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EU-UK summit — live updates

Andy Burnham heads to Brussels Friday for his first formal summit with the European Union as British prime minister.

More than a decade after the U.K. voted for Brexit, the two sides are hoping to move a little closer, eying deals on food and drink rules, emissions trading and a youth mobility scheme. London and Brussels are also seeking agreement on the thornier question of reduced tuition fees for European students in the U.K.

The long-in-the-works summit comes as Burnham eyes a wider reset in Britain’s relationship with the bloc in the coming years. POLITICO’s team on the ground will be poring over Friday’s deals, parsing leaders’ words, and asking what comes next in the post-Brexit rapprochement.

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Crimea bridge destruction will impair Russian supply chains, says Ukraine

KYIV — Ukraine’s destruction of part of the Kerch Bridge linking Russia to Crimea was the result of a carefully planned operation involving Ukrainian weapons, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday.

Zelenskyy described the bridge strike as a response to Russian attacks against Ukrainian bridges that began a month ago.

 “We have repeatedly offered Russia steps toward de-escalation — and every proposal has been met with loud rejection. Russia strikes our infrastructure every day, including bridges in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kyiv, and the Odesa region. We are restoring our infrastructure. But we are also reminding Russia that war will always return to where it began,” Zelenskyy said in a statement.

The Russia-installed governor of Crimea, Sergei Aksenov, confirmed the strike, saying the bridge was closed until further notice, but provided no details of the damage.

Russia launched a bombing campaign against Ukrainian bridges on Oct. 1, choking logistics and causing huge public transport problems. The Russian defense ministry reported hitting Kyiv’s North and South bridges across the Dnipro River, linking the two sides of the Ukrainian capital.

Ukraine said its attack against the $3.7 billion Kerch Bridge is part of its response to the Russian campaign. The road and rail bridge is a key supply line for the 2.5 million people living on the Crimean Peninsula, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014, as well as for Russian forces stationed there.

The road portion has collapsed, and the extent of damage to the parallel rail bridge is uncertain, although the Russian transport ministry said Tuesday that limited traffic will resume on a single railway track. Without the bridge, Russia will have to rely on ferries and overland transport through occupied Ukraine — both routes subject to attack by Kyiv.

“Partial destruction of the bridge affects logistics, supply chains, and the morale and psychological state of the families of Russian military personnel, intelligence officers, and officials,” said Andrii Klymenko, head of the Black Sea and Baltic Strategic Research Monitoring Group.

Zelenskyy said the operation was carefully planned and gave a long list of the missiles and drones used.

“Our warriors gradually destroyed air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other designated targets on the way to the final objective. For this, they used Dovbush, Vendetta, Da Vinci, Sichen, Mich-2000, Ruta, Palianytsia, An-197, FP-1, FP-5 Flamingo, and R-360 Neptune,” the president said.

For the final stage, the Ukrainian army used Palianytsia drones to strike a road section of the bridge, while Neptune missiles, Ruta cruise missiles and FP-5 Flamingo heavy missiles struck the railway section.

“Using Flamingo, our warriors carried out a precision-guided strike — and the communications uplink worked flawlessly until the very last seconds,” Zelenskyy said, thanking Ukrainian weapons manufacturers.

Dutch-Ukrainian defense startup Destinus Group said that its Ruta missiles were used over two consecutive days. “Today, seven RUTA missiles hit the bridge, causing one span to collapse.”

“For years, the Russians convinced the entire world that the Crimean Bridge was one of the most heavily protected structures on the planet. Today, parts of it lie on the seabed,” said the press service of Ukraine’s SBU security agency.

Russian pro-war bloggers confirmed the scale of the attack.

“More than 10 Flamingo cruise missiles hit the target, plus a large number of drones. Given Russia’s air defense problems, the bridge could be ‘crushed’ by sheer numbers, without needing to overpower the defenses,” said the Rybar and Dva Mayora channels.

Russian officials downplayed the attack, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov saying the bridge would be rebuilt even better than it was before.

Russia-installed Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev said: “Supplies of food, fuel, diesel and other necessary goods continue. The bridge was not used for the delivery of goods that much, so the incident did not affect the supply of the city. Deliveries continue as usual.”

He said the bridge is largely used by private cars and buses. “Now the main task is to work out alternative logistical solutions for people who need to return home or continue their journey,” Razvozhaev said, asking people not to travel to Crimea until the authorities announce alternative routes.

Since Oct. 10, Ukrainian forces have targeted six other bridges near Crimea, creating growing problems for Russian logistics.

“The problem of destabilizing the rear in Crimea — and the entire southern grouping of forces— will only intensify if the railway section of the bridge is destroyed or significantly damaged, as this route is the most efficient one,” said Klymenko.

Disabling the bridge could make it more difficult for Russian forces to attack Odesa, Kherson and other regions along the Black Sea, said Ukrainian navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk.

“With the bridge damaged and land routes to Crimea under Ukrainian operational control, it would now be significantly harder to deliver those drones Russia sends to Ukraine from the peninsula,” he said.

This article has been updated.

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What Britain and the EU still don’t understand about each other

LONDON — They spent years locked in talks over Brexit — but Britain and the EU still sometimes manage to talk past each other.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham heads to Brussels for a much-hyped summit this Friday after promising a “new approach” to dealing with the European Union. “Not adversarial. No longer burning bridges. But being constructive and positive,” Burnham told an audience in the City of London Monday night.

He’s already talked up a major revival of ties with the bloc — and even opened the door to British return to the EU, a decade after the U.K. public voted to leave.

Yet there remain a host of things the two political bubbles still get fundamentally wrong about each other. POLITICO spoke to officials and experts on both sides to gauge the dynamic shaping Fridays’ “reset” summit — and beyond.

Brussels isn’t thinking about the UK all the time

Seven or eight years ago, Brexit was front-page news on both sides of the Channel. Now? Not so much.

Policymakers in Brussels are grappling with the same thorny challenges that keep their counterparts in London up at night. Whether that’s Donald Trump, AI, climate change, or Chinese industrial capacity depends on what day of the week it is.

“Less than 1 percent of my work is about the U.K.,” said an EU diplomat, granted anonymity like others in this article to discuss the relationship frankly. “A lot less, actually!”

It’s important not to overstate this. EU officials point out that when called upon to engage with London, they have done so happily.

There are entire teams of people in Brussels whose job it is to negotiate with the U.K. But there are also entire teams of people whose job it is to negotiate with the Philippines.

Britain is still an important ally of the EU — hence Friday’s dedicated summit to hash out the finer points of the post-Brexit relationship.

The door’s always open for more, but the bloc isn’t sitting by the phone waiting for a U.K. call.

London’s budget is pretty tight

As an EU member country, the U.K. was a big net contributor to the bloc’s budget. But it doesn’t exactly have cash to burn these days.

“We need more money” was Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’ pithy response last month when asked whether Britain could rejoin the bloc.

Since the global financial crisis, the U.K. public finances have been in a perpetually strained state. And the fraught politics of spending in Britain are not always understood abroad.

As a result, EU negotiators have repeatedly misjudged their U.K. counterparts’ willingness to write checks for things.

This led to a major failure of negotiations last year when talks on Britain joining the EU’s SAFE rearmament scheme unexpectedly collapsed over the question of money.

“A lot of people think that was a huge screw-up,” a second EU diplomat said. Both sides had very different expectations about what a British financial contribution might look like.

It’s also made things tricky in the run-up to this week’s summit. London has resisted a request to cut tuition fees for EU citizens studying in the U.K. on the basis that it would have to make up its universities’ budgets elsewhere.

The European Commission isn’t all-powerful

In 1988, Margaret Thatcher famously railed against a “European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” For some Brits decades later, leaving the EU was a rebellion against a controlling Brussels bureaucracy.

But sometimes, seeing the European Commission as the EU’s central antagonist can make it difficult to understand where the power really lies. “The Commission calls the shots with third countries — until it doesn’t,” said David Henig, U.K. director at think tank the European Centre for International Political Economy.

Henig said member countries tend to take charge “at the start and end of the negotiating process” — when they’re writing the Commission’s mandate, and then approving the final agreement. “We’re now at that latter point, when the dynamics change,” he said of the current EU-U.K. reset talks.

The European Commission has a lot of responsibility and often has freedom of action. But if EU member countries want something, they tend to get it.

Last week saw an obvious case in point: a compromise position on tuition fees was thrashed out by pragmatic EU officials, only for this to be toughened-up by member state ambassadors.

It’s a dynamic that may have left some British observers scratching their heads — but it’s worth London getting used to it. Member countries will also be the ultimate arbiter should the U.K. eventually apply to rejoin the EU — even if the Commission would directly handle negotiations.

Young people aren’t such a priority in Westminster

When the EU first proposed a post-Brexit youth experience scheme — allowing young people to move between the U.K. and EU for limited time periods — back in 2024, both Labour and the Conservative dismissed the idea out of hand.

Asked to choose between opportunities for young people and potentially angering euro-skeptic voters concerned about migration, for many in Westminster the answer was just common sense.

When it became clear that setting up the scheme was a red line for Brussels, the reaction turned to one of puzzlement. Off-the-record, some British politicians and aides seemed genuinely perplexed: why would they care so much about this issue?

“The U.K. only saw a youth mobility scheme as an EU ask because nobody was listening to young people,” Maurizio Cuttin, a board member at Youth Council UK, argued. “I remember officials telling me we didn’t need Erasmus+ or a youth mobility scheme.”

For the EU, opening up opportunities for young people was a worthy objective in itself — but also had concrete advantages. It would maintain what officials euphemistically call “people-to-people contact” with post-Brexit Britain.

The people staffing the EU institutions have themselves usually worked or studied abroad and see it as a force for soft power. That’s an argument less commonly heard in Westminster.

Both sides remain traumatized by Brexit

Here’s one point of agreement at least — both sides have scars on their back from the fraught Brexit process.

“There’s a lot of traumatized people from Brexit here in the European Union,” EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas said earlier this month.

She’s not the first to say it: Brexit as trauma has very much become a meme in Brussels. Partly it was a sheer political shock. But partly it was about having one topic dominate the political conversation for several years — to the exclusion of others.

EU responses to any British overtures for a closer relationship should be read with Kallas’ summation in mind.

Yet while Brits might not frame it quite the same way, it’s something both capitals have in common.

For years, British politicians have stooped to avoid reopening the fundamental issue of Europe — even in the face of evidence it might be economically advantageous to do so.

That’s something Burnham — Britain’s seventh prime minister since the Brexit vote — has set out to change.

Pulling the U.K. out of its post-Brexit crouch will require convincing a bruised Brussels to trust again — and a weary electorate that reopening old wounds is worth the discomfort.

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Accelerating the EU’s electric heavy-duty vehicle transition

The EU’s transition to electric trucks, buses and coaches depends on many enabling conditions, from affordable vehicles and electricity to sufficient grid capacity and accessible charging infrastructure. But when it comes to charging, the EU needs to think beyond public stations along motorways.

Raluca Marian, general delegate of the permanent delegation to the EU, IRU

For transport operators investing in electrification, charging is an integral part of the business case. Having control over where, when and at what cost vehicles recharge is essential to managing operations and making electric vehicles economically viable.

This is why depot charging deserves much greater attention in the EU’s infrastructure strategy — and why enabling operators to share charging facilities could help make every investment go further.

Charging where vehicles already stop

Public charging along major transport corridors is indispensable, particularly for long-distance operations. But trucks also spend hours loading and unloading; buses return to operating bases; and coaches park in cities and tourist destinations, often far from home.

For many operators, depot charging will be the backbone of their transition.

Charging where vehicles are already stationary can save time, reduce disruption and improve the business case for electric vehicles. For many operators, depot charging will be the backbone of their transition.

Yet high upfront costs, slow permitting and delays in grid connections can hold investment back. Depot charging must therefore feature prominently in national infrastructure, energy and grid plans, backed by practical measures to accelerate connections and support investment.

Making every charger serve further

Imagine a logistics company with spare charging capacity at its depot. A subcontractor needs to recharge an electric truck. Or consider a coach arriving in a city hundreds of kilometres from its home base, where another operator or passenger terminal has a charger available.

Why should each business need to build its own infrastructure when sharing can sometimes work for both?

This is the promise of semi-private charging: operators voluntarily making chargers available to other businesses under agreed conditions, while retaining control over access, security and their own operational priorities.

This opportunity is especially important for smaller operators, which often have less capital, fewer suitable premises and more difficulty financing charging infrastructure.

Such arrangements already exist in parts of the EU. A clear consistent EU framework could help them spread, improving returns for infrastructure owners and giving more operators practical access to charging.

Making the transition work for smaller businesses

This opportunity is especially important for smaller operators, which often have less capital, fewer suitable premises and more difficulty financing charging infrastructure.

The 2026 IRU Green Compact survey highlights the divide: in Western Europe, 47 percent of respondents with fleets of 21 or more vehicles plan to invest in electric heavy-duty vehicles within five years, compared with just 22 percent of those with 20 or fewer.

Sharing chargers will not solve every challenge, but it can lower one important barrier. It can also help coach operators charge away from their home bases, including at destinations where suitable public facilities are scarce.

The EU’s decarbonization ambitions will only succeed if the transition is operationally feasible and economically viable for businesses of every size.

Enabling investment, not imposing obligations

Sharing should be simple. Yet depot owners may face uncertainty about whether giving another operator access makes them a public charging provider or electricity supplier, and which rules apply.

A depot allowing pre-arranged access is not the same as a public charging station. EU legislation should recognize that distinction, without forcing private businesses to open their premises.

The forthcoming review of the EU Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation offers a timely opportunity to define semi-private charging and establish clear, proportionate rules. It should also ensure that qualifying shared infrastructure can be recognized in relevant funding frameworks and, where appropriate, infrastructure planning.

A complete charging ecosystem

Public, private and semi-private charging are not competing models. They serve different needs, and the EU needs all three.

The goal is a network designed around the realities of freight and passenger transport: reliable corridors, well-connected depots and accessible charging at destinations.

The EU certainly needs to build more chargers. But it should also help businesses use existing and planned infrastructure more effectively.

Making every charging investment go further is good for operators, good for competitiveness and good for the EU’s climate ambitions.


Disclaimer

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  • The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union.
  • The advertisement relates to EU transport and charging infrastructure policy and advocates for greater support for depot and shared charging, including clearer EU rules, infrastructure planning and funding for semi-private charging.

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Cut off from Europe, Russia will have to rewire its Arctic gas trade

An EU ban on Russian liquefied natural gas imports starting Jan. 1, 2027 will force Moscow to find new buyers for exports from Yamal, its flagship Arctic project, and new ways to ship the gas.

Yamal’s LNG, gas that is cooled into a liquid so it can travel by ship, goes west through the Kara and Barents seas, around northern Norway and into European waters. Between January and October 2026, 81% of Yamal’s recorded deliveries were destined for Europe as companies scrambled to get ahead of the upcoming ban, according to new analysis by the NGO Urgewald. It estimates Europe’s bill for that period at €8.7 billion, already above its estimate of €7.2 billion for all of 2025.

The ban will end the long-term contracts that still tie Yamal to Europe. Russia will have to redirect the gas, most likely to buyers in Asia, and reorganize the shipping network to reach them. Longer voyages mean higher costs and fewer trips per tanker each year because of the distance.

The LNG trade “is going to look completely different,” said Malte Humpert, senior fellow and founder of the think tank Arctic Institute. The ban gives Moscow “a bigger incentive” to find another route, he said. “It’s not easy. It’s not cheap. It’s very slow,” but Russia will “figure it out.”

From black markets to new ports

An increase in black market LNG trade could be one way out. A classic shadow fleet has not been needed so far, since Yamal is not under sanctions, said Sebastian Rötters, sanctions campaigner at Urgewald.

Nor is a shadow fleet well suited to the job. They typically use old, unregistered oil tankers that can easily disguise their movements. On the other hand, there are fewer LNG carriers globally and they follow a limited number of routes, making them easier to track, said Martin Vladimirov, a senior analyst at the Center for the Study of Democracy, a think tank that follows EU sanctions policy.

Bovanenkovo gas field on the Yamal peninsula in the Arctic circle on May 21, 2019. | Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images

One possible workaround is a “virtual swap.” Russia could sell more gas to countries such as Turkey or China, which could then sell more of their own or other countries’ gas to Europe. That would preserve Russia’s income even as its LNG is barred from European ports, Vladimirov said.

But even if Moscow finds buyers, it still has to get the LNG to them. That means Russian ships unable to access Europe will need to rebuild their logistics chains to sail farther or transfer their cargoes to other ships elsewhere before sailing on to alternative markets.

Either way, officials are already gearing up to confront the anticipated increase in black market activity. The matter requires “more attention on the European level,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Lukas Savickas, whose government will helm the EU’s six-month rotating presidency from January.

That means a holistic approach that steps up monitoring of interconnection points, pipelines and ports across the EU rather than focusing on individual ships or companies, he said.

How far the ships have to go will be determined by who is willing to buy. If China, South Korea or Japan are the only buyers, “they have to go really far,” Humpert said, but if Moscow can sell part of the gas to Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan or Vietnam, they wouldn’t have to.

“Imagine the gas station you’ve been driving to for the last seven years, suddenly the gas station is three or four times as far away,” Humpert said. Yamal sits on Siberia’s Arctic coast. Europe was Yamal’s nearest major market, a voyage of about six to 10 days, compared with Asia, which takes much longer to reach.

East vs. West

Russia has two main ways to get Yamal’s gas to Asian buyers.

One is to sail east through Arctic waters on the Northern Sea Route. But Russia has only 15 specialized tankers capable of navigating the route in winter. They are costly to operate, so most have been used for short trips to Europe, where they can unload and return quickly, Rötters said.

Vladimir Panov, head of the Arctic Directorate at Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, said last month it plans to send the gas east year-round, with help from a new nuclear icebreaker expected in early 2027. That will be easier said than done. Only 11 ships have made that eastward winter trip since 2018, and some returned with hull and propeller damage.

Repairs are another problem. Ships damaged in the ice can no longer be fixed in EU yards. Europe is currently the specialist in repairing icebreakers. China’s repair capacity is limited, Rötters said. The tanker Alexey Kosygin, for example, has spent an unusually long time in a Chinese shipyard after being damaged.

The other option is to sail west first. Because Russian ships cannot stop in Europe, they could transfer the gas near Murmansk from the specialized tankers to conventional carriers, which would then take it to Asia. Russia has bought an estimated 20 to 25 second-hand conventional ships for this purpose over the past year or two, Humpert said.

The shorter way to Asia would run through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, but Russian LNG carriers have largely avoided it since March, when the Arctic Metagaz, which was carrying gas from Russia’s sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project, was attacked off Malta. No Russian gas has passed through the Mediterranean since, Rötters said. That leaves a route around Africa, which takes 35 to 40 days one way.

Ripple effects

That’s not to say Moscow is without options, thanks mainly to non-European companies, said Humpert, of the Arctic Institute. Novatek, the company behind Yamal, acquired two medium-ice-class vessels from a Japanese company a month ago. “I would never bet against Novatek,” he said, adding that Moscow could restore most of its Yamal LNG exports within a year or two.

The wreck of Russian liquified natural gas carrier Arctic Metagaz adrift between Malta and Lampedusa is seen in this aerial photo taken on March 15, 2026. | Miguela Xuereb/Newsbook Malta/AFP via Getty Images

Each winter voyage also gives Russia more experience navigating the frozen Arctic, Humpert said. These winter routes differ sharply from the summer routes Brussels is focused on, and Russia is currently the only country able to sail the former. What Moscow learns about ice, ships and logistics under the ban could benefit it in the future.

All this will unfold in a region the EU’s new Arctic Strategy casts as a vital part of its future trade, economic and security policy.

The effects of the ban extend well beyond Russia. At a time when the Iran war has already tightened supply, Europe will have to buy LNG elsewhere, “and most likely that LNG will be more expensive,” Humpert said. Urgewald says the benchmark price rose to €86.79 per megawatt-hour in October, up from €75.34 in September and €35 in January. Rötters said those higher prices help Moscow cover part of the cost of the longer routes.

European ports like Belgium’s Zeebrugge terminal, the largest EU destination for Yamal gas this year, will also feel the loss of that supply.

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Burnham to discuss ‘problem’ Chinese imports in final days of Brexit reset talks

DUBLIN, Ireland — Britain shares Europe’s Chinese import problem, Andy Burnham said Thursday, as he pushes for Britain to be included in the bloc’s Made in Europe rules in the final run-up to Brexit reset talks. 

The British prime minister argued that Britain and the EU should work together to tackle the challenge posed by China — making the case for U.K. manufacturers to benefit from the bloc’s plans to give European industry preferential treatment.

“On Made in Europe, Europe’s issue is Britain’s issue, which is obviously, particularly imports from China, causing the problem,” Burnham told reporters on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Dublin.

His words come after Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds and Brexit Minister Hamish Falconer traveled to Brussels earlier this week to press for assurances that Britain will be included in the incoming legislation — which risks shutting U.K. manufacturers out of key European supply chains.

Burnham held a series of meetings with European leaders, many for the first time, on Thursday as he sought to build support for a closer relationship with the bloc.

“We’ve had a good day but we’ve got a big week ahead of us,” Burnham said. “You know, the deal is not done. There’ll be some long nights ahead in the next seven days.”

The prime minister met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. After their bilateral, he said Britain is serious about delivering on its commitment to closer ties — but that the next move is up to Brussels.

“We are, you know, very serious about honoring the manifesto which said deeper ties, and I’m delivering on that. But we have to see what Europe says in response to that.”

Next week’s summit is expected to cover a new agri-food agreement, linking the U.K. and EU emissions trading systems, and a youth mobility scheme.

But significant hurdles remain, including the terms of any youth mobility deal, Britain’s access to the EU’s Made in Europe initiative and a potential reduction in tuition fees for EU students studying at U.K. universities.

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EU court rejects Poland’s bid to overturn 7 major climate laws

Poland failed to overturn seven major European Union climate laws Thursday, with the bloc’s top court rejecting challenges to measures including the 2035 target for zero-emission cars and carbon pricing for heating and transport.

The rulings by the Court of Justice of the EU uphold key parts of the EU’s Green Deal and bring to a close a legal campaign launched by Poland’s previous nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) government. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-EU administration kept the campaign alive by deciding not to withdraw the lawsuits.

Poland argued that the laws would fundamentally reshape its coal-dependent energy system and therefore required unanimous approval by EU governments, effectively giving Poland a veto.

The court rejected that argument, ruling that the measures could be adopted by a qualified majority of member countries. The judges also dismissed challenges to the bloc’s carbon border tax, energy efficiency rules and national emissions reduction targets.

Six lawsuits were filed in July and August 2023, while PiS was in power. The seventh was lodged on Dec. 14, a day after Tusk took office with a promise to repair Warsaw’s relations with Brussels. His government reviewed the cases but decided not to withdraw them.

The court’s decisions are final, but Tusk’s Poland is still among the countries pushing to weaken parts of the EU’s climate legislation, including by seeking to delay the new carbon market for heating and transport, known as ETS2.

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Turkey-Greece maritime spat threatens to intrude on EU summit

ATHENS — A controversial maritime border deal between Libya and Turkey has riled Greece, annoyed the European Union — and could intrude on Friday’s EU leaders’ summit.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will raise the issue during the informal meeting of EU leaders in Dublin, according to a senior official in Athens who spoke on condition of being granted anonymity. The summit is supposed to focus on AI and Ukraine.

The row centers on a Turkey-Libya agreement that claims a corridor in the eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus — waters Athens says fall within its exclusive economic zone and where the EU has backed energy and connectivity projects.

“Greece has explicitly stated … that in the event of any escalation, it will request sanctions and support from the European Union,” Greece’s Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis said last week in an interview with local TV.

Despite being NATO allies, Greece and Turkey have quarreled over maritime boundaries and overlapping claims to their continental shelves. Athens fears Ankara could invoke the Libya deal to challenge offshore exploration south of Crete and the EU-funded undersea electricity cable linking Greece and Cyprus, turning both projects into flashpoints.

Turkey signed the agreement in 2019 with Libya’s U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, and it was unanimously ratified by rival authorities in eastern Libya on Oct. 20.

The EU immediately responded.

“This agreement infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, it does not comply with the Law of the Sea, and is null and void,” said a joint statement on Oct. 20 from the heads of the European Commission and Council.

Egypt also rejected the border pact, as did Bahrain, Cyprus (which has its own separate disputes with Turkey over Ankara’s occupation of the northern part of the island since the 1970s), Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Turkish foreign ministry accused Brussels of adopting what it called the “maximalist and illegal” positions of Greece and Cyprus that were “detached from reality.”

“We expect them to respect the joint will of our country and Libya,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said during a recent Cabinet meeting.

Mitsotakis raised the issue at last month’s U.N. General Assembly, and Athens is now pressing the rest of the EU for stronger action.

“There is no precedent for such a diagonal delimitation,” he said in New York, holding up a map to illustrate Greece’s position. “Geography cannot be rewritten … and sovereign rights cannot be erased by drawing arbitrary lines on a map.”

The underwater border demarcation is part of a broader Turkish policy of stressing its sovereignty over coastal areas. Ankara aims to codify what it calls its Blue Homeland doctrine by year’s end.

The big test

Greece and Cyprus warn that Turkey’s claims could be used to block strategic projects in the eastern Mediterranean.

The EU’s latest report on Turkey’s stalled EU accession progress specifically referred to Ankara’s continued obstruction of a €1.9 billion electricity interconnection between Greece and Cyprus. The project was interrupted in 2024 amid a standoff between Athens and Ankara.

Three months ago, French company Meridiam became the project’s majority shareholder.

On Tuesday, a French vessel sailed from Heraklion, Greece, to start working on the project. Gerapetritis told a parliamentary committee last week that Athens is bracing for a Turkish reaction.

Tension over the maritime border and the energy project comes as Turkey’s already difficult ties with the EU — from protecting the car industry to Ankara’s role in Black Sea security — come under greater pressure, noted Carnegie Europe Turkey analyst Marc Pierini.

“In the eastern Mediterranean, several divergences over maritime borders have widened the gap between Turkey and EU governments,” wrote Pierini.

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Brussels takes on the evils of online commerce

BRUSSELS — You know that customer-service bot that won’t let you cancel your subscription? The EU wants to kill it.  

With a new law presented Wednesday, the European Commission will take aim at the endless array of practices websites have used over the past 20 years to make more money from consumers.  

The Digital Fairness Act is the European response to a wider regulatory trend that has seen consumer authorities curb irksome and exploitative practices. These include dynamic pricing that changes ticket prices based on demand, cumbersome processes for canceling subscriptions and the near-complete surrender of customer service to automated systems.  

According to a draft of the DFA obtained by POLITICO, the Commission will address several aspects of the design, service and terms under which businesses interact with consumers online. 

“Europe should not accept a digital economy where profits depend on exploiting people’s vulnerabilities,” Spanish socialist lawmaker Laura Ballarín Cereza, a key European lawmaker on tech legislation, said in a statement.

Industry leaders have pushed back on this potential new rulebook ever since the EU executive began considering a revision of consumer law in 2022. They say current consumer protection and digital services laws already cover these practices. “Where existing rules already cover a practice, it should not be regulated or enforced a second time,” said Ben Brake, director general of tech lobby DOT Europe.  

Consumer groups say existing rules, some dating back to 2005, are not clear enough and that many unfair design practices are still rampant.  

The Commission would have the power to impose fines of up to 6% of global annual revenue for companies that violate the new law. Those penalties are similar to fines levied under the Digital Services Act, the EU’s platform rules meant to stop Big Tech platforms from provoking systemic, society-wide harms through everything from election interference to keeping minors away from violent content. The new law instead would apply to any business offering services to EU consumers online. 

Dark patterns

The DFA would ban deceptive design known as “dark patterns,” which manipulate consumers through the use of such tactics as bright-colored buttons placed prominently to get customers to buy something. It also aims to ban personalized pricing that targets vulnerable consumers, including minors.  

The practice of dynamic pricing is also targeted in the law. That’s when a seller adjusts the price based on conditions such as demand or a user’s location, and it is commonly used in the sale of concert and airline tickets. The proposed law requires transparency when customers are buying products whose prices are subject to change.  

The DFA also covers consumer rights around “agentic commerce,” when artificial intelligence agents are used to find and complete purchases. 

Four lawmakers from the conservative, socialist and liberal groups said the requirement doesn’t go far enough and that the DFA should completely ban dynamic pricing for cultural and sporting events, according to a letter obtained by POLITICO. 

Sellers offering subscriptions will have to provide an easy way to cancel, reminiscent of New York State’s “click to cancel” rules. The new EU rules also require that a human is available for after-sales customer support.  

The rules also address, for the first time, specific aspects of online gaming, including bans on video games that allow kids to pay to succeed and progress in the game.  

The DFA is also trying to make its mark on what is known as “addictive design” of online platforms. This has already been the target of enforcement action in Europe and litigation in the U.S. in cases involving minors. But the new consumer rules would apply to adults as well, requiring online platforms to offer an opt-out from addictive features like autoplay.  

Spain’s Ballarín Cereza thinks this is not enough, saying users should be opted out of these features by default. “Why should consumers carry the burden when companies deliberately design these addictive mechanisms? We must shift from consumer responsibility to corporate responsibility: safety and fairness must be the default, not an option,” she said. 

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