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Irish regulator stops X training AI with data gathered by agents

17 November 2026 at 11:54

Ireland’s privacy regulator has forced X to stop feeding AI models with data collected by its agents, the authority told POLITICO.

The social media giant owned by Elon Musk has suspended the use of so-called third-party data collected by its Grok Bot AI agent, which started mining this data in late October to train its AI systems.

The Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) raised “significant concerns” about that data processing in recent weeks, Commissioner Dale Sunderland told POLITICO in an interview. “We asked them to suspend the processing, and they’ve confirmed to us today that they’ve done that,” he said Monday.

X did not respond to a request for comment.

The Irish privacy authority is the most powerful in Europe, as it enforces Europe’s data protection rulebook on companies that have their regional headquarters in Ireland, including Apple, Google, Meta, X and OpenAI.

The X action is a test case as privacy regulators shift their focus from AI training that uses data people have shared about themselves, to third-party data that personal AI agents are accessing and gathering on other people.

Third-party data is personal data about an unrelated person shared by two other parties — for example, holiday pictures shared with a friend who uses an AI agent. It also includes personal data that an AI agent scrapes from the internet.

Sunderland — who is one of three co-commissioners at the Irish authority — said they are also engaging with another, unnamed tech firm about its plans to use data collected by AI agents for training.

“It’s a very live issue at the moment,” Sunderland said, declining to name the company because the discussions are taking place ahead of any actual data processing.

The regulator doesn’t have an issue with AI agents “per se,” Sunderland said, but authorities have to scrutinize whether companies are still operating legally if they get into “further taking of that data and using it to further train the models.”

Sunderland said the Irish DPC will have “further engagement” with X about “what exactly happened, and what that means for next steps.”

What the EU can learn from Mark Carney on digital sovereignty

At Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered a compelling response to a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry. Middle powers need greater strategic autonomy, he argued, but they cannot secure it by retreating behind their borders.

Instead, they need to build their own capabilities while working more closely with like-minded partners. On technology, he reasoned that countries should cooperate so they are not ultimately forced to choose between “hegemons and hyperscalers.”

At the recent EU-Canada Summit, that philosophy began to translate into policy. Canada and the EU launched an “Alliance for the Future” based on closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation. They also concluded negotiations on a Digital Trade Agreement designed to support a “secure, open and trusted digital environment”​ resilient economic relations​,​ and trusted cross-border data flows.

That principle matters not only for Europe’s new relationship with Canada, but for its approach to other trusted partners.

Sovereignty without isolation

Like Canada, Europe has diagnosed its technology problem correctly. It depends too heavily on a handful of providers for the cloud, computing power, digital infrastructure and ​artificial intelligence (​AI​)​ models underpinning its economy and security.

Reducing those dependencies will require Europe to put its money where its mouth is, including by unlocking more diversified private investment. Mario Draghi estimated that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion of investment each year until 2030. The European Commission, meanwhile, wants to mobili​z​​​e €200 billion for AI and at least triple Europe’s data cent​er​​​ capacity within five to seven years.

Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it.

But Europe’s approach risks moving in the opposite direction. ​ ​It could exclude some of the businesses investing most heavily in the continent and building European capabilities, while favo​ring others that remain dependent on non-European technology.

That is the risk confronting policymakers as they shape the Cloud and AI Development Act. The legislation seeks to influence not only how Europe expands and secures its technological capabilities, but also which companies can take part.

Herein lies the core trade-off.​ ​ Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it. Whether it closes its technology gap will depend partly on its ability to draw on the capital and expertise of experienced, trusted partners.

Look beyond ownership

The debate over digital sovereignty therefore needs to move beyond the simplistic question of ownership or headquarters.

A definition based principally on corporate nationality could exclude trusted companies with decades of investment, infrastructure and employment across Europe. It could also protect nominally European suppliers without necessarily making Europe more secure or resilient.

Effective sovereignty should mean that Europe can keep essential services running during a crisis, protect critical systems and retain a choice of secure, trusted suppliers. Assessments should therefore examine who controls data, encryption, operations, security and continuity.

Corporate nationality is relevant, but it cannot answer these questions on its own. A cloud provider may be EU-owned yet rely on processors, software and security tools developed elsewhere. Another may be headquartered outside the EU but operate European data cent​er​​​s, employ European engineers, place data and encryption keys under European control​,​ and comply with demanding European regulation. Any nationality test alone tells policymakers little about which arrangement provides greater sovereignty.

​​ ​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Nationality should carry the greatest weight where a provider is controlled from a country that presents a recognized security threat, or where the relevant jurisdiction has the capacity and record of exploiting technological dependencies. ​​The strictest restrictions are justified where foreign interference could threaten national security, including defense, law enforcement and the most essential public services.

Countries such as Switzerland, Canada​ ​and the UK should not automatically fall into the same category as recognized security threats. Where the security conditions do not apply, nationality-based restrictions risk becoming protectionist rather than protective.

Instead, Europe should apply three tests for trusted partners and domestic firms alike: whether operational control rests in Europe; whether the service can continue during a crisis; and whether the provider makes a substantial, long-term contribution to Europe’s technological capacity.

​​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Telecoms is a case in point. Regardless of where they are headquartered, operators must keep essential services running through cyberattacks, power failures and supply-chain disruption while protecting the confidentiality of EU data.

A company’s registered address answers none of those operational questions.

Build with trusted partners

This matters beyond the Cloud and AI Development Act. The approach Europe takes to sovereignty could shape policy toward​ ​telecommunications, satellites, semiconductors and other strategic technologies.

Rules that exclude trusted foreign investors primarily on the basis of nationality risk fragmenting the market and deterring some of the capital and experti​se Europe is trying to attract. They could also encourage reciprocal restrictions on European companies operating abroad.

The better approach is the one Carney has begun to articulate: build domestic capability while deepening cooperation with countries that share your security interests and can contribute technology, infrastructure and investment.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers.

The EU’s developing relationship with Canada shows that this is possible. Its new Alliance for the Future explicitly combines closer economic integration with technological cooperation, security and resilience, while the Digital Trade Agreement seeks to remove unjustified barriers while maintaining strong safeguards.

If deeper integration with Canada can strengthen European sovereignty, the same principle should apply to other trusted partners that meet equally demanding standards.

The obvious next test is the UK.

Britain sits outside the EU’s institutions but remains closely connected to Europe’s economy, technology sector and security. Infrastructure, investment and supply chains cross the Channel, while the UK and EU face many of the same cyber and geopolitical threats.

​​The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers, with reciprocal arrangements for qualifying European companies in the UK.

Strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

The second UK-EU Summit on 20 November provides an opportunity to turn that principle into practice.

Leaders should establish a UK-EU Digital Partnership, covering the mutual recognition of trusted providers, coordinating rules affecting cloud and AI infrastructure, and the removal of unnecessary procurement barriers before they become embedded.

Such a partnership would support both sides’ sovereignty objectives by distinguishing genuine strategic dependencies from relationships that add to their resilience and security.

Europe is right to seek greater control over its technological future. But ​​Carney has identified the crucial distinction:​ ​strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

Canada and the EU have begun to show what trusted partnership can look like. The UK should be next.


Disclaimer

POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT

  • The sponsor is Vodafone Group Services Limited.
  • The political advertising is related to the EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act and the development of EU-UK digital cooperation.

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EU sanctions Russian trolls, hackers

16 November 2026 at 13:11

European Union member countries on Monday issued sanctions against a Russian company running disinformation campaigns and one of Russia’s most well-known hacking groups.

The Council of the EU said it had sanctioned the Social Design Agency, a Moscow-based firm that carries out “large scale information manipulation and interference projects,” as well as 24 of its staff members.

The Social Design Agency is “funded, directed and supervised” by the Russian government and has organized disinformation campaigns targeting EU countries, EU institutions and European support for Ukraine, Council said.

The group has been connected in the past to a vast online disinformation network known as Doppelganger. It targeted the 2024 European elections and carried out “dedicated operations against EU member states such as Germany and France,” countries said.

EU capitals also agreed to levy sanctions against notorious Russian hacking group NoName057(16), which has targeted government bodies and critical infrastructure as well as private firms in the EU, Ukraine and the United States.

The group is known to hit targets with so-called distributed denial-of-service attacks to shut down websites. A European law enforcement operation targeted the group last year. 

The EU also levied sanctions including travel bans and asset freezes against Russian propagandists. 

The bloc has issued multiple sanctions packages for Russian disinformation since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

Estonia has a plan for Russian occupation: Run its government from the cloud

16 November 2026 at 04:00

TALLINN — Imagine French General Charles de Gaulle, exiled in London during World War II, running his Free France government by logging into the cloud.

Officials in Estonia are preparing for exactly such a scenario with a new strategy to boost doomsday resilience — hukukindlus in Estonian — that would allow the government’s digital services to be run entirely from abroad if its territory is occupied by a foreign enemy.

The Baltic country of  1.3 million, which shares a 294-kilometer border with Russia, fears it is a prime target if Moscow were to invade a European Union country. Security services have already warned that Russia is waging a hybrid war on Europe, and Estonia has blamed Moscow for everything from cyberattacks to arson plots to cuts to undersea data cables.

Now, Tallinn is preparing to move its public services to the cloud “either when data centers are destroyed or there’s boots on the ground and we cannot operate,” said Tõnu Grünberg, an architect of the new strategy and former deputy secretary general for digital infrastructure and cybersecurity at Estonia’s Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs.

Estonia already has a data backup in its “digital embassy” in Luxembourg, effectively a copy of the country’s blueprint that includes everything from citizen registries to land registries and its legal code.

“Now we want to really be online, whatever happens,” Grünberg said. “All critical services stay online … Everything needs to stay operational.”

The Estonian government is building secure applications on cloud providers including Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services as well as its own state cloud platform. The country is shipping the system to its data embassy and other places in Europe, said Grünberg, who started a job as CEO of tech infrastructure provider Levira this month.

Allan Allmere, an adviser for IT architecture and infrastructure at the Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, said in comments to POLITICO that Estonia wants to minimize the impact of the worst-case scenario.

“Ideally, we would like to build systems that can withstand every possible crisis, but in reality no country can predict or eliminate every risk,” he said. “In the most severe scenarios, we also need to preserve a trusted foundation from which Estonia’s digital state can be rebuilt.”

The danger to digital services has been apparent for Estonians ever since 2007 when the country faced a wave of cyberattacks lasting 22 days that brought down large swathes of commercial and government services. The country’s authorities later attributed the attacks to Russia.

The incident was in many ways the first large-scale modern cyberattack targeting a country. It prompted Tallinn to overhaul its entire digital infrastructure, making Estonia what some consider the world’s most digitized state.

“They have taken a remarkably forward-leaning approach in terms of digitizing government services,” said Joseph Jarnecki, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank in London.

Allmere said the doomsday planning seeks to ensure that “we should never have to start again from zero.”

Digital resilience

Recent attacks on data centers in Russia underlined how critical digital services have become for countries at war. Ukraine struck three data centers belonging to Russian provider Yandex last month, showing how targeting compute power had become akin to striking a power plant supplying the electricity, heating and fuel that militaries and civilians depend on.

The Estonian national plan for doomsday resilience is a notable example of how countries are looking to protect their citizens and services from those risks through delocalization. Until recently, the debate on digital security tended to focus on keeping control close to home by storing data locally and building technologies and data centers inside a state’s territory.

Now states — especially those facing heightened risks of conflict — are rethinking their approach, making sure they are also spreading the risks to digital infrastructure.

On Thursday, the United Kingdom and Norway announced they are looking at ways to host each others’ secure data by setting up their own “data embassies.”

Estonia, too, is investing in “partnerships and alliances with safe third countries” for security and resilience, “rather than saying ‘we are most sovereign and most resilient when we have everything physically under our control, within our territory,'” said Jarnecki.

The Microsoft outage that struck companies and countries worldwide last week illustrated again how states should diversify cloud and digital service providers in case key providers are struck by cyberattacks, disruptions or technical failures.

Allmere, the Estonian official managing the doomsday resilience plan, said the country was also working to prepare for the next challenge: “The first question was how to make sure Estonia’s state data would not disappear,” he said, referring to its existing data embassy in Luxembourg as a backup. “The next [challenge] is how to ensure that the state can continue functioning with that data during a crisis,” he said.

Tallinn won’t stop there. “We also need to ensure that the same data remains understandable and usable decades from now,” Allmere said.

Brussels takes on the evils of online commerce

10 November 2026 at 20:45

BRUSSELS — You know that customer-service bot that won’t let you cancel your subscription? The EU wants to kill it.  

With a new law presented Wednesday, the European Commission will take aim at the endless array of practices websites have used over the past 20 years to make more money from consumers.  

The Digital Fairness Act is the European response to a wider regulatory trend that has seen consumer authorities curb irksome and exploitative practices. These include dynamic pricing that changes ticket prices based on demand, cumbersome processes for canceling subscriptions and the near-complete surrender of customer service to automated systems.  

According to a draft of the DFA obtained by POLITICO, the Commission will address several aspects of the design, service and terms under which businesses interact with consumers online. 

“Europe should not accept a digital economy where profits depend on exploiting people’s vulnerabilities,” Spanish socialist lawmaker Laura Ballarín Cereza, a key European lawmaker on tech legislation, said in a statement.

Industry leaders have pushed back on this potential new rulebook ever since the EU executive began considering a revision of consumer law in 2022. They say current consumer protection and digital services laws already cover these practices. “Where existing rules already cover a practice, it should not be regulated or enforced a second time,” said Ben Brake, director general of tech lobby DOT Europe.  

Consumer groups say existing rules, some dating back to 2005, are not clear enough and that many unfair design practices are still rampant.  

The Commission would have the power to impose fines of up to 6% of global annual revenue for companies that violate the new law. Those penalties are similar to fines levied under the Digital Services Act, the EU’s platform rules meant to stop Big Tech platforms from provoking systemic, society-wide harms through everything from election interference to keeping minors away from violent content. The new law instead would apply to any business offering services to EU consumers online. 

Dark patterns

The DFA would ban deceptive design known as “dark patterns,” which manipulate consumers through the use of such tactics as bright-colored buttons placed prominently to get customers to buy something. It also aims to ban personalized pricing that targets vulnerable consumers, including minors.  

The practice of dynamic pricing is also targeted in the law. That’s when a seller adjusts the price based on conditions such as demand or a user’s location, and it is commonly used in the sale of concert and airline tickets. The proposed law requires transparency when customers are buying products whose prices are subject to change.  

The DFA also covers consumer rights around “agentic commerce,” when artificial intelligence agents are used to find and complete purchases. 

Four lawmakers from the conservative, socialist and liberal groups said the requirement doesn’t go far enough and that the DFA should completely ban dynamic pricing for cultural and sporting events, according to a letter obtained by POLITICO. 

Sellers offering subscriptions will have to provide an easy way to cancel, reminiscent of New York State’s “click to cancel” rules. The new EU rules also require that a human is available for after-sales customer support.  

The rules also address, for the first time, specific aspects of online gaming, including bans on video games that allow kids to pay to succeed and progress in the game.  

The DFA is also trying to make its mark on what is known as “addictive design” of online platforms. This has already been the target of enforcement action in Europe and litigation in the U.S. in cases involving minors. But the new consumer rules would apply to adults as well, requiring online platforms to offer an opt-out from addictive features like autoplay.  

Spain’s Ballarín Cereza thinks this is not enough, saying users should be opted out of these features by default. “Why should consumers carry the burden when companies deliberately design these addictive mechanisms? We must shift from consumer responsibility to corporate responsibility: safety and fairness must be the default, not an option,” she said. 

Kraków shooter dies in hospital

9 November 2026 at 09:47

A Polish man, who fatally shot six people after driving onto Kraków’s main square Saturday, died in hospital Monday, local police reported.

“We would like to inform you that the perpetrator of the tragic events died in hospital early this morning,” police wrote on X.

The masked 24-year-old opened fire on passersby in central Kraków, killing six people, including a British citizen, and injuring 16 — 12 of whom remain in critical condition. Police shot and detained the attacker. They also found his parents and sister dead at their family home Sunday. Investigators are examining those deaths alongside the Kraków attack, and have opened a terrorism probe.

Authorities identified the suspect as Michał O., from Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, a town about 140 kilometers northeast of Kraków. He had a firearms permit and was not previously known to police.

Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński initially said that “everything indicated that he was fascinated by extreme right-wing ideologies,” but later he said the shooter’s motives remained unclear.

“My deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims of the tragic attack in Kraków. My highest praise for the heroic police officers who risked their lives,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X on Saturday. “And a heartfelt appeal to politicians of all stripes: do not exploit this tragedy. We will establish all the circumstances of this crime.”

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