 450 million people. Today, it runs at half its potential. The IMF estimates that barriers inside the single market are equivalent to a tariff of 44 percent on goods. The priority should be to close the gap between the promise of a single market and the reality of doing business across 27 member states.

Mars, Incorporated is a global business that has been operating in Europe for almost a century. We employ more than 30,000 people in the EU; we have 24 factories and more than 450 veterinary clinics. In recent years we have invested more than €1.5 billion in Europe, with another billion coming by the end of this year.

From my vantage point, Europe remains a good place to do business. But running a global business also gives you a clear view of where Europe could do more. In an increasingly competitive global economy, the costs of fragmentation are hard to ignore, and addressing them could help unlock even greater investment across the continent.

Making the single market work as one

Few markets offer the EU’s combination of scale and cross-border access. Yet common rules must work consistently in practice. Take a pouch of Whiskas cat food. Manufactured in the same factory to the same standards, it can require different labels, recycling information and packaging fee arrangements depending on where it is sold.

If the single market is to really work, the principle should be straightforward: one rule, applied once, consistently. An EU law should mean the same thing in Madrid as it does in Warsaw. Greater consistency across member states would make it easier for businesses to expand, innovate and invest further.

From my vantage point, Europe remains a good place to do business. But running a global business also gives you a clear view of where Europe could do more. In an increasingly competitive global economy, the costs of fragmentation are hard to ignore, and addressing them could help unlock even greater investment across the continent.

Varying taxes, packaging requirements, logistics and retail structures also have an impact on consumer pricing. Making the single market work for business can benefit European consumers at the checkout.

Staying open to the world will make Europe stronger

A more effective single market would also strengthen Europe’s position globally. For manufacturers, exporting competitively matters as much as operating efficiently within Europe. Put simply, the better the single market works within the EU, the easier it is for us to export from the EU.

Mars’ European factories supply countries beyond the EU. The conclusion of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement earlier this year was very welcome and supports further efforts to enable European manufacturers to compete globally. Closer to home, this week’s EU-UK summit is an opportunity to make trade easier with our nearest neighbour across the Channel. The United Kingdom is one of our most important trading partners, and many of our products now face checks and paperwork that did not exist before Brexit. A food and veterinary agreement would remove much of that friction, and I hope leaders seize this moment to finalize it.

Predictable, well-designed regulation builds investment confidence

Europe’s high standards of safety, sustainability and consumer protection are its strengths. But delivering them requires clear, workable and predictable regulation.

A more effective single market would also strengthen Europe’s position globally. For manufacturers, exporting competitively matters as much as operating efficiently within Europe. Put simply, the better the single market works within the EU, the easier it is for us to export from the EU.

Packaging illustrates the challenge. Under new EU rules, packaging must be designed for recycling by 2030, yet some technical criteria defining compliance are not expected until 2028. Investment decisions cannot wait until every regulatory detail is settled. Businesses are making choices now about factories, equipment and supply chains that will operate for years.

The goal is rules that achieve their objectives without creating unnecessary uncertainty. Clear, predictable rules strengthen the single market and give businesses the certainty to invest.

Making Europe’s advantage count

Europe does not lack competitive strengths. But fragmentation makes it harder to realize its full potential.

For many years Mars has worked to support more uniform regulation. That work is not finished. Harmonized labeling is one practical starting point. Products manufactured to identical standards should not require multiple packaging versions to circulate across member states, provided consumers receive the information they need.

Europe does not need to invent a new competitive advantage. It needs to make better use of the one it already has. Making the single market work as one is where that effort should begin.

And fixing fragmentation is only half the battle; we must also build smarter regulation from the start. Reporting is a good example. We support transparency, but EU reporting requirements have multiplied in recent years and now place a heavy administrative burden on businesses of all sizes. Patchwork exemptions and higher thresholds bring welcome relief for smaller companies, but they are a patch, not a solution. They do not make the rules themselves any simpler. The lasting fix is to design rules that are simple, efficient and predictable from the outset for all businesses.

Europe should establish clear compliance requirements before major investments are needed, involve industry early and apply common rules consistently. Combined with a commitment to open international trade, these are practical steps toward a more competitive Europe.

Europe does not need to invent a new competitive advantage. It needs to make better use of the one it already has. Making the single market work as one is where that effort should begin.


Marc Carena is global president of Mars Petcare, the +$30 billion pet care division of Mars, Incorporated.


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Crimea bridge destruction will impair Russian supply chains, says Ukraine

KYIV — Ukraine’s destruction of part of the Kerch Bridge linking Russia to Crimea was the result of a carefully planned operation involving Ukrainian weapons, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday.

Zelenskyy described the bridge strike as a response to Russian attacks against Ukrainian bridges that began a month ago.

 “We have repeatedly offered Russia steps toward de-escalation — and every proposal has been met with loud rejection. Russia strikes our infrastructure every day, including bridges in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kyiv, and the Odesa region. We are restoring our infrastructure. But we are also reminding Russia that war will always return to where it began,” Zelenskyy said in a statement.

The Russia-installed governor of Crimea, Sergei Aksenov, confirmed the strike, saying the bridge was closed until further notice, but provided no details of the damage.

Russia launched a bombing campaign against Ukrainian bridges on Oct. 1, choking logistics and causing huge public transport problems. The Russian defense ministry reported hitting Kyiv’s North and South bridges across the Dnipro River, linking the two sides of the Ukrainian capital.

Ukraine said its attack against the $3.7 billion Kerch Bridge is part of its response to the Russian campaign. The road and rail bridge is a key supply line for the 2.5 million people living on the Crimean Peninsula, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014, as well as for Russian forces stationed there.

The road portion has collapsed, and the extent of damage to the parallel rail bridge is uncertain, although the Russian transport ministry said Tuesday that limited traffic will resume on a single railway track. Without the bridge, Russia will have to rely on ferries and overland transport through occupied Ukraine — both routes subject to attack by Kyiv.

“Partial destruction of the bridge affects logistics, supply chains, and the morale and psychological state of the families of Russian military personnel, intelligence officers, and officials,” said Andrii Klymenko, head of the Black Sea and Baltic Strategic Research Monitoring Group.

Zelenskyy said the operation was carefully planned and gave a long list of the missiles and drones used.

“Our warriors gradually destroyed air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other designated targets on the way to the final objective. For this, they used Dovbush, Vendetta, Da Vinci, Sichen, Mich-2000, Ruta, Palianytsia, An-197, FP-1, FP-5 Flamingo, and R-360 Neptune,” the president said.

For the final stage, the Ukrainian army used Palianytsia drones to strike a road section of the bridge, while Neptune missiles, Ruta cruise missiles and FP-5 Flamingo heavy missiles struck the railway section.

“Using Flamingo, our warriors carried out a precision-guided strike — and the communications uplink worked flawlessly until the very last seconds,” Zelenskyy said, thanking Ukrainian weapons manufacturers.

Dutch-Ukrainian defense startup Destinus Group said that its Ruta missiles were used over two consecutive days. “Today, seven RUTA missiles hit the bridge, causing one span to collapse.”

“For years, the Russians convinced the entire world that the Crimean Bridge was one of the most heavily protected structures on the planet. Today, parts of it lie on the seabed,” said the press service of Ukraine’s SBU security agency.

Russian pro-war bloggers confirmed the scale of the attack.

“More than 10 Flamingo cruise missiles hit the target, plus a large number of drones. Given Russia’s air defense problems, the bridge could be ‘crushed’ by sheer numbers, without needing to overpower the defenses,” said the Rybar and Dva Mayora channels.

Russian officials downplayed the attack, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov saying the bridge would be rebuilt even better than it was before.

Russia-installed Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev said: “Supplies of food, fuel, diesel and other necessary goods continue. The bridge was not used for the delivery of goods that much, so the incident did not affect the supply of the city. Deliveries continue as usual.”

He said the bridge is largely used by private cars and buses. “Now the main task is to work out alternative logistical solutions for people who need to return home or continue their journey,” Razvozhaev said, asking people not to travel to Crimea until the authorities announce alternative routes.

Since Oct. 10, Ukrainian forces have targeted six other bridges near Crimea, creating growing problems for Russian logistics.

“The problem of destabilizing the rear in Crimea — and the entire southern grouping of forces— will only intensify if the railway section of the bridge is destroyed or significantly damaged, as this route is the most efficient one,” said Klymenko.

Disabling the bridge could make it more difficult for Russian forces to attack Odesa, Kherson and other regions along the Black Sea, said Ukrainian navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk.

“With the bridge damaged and land routes to Crimea under Ukrainian operational control, it would now be significantly harder to deliver those drones Russia sends to Ukraine from the peninsula,” he said.

This article has been updated.

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Accelerating the EU’s electric heavy-duty vehicle transition

The EU’s transition to electric trucks, buses and coaches depends on many enabling conditions, from affordable vehicles and electricity to sufficient grid capacity and accessible charging infrastructure. But when it comes to charging, the EU needs to think beyond public stations along motorways.

Raluca Marian, general delegate of the permanent delegation to the EU, IRU

For transport operators investing in electrification, charging is an integral part of the business case. Having control over where, when and at what cost vehicles recharge is essential to managing operations and making electric vehicles economically viable.

This is why depot charging deserves much greater attention in the EU’s infrastructure strategy — and why enabling operators to share charging facilities could help make every investment go further.

Charging where vehicles already stop

Public charging along major transport corridors is indispensable, particularly for long-distance operations. But trucks also spend hours loading and unloading; buses return to operating bases; and coaches park in cities and tourist destinations, often far from home.

For many operators, depot charging will be the backbone of their transition.

Charging where vehicles are already stationary can save time, reduce disruption and improve the business case for electric vehicles. For many operators, depot charging will be the backbone of their transition.

Yet high upfront costs, slow permitting and delays in grid connections can hold investment back. Depot charging must therefore feature prominently in national infrastructure, energy and grid plans, backed by practical measures to accelerate connections and support investment.

Making every charger serve further

Imagine a logistics company with spare charging capacity at its depot. A subcontractor needs to recharge an electric truck. Or consider a coach arriving in a city hundreds of kilometres from its home base, where another operator or passenger terminal has a charger available.

Why should each business need to build its own infrastructure when sharing can sometimes work for both?

This is the promise of semi-private charging: operators voluntarily making chargers available to other businesses under agreed conditions, while retaining control over access, security and their own operational priorities.

This opportunity is especially important for smaller operators, which often have less capital, fewer suitable premises and more difficulty financing charging infrastructure.

Such arrangements already exist in parts of the EU. A clear consistent EU framework could help them spread, improving returns for infrastructure owners and giving more operators practical access to charging.

Making the transition work for smaller businesses

This opportunity is especially important for smaller operators, which often have less capital, fewer suitable premises and more difficulty financing charging infrastructure.

The 2026 IRU Green Compact survey highlights the divide: in Western Europe, 47 percent of respondents with fleets of 21 or more vehicles plan to invest in electric heavy-duty vehicles within five years, compared with just 22 percent of those with 20 or fewer.

Sharing chargers will not solve every challenge, but it can lower one important barrier. It can also help coach operators charge away from their home bases, including at destinations where suitable public facilities are scarce.

The EU’s decarbonization ambitions will only succeed if the transition is operationally feasible and economically viable for businesses of every size.

Enabling investment, not imposing obligations

Sharing should be simple. Yet depot owners may face uncertainty about whether giving another operator access makes them a public charging provider or electricity supplier, and which rules apply.

A depot allowing pre-arranged access is not the same as a public charging station. EU legislation should recognize that distinction, without forcing private businesses to open their premises.

The forthcoming review of the EU Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation offers a timely opportunity to define semi-private charging and establish clear, proportionate rules. It should also ensure that qualifying shared infrastructure can be recognized in relevant funding frameworks and, where appropriate, infrastructure planning.

A complete charging ecosystem

Public, private and semi-private charging are not competing models. They serve different needs, and the EU needs all three.

The goal is a network designed around the realities of freight and passenger transport: reliable corridors, well-connected depots and accessible charging at destinations.

The EU certainly needs to build more chargers. But it should also help businesses use existing and planned infrastructure more effectively.

Making every charging investment go further is good for operators, good for competitiveness and good for the EU’s climate ambitions.


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Cut off from Europe, Russia will have to rewire its Arctic gas trade

An EU ban on Russian liquefied natural gas imports starting Jan. 1, 2027 will force Moscow to find new buyers for exports from Yamal, its flagship Arctic project, and new ways to ship the gas.

Yamal’s LNG, gas that is cooled into a liquid so it can travel by ship, goes west through the Kara and Barents seas, around northern Norway and into European waters. Between January and October 2026, 81% of Yamal’s recorded deliveries were destined for Europe as companies scrambled to get ahead of the upcoming ban, according to new analysis by the NGO Urgewald. It estimates Europe’s bill for that period at €8.7 billion, already above its estimate of €7.2 billion for all of 2025.

The ban will end the long-term contracts that still tie Yamal to Europe. Russia will have to redirect the gas, most likely to buyers in Asia, and reorganize the shipping network to reach them. Longer voyages mean higher costs and fewer trips per tanker each year because of the distance.

The LNG trade “is going to look completely different,” said Malte Humpert, senior fellow and founder of the think tank Arctic Institute. The ban gives Moscow “a bigger incentive” to find another route, he said. “It’s not easy. It’s not cheap. It’s very slow,” but Russia will “figure it out.”

From black markets to new ports

An increase in black market LNG trade could be one way out. A classic shadow fleet has not been needed so far, since Yamal is not under sanctions, said Sebastian Rötters, sanctions campaigner at Urgewald.

Nor is a shadow fleet well suited to the job. They typically use old, unregistered oil tankers that can easily disguise their movements. On the other hand, there are fewer LNG carriers globally and they follow a limited number of routes, making them easier to track, said Martin Vladimirov, a senior analyst at the Center for the Study of Democracy, a think tank that follows EU sanctions policy.

Bovanenkovo gas field on the Yamal peninsula in the Arctic circle on May 21, 2019. | Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images

One possible workaround is a “virtual swap.” Russia could sell more gas to countries such as Turkey or China, which could then sell more of their own or other countries’ gas to Europe. That would preserve Russia’s income even as its LNG is barred from European ports, Vladimirov said.

But even if Moscow finds buyers, it still has to get the LNG to them. That means Russian ships unable to access Europe will need to rebuild their logistics chains to sail farther or transfer their cargoes to other ships elsewhere before sailing on to alternative markets.

Either way, officials are already gearing up to confront the anticipated increase in black market activity. The matter requires “more attention on the European level,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Lukas Savickas, whose government will helm the EU’s six-month rotating presidency from January.

That means a holistic approach that steps up monitoring of interconnection points, pipelines and ports across the EU rather than focusing on individual ships or companies, he said.

How far the ships have to go will be determined by who is willing to buy. If China, South Korea or Japan are the only buyers, “they have to go really far,” Humpert said, but if Moscow can sell part of the gas to Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan or Vietnam, they wouldn’t have to.

“Imagine the gas station you’ve been driving to for the last seven years, suddenly the gas station is three or four times as far away,” Humpert said. Yamal sits on Siberia’s Arctic coast. Europe was Yamal’s nearest major market, a voyage of about six to 10 days, compared with Asia, which takes much longer to reach.

East vs. West

Russia has two main ways to get Yamal’s gas to Asian buyers.

One is to sail east through Arctic waters on the Northern Sea Route. But Russia has only 15 specialized tankers capable of navigating the route in winter. They are costly to operate, so most have been used for short trips to Europe, where they can unload and return quickly, Rötters said.

Vladimir Panov, head of the Arctic Directorate at Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, said last month it plans to send the gas east year-round, with help from a new nuclear icebreaker expected in early 2027. That will be easier said than done. Only 11 ships have made that eastward winter trip since 2018, and some returned with hull and propeller damage.

Repairs are another problem. Ships damaged in the ice can no longer be fixed in EU yards. Europe is currently the specialist in repairing icebreakers. China’s repair capacity is limited, Rötters said. The tanker Alexey Kosygin, for example, has spent an unusually long time in a Chinese shipyard after being damaged.

The other option is to sail west first. Because Russian ships cannot stop in Europe, they could transfer the gas near Murmansk from the specialized tankers to conventional carriers, which would then take it to Asia. Russia has bought an estimated 20 to 25 second-hand conventional ships for this purpose over the past year or two, Humpert said.

The shorter way to Asia would run through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, but Russian LNG carriers have largely avoided it since March, when the Arctic Metagaz, which was carrying gas from Russia’s sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project, was attacked off Malta. No Russian gas has passed through the Mediterranean since, Rötters said. That leaves a route around Africa, which takes 35 to 40 days one way.

Ripple effects

That’s not to say Moscow is without options, thanks mainly to non-European companies, said Humpert, of the Arctic Institute. Novatek, the company behind Yamal, acquired two medium-ice-class vessels from a Japanese company a month ago. “I would never bet against Novatek,” he said, adding that Moscow could restore most of its Yamal LNG exports within a year or two.

The wreck of Russian liquified natural gas carrier Arctic Metagaz adrift between Malta and Lampedusa is seen in this aerial photo taken on March 15, 2026. | Miguela Xuereb/Newsbook Malta/AFP via Getty Images

Each winter voyage also gives Russia more experience navigating the frozen Arctic, Humpert said. These winter routes differ sharply from the summer routes Brussels is focused on, and Russia is currently the only country able to sail the former. What Moscow learns about ice, ships and logistics under the ban could benefit it in the future.

All this will unfold in a region the EU’s new Arctic Strategy casts as a vital part of its future trade, economic and security policy.

The effects of the ban extend well beyond Russia. At a time when the Iran war has already tightened supply, Europe will have to buy LNG elsewhere, “and most likely that LNG will be more expensive,” Humpert said. Urgewald says the benchmark price rose to €86.79 per megawatt-hour in October, up from €75.34 in September and €35 in January. Rötters said those higher prices help Moscow cover part of the cost of the longer routes.

European ports like Belgium’s Zeebrugge terminal, the largest EU destination for Yamal gas this year, will also feel the loss of that supply.

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