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How to watch the UK-EU summit like a pro

BRUSSELS — Andy Burnham has gone big on Britain’s relationship with the EU during the first months of his premiership.

By the weekend, he may actually have something to show for it.

The British prime minister is heading to Brussels on Friday for his first U.K.-EU summit. But on the eve of the meeting, what exactly he’ll be coming back with is still up in the air. 

POLITICO analyzed leaked draft communiqués and spoke to diplomats and officials on both sides of the talks to piece together how the agreements are shaping up — and what’s still to be decided.  

Here’s what you need to know.

Why is this happening? 

The U.K. and EU have committed to holding annual summits to build on the relationship they were left with after Brexit.

This is the second such meeting, and is primarily about concluding negotiations on agreements announced at the first gathering back in May 2025.  

That summit was attended by then-British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. This week’s meeting was originally due to be held in July, but it was postponed after Starmer stepped down — to give Burnham time to put his stamp on the process.

What’s on the table?  

Three new international agreements are set to be announced at the meeting.  

The first is a sanitary and phytosanitary deal that would align British food and drink standards with the EU’s. The aim of the agreement is to remove bureaucracy and to eliminate the need for border checks on food exports, smoothing trade. 

The two sides have also negotiated a deal to link their emissions trading systems. The main benefit would be to exempt U.K. and EU businesses from having to pay new carbon border taxes levied by both sides. It would also provide more liquidity in carbon trading markets.

It still wasn’t clear on Thursday night when the deal will take effect, though. The longer it takes to introduce, the longer firms would be caught between the two competing tax regimes. 

Brussels and London also want to establish a youth experience scheme, which would provide low-cost visas for young people to live and work abroad for a fixed period of time. The U.K. has insisted the system should be subject to a cap on numbers — expected to be around 100,000 after fraught negotiations.

Complications implementing the scheme in some member countries means it isn’t set to take full effect until 2030. This would also mean its full impact on politically-sensitive U.K. migration data won’t register until after the next election, which must be held no later than 2029. 

In addition to these three agreements, the two sides will also publish a “joint statement” outlining their plans for other areas of cooperation. This isn’t a binding international agreement, but a statement of intent, covering areas ranging from migration and defense to cultural exchange, a digital partnership and a health security pact.

On tech, British firms are concerned that they could be shut out of parts of the EU public administration market because of the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) and its new sovereignty requirements. They’ve lobbied hard for reassuring language in talks, both with the negotiators working on the law and with those drafting the joint statement. 

On health, the U.K. and EU are looking to strike a deal to tackle medicine shortages by sharing intelligence on supply disruptions and stockpiles. As Brussels steps up efforts to manage medicine shortages across the bloc, Britain risks being left out of the increasingly joined up system. Closer cooperation could help both sides “avoid procurement battles” for limited stocks and “tit-for-tat export bans, as happened during the pandemic,” said Mark Dayan, Brexit lead at the Nuffield Trust. 

One area the statement will definitely cover is the question of tuition fees. EU countries want European students studying at British universities to qualify for lower domestic fees, as they did before Brexit.  

The U.K. is open to the idea but wants, in turn, assurances its businesses won’t be hit by new EU Made in Europe rules. Brussels says it can’t give those assurances yet, so the statement is likely to include a compromise to delay talks by up to six months. Only then will we find out how much lower tuition fees might get. 

Another key question is whether the implementation of the agri-food, emissions trading and youth mobility deals will be contingent on a successful outcome for tuition fee talks — which some member countries have been pushing for. This will be determined by the wording of the final statement, but the latest version does not make this link explicit. 

What does Burnham want to talk about?  

Since Labour Party conference in September, Burnham has talked up building a closer relationship with the EU — ditching some of the caution that characterized his predecessor’s approach to European relations.  

He may try to use the meeting as an opportunity to sound out EU leaders on where things could go next. 

But grumblings from Burnham’s own Cabinet about his policy shift on Europe could mean he keeps a lot of that under his hat. He’s expected to set out options for a new look-relationship in mid-December.  

In the meantime, the government wants a political win from the deals to be agreed on Friday. In the run-up to the meeting, European Relations Minister Hamish Falconer has been making the argument that the SPS deal will help bring down the cost of living by controlling food inflation. Expect more of that.

There are also topics that Burnham won’t want Brussels to forget — chiefly shielding British industry from Made in Europe protectionism. The EU wants the joint statement to “bind” the U.K. to implementing EU tariffs against Chinese vehicles. But London hasn’t made up its mind and merely wants to commit to guarding against the risk of “circumvention.”

What does the EU want to talk about?  

Equally, there are topics Brussels won’t want London to forget about. EU member countries are very keen on that tuition fees cut, for example. 

But for the EU, building a closer relationship with Britain is mostly about geostrategic aims.

With an uncertain Atlantic alliance and war raging in Europe’s east, the EU wants to build new defense, industrial and security relationships — and the U.K. is the most obvious partner. 

How does the day unfold?  

The summit will kick off at 10 a.m. Brussels time, so 9 a.m. London time.  

How long it goes on for will depend on just how done those deals are by the time Burnham steps off the Eurostar. 

If things go smoothly, officials on both sides are estimating a joint press conference to announce the package and take questions around lunchtime.  

That’ll be attended by Burnham, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and European Council President António Costa.  

But if there’s no sign of a white smoke by around 2 p.m., things may not be going entirely to plan. 

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Why depth beats breadth in Europe’s hunt for an AI edge

​​​An artificial intelligence (AI) system is judged on the job it does, not on how clever it is in general. For European businesses, that is an opening. For example, a pharmaceutical company does not need a model that can discuss biology. It needs one that can flag the rare adverse-event signal in its own trial data. An energy grid operator needs load forecasts built on its own network topology, not generic ones. A defen​s​​​e manufacturer needs a system that can verify a weld against its own specification, and say why it passed or failed. Each needs a system that understands its domain, works on its data, follows its rules and guardrails, and can be trusted to execute in a protected, controlled environment.

An edge Europe can’t buy

That task-specific fit is Europe’s opening to turn its industrial experti​z​​​e into an AI edge, because that edge was never going to come from outspending anyone. US private AI investment reached ​US​$285.9 billion in 2025, more than 23 times the ​US​$12.4 billion invested in China​ ​—​​​ ​though looking at just private investment figures likely understates China’s total AI spending, given its government guidance funds. The ​​Stargate​​ venture plans to invest between ​US​$100 billion and ​US​$500 billion to build advanced AI data centers across the US by 2029. Matching that euro for dollar would be a strategic mistake, and Europe’s grids rule it out regardless: connection queues in major hubs already run seven to ​10​​​ years. None of this means Europe should stop building AI factories. They matter for critical workloads and for a credible European alternative. ​ ​The point is not to scale compute, but to invest smartly in the infrastructure needed to run specialist industrial applications. A factory with nothing to run on is just an expensive data cent​er​​​. The number that matters is not compute deployed, but the number of specialist applications built, the tasks addressed and the vertical industry solutions delivered.

Breadth first, depth next

The same pattern shows up globally in how AI is actually used. Our September 2026 CIO Pulse survey of 300 technology leaders worldwide found that 70​ percent​​​ were using AI for individual productivity: particularly copilots and general-purpose tools adopted across the organi​z​​​ation. Only 37​ percent​​​ were using it to orchestrate processes end-to-end with agents, where AI sits inside a process and solves a real business problem in context, as a specialist. Breadth of adoption is arriving first, and faster​,​ than depth. Depth is harder, because it needs speciali​z​​​ation, context and precision, not just more scale, and that is where Europe can lead.

Sovereignty by design

Another factor in European AI adoption is non-negotiable: sovereignty. In mid-2025, 61​ percent​​​ of the business leaders we surveyed called it a strategic priority. By early 2026 that figure exceeded 80​ percent​​​. The June 2026 suspension of access to two frontier models under US export controls showed how fast the terms of access can change, and how little say any European company had in the decision. Sovereignty itself has layers: where infrastructure sits, where data lives, which models run, and now, above all three, what knowledge those models are grounded in. It has to be designed in from the start. It cannot be bolted on after a system is already live. Being sovereign while staying part of the global technology landscape is Europe’s real competitive advantage. That balance only works through speciali​z​​​ation: the precision to control what matters most while still drawing on the best of what the world builds. This is a wave Europe is well placed to ride.

Specialist AI in practice

AI designed with intention. How Europe can win with Specialist AI | via Accenture

We call this operating logic Specialist AI in our report, AI designed with intention. How Europe can win with Specialist AI: model size, data, deployment location, inference pathway and governance controls matched deliberately to a defined task. Frontier models suit open-ended reasoning, cross-domain synthesis and genuine exceptions, which we estimate account for roughly 10​ ​percent​​​​ of enterprise workloads. Smaller domain-tuned models suit repetitive, high-volume work where latency, cost, auditability or local control matter most. The strongest architecture uses both, deliberately, not by accident.

The point is not to scale compute, but to invest smartly in the infrastructure needed to run specialist industrial applications. A factory with nothing to run on is just an expensive data cent​er​​​.

The European Patent Office​ (EPO)​ shows what this looks like in practice. With Mistral AI, it processes 400,000 pages a day on a one-billion-parameter model fine-tuned on 50,000 patents. The error rate is below 1​ percent​​​, and work that used to take five days now takes minutes. The model runs on the EPO’s own domain data, in a sovereign environment. It is not the biggest model in the world. It is the right one.

Upcoming regulation​,​ including the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act​​​ which was put forward​​​ in June, will likely only reinforce this shift and the opportunity it creates, especially through its multi-layer sovereignty definitions. Companies should start shoring up governance that holds across every layer of the stack now and understand that different parts of the stack carry different types of risk, with kill-switch exposure varying by layer. The future needs sophisticated controls, but it also rewards whoever builds them first.

Turning ​a​​​dvantage into action

Three moves follow for enterprises:

  1. Build demand alongside capacity. Develop the pipeline of industrial applications, from predictive maintenance to mission-critical decision support, while infrastructure is provisioned.
  2. Design for choice. Classify data, workloads and applications to find the right deployment model and governance for each, and keep the ability to change models as the market moves.
  3. Govern the knowledge layer. Set rules for grounding, provenance, evaluation and retention of derived knowledge, and for what any provider may learn from your data.

Policymakers can reinforce the shift. Compute investment should connect to sectoral test facilities and adoption cent​er​​​s, not sit apart from them. Procurement should reward task performance, auditability, energy efficiency and portability, not just scale. Standards should enable interoperability and federation, so every provider adds to a single European fabric of capacity rather than ​27​​​ disconnected ones.

Europe may not lead on AI breadth, but it can lead on AI depth. By combining generations of industrial experti​z​​​e with sovereign, specialist AI, designed for specific tasks and deployed on Europe’s terms, businesses can turn the potential of AI into lasting competitive advantage.

AI Designed with Intention: How Europe Can Win with Specialist AI
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What the EU can learn from Mark Carney on digital sovereignty

At Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered a compelling response to a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry. Middle powers need greater strategic autonomy, he argued, but they cannot secure it by retreating behind their borders.

Instead, they need to build their own capabilities while working more closely with like-minded partners. On technology, he reasoned that countries should cooperate so they are not ultimately forced to choose between “hegemons and hyperscalers.”

At the recent EU-Canada Summit, that philosophy began to translate into policy. Canada and the EU launched an “Alliance for the Future” based on closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation. They also concluded negotiations on a Digital Trade Agreement designed to support a “secure, open and trusted digital environment”​ resilient economic relations​,​ and trusted cross-border data flows.

That principle matters not only for Europe’s new relationship with Canada, but for its approach to other trusted partners.

Sovereignty without isolation

Like Canada, Europe has diagnosed its technology problem correctly. It depends too heavily on a handful of providers for the cloud, computing power, digital infrastructure and ​artificial intelligence (​AI​)​ models underpinning its economy and security.

Reducing those dependencies will require Europe to put its money where its mouth is, including by unlocking more diversified private investment. Mario Draghi estimated that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion of investment each year until 2030. The European Commission, meanwhile, wants to mobili​z​​​e €200 billion for AI and at least triple Europe’s data cent​er​​​ capacity within five to seven years.

Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it.

But Europe’s approach risks moving in the opposite direction. ​ ​It could exclude some of the businesses investing most heavily in the continent and building European capabilities, while favo​ring others that remain dependent on non-European technology.

That is the risk confronting policymakers as they shape the Cloud and AI Development Act. The legislation seeks to influence not only how Europe expands and secures its technological capabilities, but also which companies can take part.

Herein lies the core trade-off.​ ​ Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it. Whether it closes its technology gap will depend partly on its ability to draw on the capital and expertise of experienced, trusted partners.

Look beyond ownership

The debate over digital sovereignty therefore needs to move beyond the simplistic question of ownership or headquarters.

A definition based principally on corporate nationality could exclude trusted companies with decades of investment, infrastructure and employment across Europe. It could also protect nominally European suppliers without necessarily making Europe more secure or resilient.

Effective sovereignty should mean that Europe can keep essential services running during a crisis, protect critical systems and retain a choice of secure, trusted suppliers. Assessments should therefore examine who controls data, encryption, operations, security and continuity.

Corporate nationality is relevant, but it cannot answer these questions on its own. A cloud provider may be EU-owned yet rely on processors, software and security tools developed elsewhere. Another may be headquartered outside the EU but operate European data cent​er​​​s, employ European engineers, place data and encryption keys under European control​,​ and comply with demanding European regulation. Any nationality test alone tells policymakers little about which arrangement provides greater sovereignty.

​​ ​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Nationality should carry the greatest weight where a provider is controlled from a country that presents a recognized security threat, or where the relevant jurisdiction has the capacity and record of exploiting technological dependencies. ​​The strictest restrictions are justified where foreign interference could threaten national security, including defense, law enforcement and the most essential public services.

Countries such as Switzerland, Canada​ ​and the UK should not automatically fall into the same category as recognized security threats. Where the security conditions do not apply, nationality-based restrictions risk becoming protectionist rather than protective.

Instead, Europe should apply three tests for trusted partners and domestic firms alike: whether operational control rests in Europe; whether the service can continue during a crisis; and whether the provider makes a substantial, long-term contribution to Europe’s technological capacity.

​​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Telecoms is a case in point. Regardless of where they are headquartered, operators must keep essential services running through cyberattacks, power failures and supply-chain disruption while protecting the confidentiality of EU data.

A company’s registered address answers none of those operational questions.

Build with trusted partners

This matters beyond the Cloud and AI Development Act. The approach Europe takes to sovereignty could shape policy toward​ ​telecommunications, satellites, semiconductors and other strategic technologies.

Rules that exclude trusted foreign investors primarily on the basis of nationality risk fragmenting the market and deterring some of the capital and experti​se Europe is trying to attract. They could also encourage reciprocal restrictions on European companies operating abroad.

The better approach is the one Carney has begun to articulate: build domestic capability while deepening cooperation with countries that share your security interests and can contribute technology, infrastructure and investment.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers.

The EU’s developing relationship with Canada shows that this is possible. Its new Alliance for the Future explicitly combines closer economic integration with technological cooperation, security and resilience, while the Digital Trade Agreement seeks to remove unjustified barriers while maintaining strong safeguards.

If deeper integration with Canada can strengthen European sovereignty, the same principle should apply to other trusted partners that meet equally demanding standards.

The obvious next test is the UK.

Britain sits outside the EU’s institutions but remains closely connected to Europe’s economy, technology sector and security. Infrastructure, investment and supply chains cross the Channel, while the UK and EU face many of the same cyber and geopolitical threats.

​​The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers, with reciprocal arrangements for qualifying European companies in the UK.

Strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

The second UK-EU Summit on 20 November provides an opportunity to turn that principle into practice.

Leaders should establish a UK-EU Digital Partnership, covering the mutual recognition of trusted providers, coordinating rules affecting cloud and AI infrastructure, and the removal of unnecessary procurement barriers before they become embedded.

Such a partnership would support both sides’ sovereignty objectives by distinguishing genuine strategic dependencies from relationships that add to their resilience and security.

Europe is right to seek greater control over its technological future. But ​​Carney has identified the crucial distinction:​ ​strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

Canada and the EU have begun to show what trusted partnership can look like. The UK should be next.


Disclaimer

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  • The political advertising is related to the EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act and the development of EU-UK digital cooperation.

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More than cash: EU defense spending push is ‘game-changer’ for industry, says arms boss

BRUSSELS — The EU’s next long-term budget could be a “game-changer” for Europe’s defense industry by giving companies predictable, longer-term funding, the head of Finnish defense firm Patria told POLITICO.

EU member countries are still negotiating the size of the bloc’s next seven-year budget, with pressure to reach a deal by the end of the year before a series of national elections in key countries like France and Poland in 2027.

The Commission has proposed allocating €131 billion of its nearly €2 trillion budget request to defense and space. Although the final amount is expected to be lower, as countries led by Germany and the Netherlands push for a smaller overall budget, it is likely to represent a huge increase from the roughly €25 billion in the current budget.

That kind of money paid out over the next budget running from 2028 to 2034 would allow companies to make long-term investment plans — something that is riskier with current short-term EU programs — said Patria President and CEO Panu Routila. He called the next budget “totally a game-changer.”

“Traditionally, the orders have been only for two years or so and not much more,” he said of current arms deals. As a result, “you cannot make really long-term investments even though the demand signals are there.”

European defense industry groups have made a similar case.

“Coordinated procurement, pooled demand, long-term contracts, greater regulatory predictability, and aligned priorities are essential to expand capacity, strengthen supply chains, and reduce duplication, making investments more effective,” the ASD defense lobby said after the NATO summit in July.

So far, the EU’s efforts to boost its defense industry have been limited in duration.

The €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Programme provides funding under the current EU budget through 2027. The €150 billion Security Action for Europe rearmament scheme is a temporary five-year instrument, with disbursements and project completion deadlines extending through 2030.

Routila, who took over Patria in April, said it was extremely important that the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework “will lead to something. And something is not regulation only, something is clear products.”

Like many other defense companies, the Finnish group has seen sales and profits soar following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That war also saw Finland break with its past military nonalignment and join NATO in 2023.

The need to continue supplying Ukraine and the uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to European security under President Donald Trump are adding to the pressure to rearm.

A firefighter works to put out a fire at a residential building in Kyiv after a Russian attack, on Nov. 12, 2026. | Sergii Volskyi/AFP via Getty Images

The scale of the European rearmament means there is a need to dramatically increase production. Routila argued that this would not be a major obstacle once companies receive more orders and greater long-term investment certainty.

“It’s a problem that is solvable,” he said, comparing the scale of defense firms to the much larger vehicle industry. “The automotive companies, they make millions of vehicles a year. We make thousands of vehicles per year. So the magnitude of volume is different.”

Patria has already increased its production, but “I would not say that we are yet working on top limit of our capacity. If there’s a good customer, we can still get orders,” he said.

The Finnish state owns just over half of Patria, with Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace holding the rest. Patria, in turn, owns half of Nammo, a key manufacturer of 155-millimeter artillery ammunition.

Patria is known for multinational projects such as the Common Armoured Vehicle System, a 6×6 armored vehicle developed through cooperation involving Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Norway and the U.K.

The company is also moving into drones, signing a letter of intent with Ukraine’s General Cherry in August on cooperation and planning to start drone production in Finland.

In the first nine months of this year, the group’s net sales increased by 40% to €933.5 million, while operating profit more than doubled to €113.9 million.

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UK hands Palantir two-year reprieve on NHS contract

LONDON —The U.K. government has confirmed it plans to end Palantir’s contract to provide a data platform for the National Health Service in 2029.

However it is not severing the contract immediately, as some MPs and campaigners had pushed it to do.

The government will begin formal procurement for a “new” contract in the second half of 2027, with the process expected to take 18 months, health minister James Frith told MPs on Monday. He described the extension of Palantir’s contract until 2029 as “a bridge, not the destination.”

In a bid to regain “public trust” and open up opportunities for “U.K. sovereign capabilities,” Frith said “interoperability, resilience and trusted common standards” will be “baked into” the new procurement round, though non-U.K. firms will also be encouraged to bid.

Palantir’s contract has attracted considerable scrutiny from campaigners, health professionals and MPs over controversial views expressed by the company’s founders and concerns about vendor lock-in.

Two parliamentary committees have called for its NHS contract to be ended in the last year.

“We want to give the health and care system more choice, greater resilience and less dependence on any single supplier, as well as the ability to adapt and evolve as new technologies emerge in future, with better value for taxpayers through time,” Frith said.

“These objectives require a new approach — an approach that will stimulate a more diverse and innovative supplier market, including greater use of sovereign AI as well as internationally developed capabilities,” he added.

This approach will encompass investment in strategic technologies, changing how novel technologies are procured, and developing open standards, Frith said.

“We must avoid over-dependence and our future capability should avoid being locked into any single technology,” he said. He didn’t say whether Palantir will be able to bid on the new contract in 2029.

A Palantir spokesperson said the announcement was “good news for patients and for the NHS” and it was “proud” of its work.

“We will now redouble our efforts over the next two years to continue and accelerate that support,” as well as “deepen our investment in the U.K.,” they said.

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Poland turns to home-grown giant for its defense buildup

WARSAW — Poland wants domestic companies to supply more of its rapidly expanding military, but state-owned PGZ’s fragmented structure and political exposure raise questions about whether Warsaw can turn the spending surge into a stronger industry.

The Polish Armaments Group, the country’s largest defense company, has won billions of złoty in new orders, placing it at the center of the military buildup.

The conglomerate was cobbled together in 2013 from about 50 fiercely independent smaller companies with their own management teams and often their own political backers. CEO Adam Leszkiewicz has been in the post since May 2025 — making him the holding company’s 12th CEO since its founding.

“PGZ is different from other European companies,” Leszkiewicz said, adding that PGZ makes more than 700 products. “I could say we make almost everything. But what can be a strength can also be a weakness.”

Marek Świerczyński, a defense analyst with the Warsaw-based Polityka Insight Center for Policy Analysis, said: “He essentially has to use diplomacy to try to manage the other companies.”

Legacy defense industry

For decades after the end of communism, Poland spent little on defense and the military largely made do with antiquated Soviet-era equipment. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 changed that, and Polish defense spending surged.

“We have strong historical and current experience with armored vehicles and maintenance, repair and overhaul services,” said Leszkiewicz. “We also make wheeled vehicles such as the Jelcz, and our work on sensors and radar is developing well. We have long been strong in rifles and pistols.”

Aleksandra Kozioł, a defense analyst with the Warsaw-based Polish Institute of International Affairs, pointed out other notable Polish defense companies, such as the private WB Group, which specializes in communications networks, unmanned aerial vehicles, loitering munitions and fire control solutions.

“We want to improve in new technologies, especially unmanned vehicles as well as software and IT solutions,” Leszkiewicz said.

PGZ is also building ties with other European defense firms. It is building three new artillery shell factories in conjunction with the U.K.’s BAE Systems. PGZ’s Narew air defense system includes a tie-up with MBDA to supply missiles and launchers.

“Either we take advantage of this opportunity, or we let this period of rapid industrial development in defense pass. We have ambitions and want to fulfill them,” Leszkiewicz said.

Keeping the cash at home

This year, Poland aims to spend 200 billion złoty (€45.7 billion) — or 4.8% of GDP — on defense, the highest level in NATO. It is also the largest recipient of the EU’s €150 billion SAFE loans-for-arms program, taking in almost €44 billion.

The government is trying to ensure that the country’s defense industry gets a growing share of the new spending.

In May, Poland’s Armaments Agency signed almost 120 billion złoty in contracts with Polish arms companies financed by SAFE. A large share went to PGZ and its subsidiaries, mainly Huta Stalowa Wola, for equipment including 146 Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles, 96 Krab howitzers, 64 Rak mortars, K9PL support vehicles and 1,000 vehicles for the Homar-K rocket-launcher system.

Most of the deals with PGZ were no-bid contracts, according to a report by the Warsaw Enterprise Institute think tank.

“The development of the Polish defense industry is necessary, but it should not automatically mean preferential treatment for companies directly controlled by the government,” the report said.

Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz last month underlined that the government aims to develop the country’s military-industrial complex, saying: “We are building a strong army, strengthening security, and investing in Poland’s future.”

But favoring domestic companies risks clashing with the government’s drive to rearm as quickly as possible; Warsaw wants to buy tanks, jets and missiles to deter Russia, although that goal does pose problems for its domestic arms industry.

A drone hangs above visitors’ heads at the WB Group stand at the 34th International Defence Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Poland on Sept. 8, 2026. | Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images

About 60 percent of Poland’s defense spending goes on imports, “and that won’t change quickly,” said Świerczyński. Most arms imports come from South Korea and the United States, including systems like K2 Black Panther tanks and F-35A fighter jets.

“In 2022, we were looking for ready-made solutions and products because we felt threatened,” said Leszkiewicz. “Today, we are trying to take every opportunity to Polonize production. We are now hardly buying ready-made products, except where we really lack a particular capability.” One of PGZ’s subsidiaries will be building K2 tanks starting in 2028. 

“I do see an effort to increase Polish intellectual property,” said Kozioł, the defense analyst, adding that it’s still unclear if the government’s effort to shift contracts to Polish firms will lessen the reliance on foreign technology.

In 2025, PGZ reported 18.4 billion złoty in revenues, a 23% increase on the previous year, and 2.8 billion złoty in profit, a 66% increase. The company ranked 51st in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2025 list of the world’s top 100 defense companies.  

“We aim to reach the top 10 in Europe and the top 30 globally,” said Leszkiewicz.

“If we look at PGZ’s development and results, it appears that, despite political issues, the company is trying to fulfill the task of arming the Polish military,” said Kozioł.

Political risk

Polish state-controlled companies are notorious for high levels of political interference. Although Kozioł underlined that there is a cross-party consensus in favor of continued high defense spending, PGZ does face political risks.

Mateusz Morawiecki, prime minister from 2017 to 2023 under the previous Law and Justice Party government, this summer called for PGZ to potentially be dissolved, accusing it of “weak” management.

Kosiniak-Kamysz fired back, calling the idea “harmful and anti-state.”

The danger is likely to grow. Poland holds a parliamentary election next year and opinion polls suggest that Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s coalition could be unseated by a grouping of right-wing parties.

That means Leszkiewicz’s position — he was a junior member of Tusk’s previous government from 2007 to 2011 and took over PGZ after running state-controlled fertilizer giant Grupa Azoty — could be under threat.

“A CEO would have to be in the job for a decade, but in Polish realities there is no chance of that,” said Świerczyński.

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