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Irish regulator stops X training AI with data gathered by agents

Ireland’s privacy regulator has forced X to stop feeding AI models with data collected by its agents, the authority told POLITICO.

The social media giant owned by Elon Musk has suspended the use of so-called third-party data collected by its Grok Bot AI agent, which started mining this data in late October to train its AI systems.

The Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) raised “significant concerns” about that data processing in recent weeks, Commissioner Dale Sunderland told POLITICO in an interview. “We asked them to suspend the processing, and they’ve confirmed to us today that they’ve done that,” he said Monday.

X did not respond to a request for comment.

The Irish privacy authority is the most powerful in Europe, as it enforces Europe’s data protection rulebook on companies that have their regional headquarters in Ireland, including Apple, Google, Meta, X and OpenAI.

The X action is a test case as privacy regulators shift their focus from AI training that uses data people have shared about themselves, to third-party data that personal AI agents are accessing and gathering on other people.

Third-party data is personal data about an unrelated person shared by two other parties — for example, holiday pictures shared with a friend who uses an AI agent. It also includes personal data that an AI agent scrapes from the internet.

Sunderland — who is one of three co-commissioners at the Irish authority — said they are also engaging with another, unnamed tech firm about its plans to use data collected by AI agents for training.

“It’s a very live issue at the moment,” Sunderland said, declining to name the company because the discussions are taking place ahead of any actual data processing.

The regulator doesn’t have an issue with AI agents “per se,” Sunderland said, but authorities have to scrutinize whether companies are still operating legally if they get into “further taking of that data and using it to further train the models.”

Sunderland said the Irish DPC will have “further engagement” with X about “what exactly happened, and what that means for next steps.”

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What the EU can learn from Mark Carney on digital sovereignty

At Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered a compelling response to a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry. Middle powers need greater strategic autonomy, he argued, but they cannot secure it by retreating behind their borders.

Instead, they need to build their own capabilities while working more closely with like-minded partners. On technology, he reasoned that countries should cooperate so they are not ultimately forced to choose between “hegemons and hyperscalers.”

At the recent EU-Canada Summit, that philosophy began to translate into policy. Canada and the EU launched an “Alliance for the Future” based on closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation. They also concluded negotiations on a Digital Trade Agreement designed to support a “secure, open and trusted digital environment”​ resilient economic relations​,​ and trusted cross-border data flows.

That principle matters not only for Europe’s new relationship with Canada, but for its approach to other trusted partners.

Sovereignty without isolation

Like Canada, Europe has diagnosed its technology problem correctly. It depends too heavily on a handful of providers for the cloud, computing power, digital infrastructure and ​artificial intelligence (​AI​)​ models underpinning its economy and security.

Reducing those dependencies will require Europe to put its money where its mouth is, including by unlocking more diversified private investment. Mario Draghi estimated that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion of investment each year until 2030. The European Commission, meanwhile, wants to mobili​z​​​e €200 billion for AI and at least triple Europe’s data cent​er​​​ capacity within five to seven years.

Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it.

But Europe’s approach risks moving in the opposite direction. ​ ​It could exclude some of the businesses investing most heavily in the continent and building European capabilities, while favo​ring others that remain dependent on non-European technology.

That is the risk confronting policymakers as they shape the Cloud and AI Development Act. The legislation seeks to influence not only how Europe expands and secures its technological capabilities, but also which companies can take part.

Herein lies the core trade-off.​ ​ Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it. Whether it closes its technology gap will depend partly on its ability to draw on the capital and expertise of experienced, trusted partners.

Look beyond ownership

The debate over digital sovereignty therefore needs to move beyond the simplistic question of ownership or headquarters.

A definition based principally on corporate nationality could exclude trusted companies with decades of investment, infrastructure and employment across Europe. It could also protect nominally European suppliers without necessarily making Europe more secure or resilient.

Effective sovereignty should mean that Europe can keep essential services running during a crisis, protect critical systems and retain a choice of secure, trusted suppliers. Assessments should therefore examine who controls data, encryption, operations, security and continuity.

Corporate nationality is relevant, but it cannot answer these questions on its own. A cloud provider may be EU-owned yet rely on processors, software and security tools developed elsewhere. Another may be headquartered outside the EU but operate European data cent​er​​​s, employ European engineers, place data and encryption keys under European control​,​ and comply with demanding European regulation. Any nationality test alone tells policymakers little about which arrangement provides greater sovereignty.

​​ ​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Nationality should carry the greatest weight where a provider is controlled from a country that presents a recognized security threat, or where the relevant jurisdiction has the capacity and record of exploiting technological dependencies. ​​The strictest restrictions are justified where foreign interference could threaten national security, including defense, law enforcement and the most essential public services.

Countries such as Switzerland, Canada​ ​and the UK should not automatically fall into the same category as recognized security threats. Where the security conditions do not apply, nationality-based restrictions risk becoming protectionist rather than protective.

Instead, Europe should apply three tests for trusted partners and domestic firms alike: whether operational control rests in Europe; whether the service can continue during a crisis; and whether the provider makes a substantial, long-term contribution to Europe’s technological capacity.

​​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Telecoms is a case in point. Regardless of where they are headquartered, operators must keep essential services running through cyberattacks, power failures and supply-chain disruption while protecting the confidentiality of EU data.

A company’s registered address answers none of those operational questions.

Build with trusted partners

This matters beyond the Cloud and AI Development Act. The approach Europe takes to sovereignty could shape policy toward​ ​telecommunications, satellites, semiconductors and other strategic technologies.

Rules that exclude trusted foreign investors primarily on the basis of nationality risk fragmenting the market and deterring some of the capital and experti​se Europe is trying to attract. They could also encourage reciprocal restrictions on European companies operating abroad.

The better approach is the one Carney has begun to articulate: build domestic capability while deepening cooperation with countries that share your security interests and can contribute technology, infrastructure and investment.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers.

The EU’s developing relationship with Canada shows that this is possible. Its new Alliance for the Future explicitly combines closer economic integration with technological cooperation, security and resilience, while the Digital Trade Agreement seeks to remove unjustified barriers while maintaining strong safeguards.

If deeper integration with Canada can strengthen European sovereignty, the same principle should apply to other trusted partners that meet equally demanding standards.

The obvious next test is the UK.

Britain sits outside the EU’s institutions but remains closely connected to Europe’s economy, technology sector and security. Infrastructure, investment and supply chains cross the Channel, while the UK and EU face many of the same cyber and geopolitical threats.

​​The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers, with reciprocal arrangements for qualifying European companies in the UK.

Strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

The second UK-EU Summit on 20 November provides an opportunity to turn that principle into practice.

Leaders should establish a UK-EU Digital Partnership, covering the mutual recognition of trusted providers, coordinating rules affecting cloud and AI infrastructure, and the removal of unnecessary procurement barriers before they become embedded.

Such a partnership would support both sides’ sovereignty objectives by distinguishing genuine strategic dependencies from relationships that add to their resilience and security.

Europe is right to seek greater control over its technological future. But ​​Carney has identified the crucial distinction:​ ​strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

Canada and the EU have begun to show what trusted partnership can look like. The UK should be next.


Disclaimer

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  • The political advertising is related to the EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act and the development of EU-UK digital cooperation.

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Estonia has a plan for Russian occupation: Run its government from the cloud

TALLINN — Imagine French General Charles de Gaulle, exiled in London during World War II, running his Free France government by logging into the cloud.

Officials in Estonia are preparing for exactly such a scenario with a new strategy to boost doomsday resilience — hukukindlus in Estonian — that would allow the government’s digital services to be run entirely from abroad if its territory is occupied by a foreign enemy.

The Baltic country of  1.3 million, which shares a 294-kilometer border with Russia, fears it is a prime target if Moscow were to invade a European Union country. Security services have already warned that Russia is waging a hybrid war on Europe, and Estonia has blamed Moscow for everything from cyberattacks to arson plots to cuts to undersea data cables.

Now, Tallinn is preparing to move its public services to the cloud “either when data centers are destroyed or there’s boots on the ground and we cannot operate,” said Tõnu Grünberg, an architect of the new strategy and former deputy secretary general for digital infrastructure and cybersecurity at Estonia’s Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs.

Estonia already has a data backup in its “digital embassy” in Luxembourg, effectively a copy of the country’s blueprint that includes everything from citizen registries to land registries and its legal code.

“Now we want to really be online, whatever happens,” Grünberg said. “All critical services stay online … Everything needs to stay operational.”

The Estonian government is building secure applications on cloud providers including Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services as well as its own state cloud platform. The country is shipping the system to its data embassy and other places in Europe, said Grünberg, who started a job as CEO of tech infrastructure provider Levira this month.

Allan Allmere, an adviser for IT architecture and infrastructure at the Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, said in comments to POLITICO that Estonia wants to minimize the impact of the worst-case scenario.

“Ideally, we would like to build systems that can withstand every possible crisis, but in reality no country can predict or eliminate every risk,” he said. “In the most severe scenarios, we also need to preserve a trusted foundation from which Estonia’s digital state can be rebuilt.”

The danger to digital services has been apparent for Estonians ever since 2007 when the country faced a wave of cyberattacks lasting 22 days that brought down large swathes of commercial and government services. The country’s authorities later attributed the attacks to Russia.

The incident was in many ways the first large-scale modern cyberattack targeting a country. It prompted Tallinn to overhaul its entire digital infrastructure, making Estonia what some consider the world’s most digitized state.

“They have taken a remarkably forward-leaning approach in terms of digitizing government services,” said Joseph Jarnecki, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank in London.

Allmere said the doomsday planning seeks to ensure that “we should never have to start again from zero.”

Digital resilience

Recent attacks on data centers in Russia underlined how critical digital services have become for countries at war. Ukraine struck three data centers belonging to Russian provider Yandex last month, showing how targeting compute power had become akin to striking a power plant supplying the electricity, heating and fuel that militaries and civilians depend on.

The Estonian national plan for doomsday resilience is a notable example of how countries are looking to protect their citizens and services from those risks through delocalization. Until recently, the debate on digital security tended to focus on keeping control close to home by storing data locally and building technologies and data centers inside a state’s territory.

Now states — especially those facing heightened risks of conflict — are rethinking their approach, making sure they are also spreading the risks to digital infrastructure.

On Thursday, the United Kingdom and Norway announced they are looking at ways to host each others’ secure data by setting up their own “data embassies.”

Estonia, too, is investing in “partnerships and alliances with safe third countries” for security and resilience, “rather than saying ‘we are most sovereign and most resilient when we have everything physically under our control, within our territory,'” said Jarnecki.

The Microsoft outage that struck companies and countries worldwide last week illustrated again how states should diversify cloud and digital service providers in case key providers are struck by cyberattacks, disruptions or technical failures.

Allmere, the Estonian official managing the doomsday resilience plan, said the country was also working to prepare for the next challenge: “The first question was how to make sure Estonia’s state data would not disappear,” he said, referring to its existing data embassy in Luxembourg as a backup. “The next [challenge] is how to ensure that the state can continue functioning with that data during a crisis,” he said.

Tallinn won’t stop there. “We also need to ensure that the same data remains understandable and usable decades from now,” Allmere said.

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