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Disposable: The ordinary people doing Russia’s dirty work

9 November 2026 at 04:00

Disposable:
The ordinary people doing Russia’s dirty work

The Kremlin is recruiting civilians to carry out sabotage across Europe.

By LENNART PFAHLER
and ARTUR WEIGANDT
in Vilnius

Illustration by Maksym Filipenko for POLITICO

The life Vasilij Kovacs knew ended with a bang. It was late afternoon on March 1, 2025, when an armored vehicle smashed through the metal gate of the old farmhouse where he lived southeast of the Latvian capital, Riga.

Masked men emerged with their guns drawn. They belonged to Latvia’s State Security Service, the country’s counterintelligence agency. The officers searched the property, seizing several mobile phones, SIM cards and documents, along with a pistol with its serial number filed off, a bayonet from an AK-47 and a cellphone jammer, according to a search report later filed by the authorities. They arrested Kovacs, a Ukrainian man in his 60s who has lived in Latvia for more than 30 years.

In March, Kovacs was transferred to stand trial in Lithuania, where he is accused of planning terrorist attacks, alongside four alleged accomplices. Five others face trial in Warsaw. Lithuanian and Polish prosecutors accuse the ten men of planning and carrying out arson attacks involving cargo parcels across several European countries on behalf of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. 

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One of those incidents made headlines across Germany. In the early hours of July 20, 2024, a parcel caught fire at Leipzig Airport just before it was due to be loaded onto a DHL cargo plane. The flames engulfed an airfreight container. It was probably only because the aircraft was delayed that the fire did not break out on board.

All ten men say they did not knowingly work for Russian intelligence and say they are innocent of the terrorism charges. According to investigative files from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Lithuania, Kovacs is an example of an increasingly common category of Russian intelligence asset — the kind Western intelligence agencies call “low-level agents,” or, more tellingly, disposable agents.

The 63-year-old Ukrainian national is alleged to have been a small cog in a much larger machine. Investigators say he transported massage pillows modified to be able to conceal incendiary devices from Latvia to Lithuania. 

The aftermath of the parcel fire in Leipzig, as seen in the investigation files. | WELT

With its own officers finding it harder to operate in Europe since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the GRU increasingly relies on intermediaries to recruit people through messaging services such as Telegram, according to investigative files from Lithuania’s State Security Department obtained by the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, of which POLITICO is a part of.

Often motivated by money, these disposable agents carry out individual assignments: Take a photograph. Mail a parcel. Move something from A to B. Sometimes the tasks are far more dangerous. Recruits may know little about the wider operation. Anyone who gets caught can be replaced.

Much has been written about these agents and the shadow war unfolding across Europe. But one perspective is usually missing: Who are these people? How did they become pawns in a new Cold War that is growing increasingly hot? Are they simply perpetrators — or are they victims, too?

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For this article, we spoke to Kovacs several times, interviewed his daughter and examined thousands of pages of investigative records. Together, they reveal a sabotage network where meticulous intelligence planning goes hand in hand with human incompetence, and in which ordinary people are, well, disposable.

The GRU, contacted through the Russian government’s Press Service, did not reply to a request for comment.

The courier

The entrance to the prison where Kovacs has been held on remand for more than a year sits beneath a rusting metal roof. A Lithuanian investigating judge has authorized us to interview him, but when we arrive in September 2026, prison officers refuse to let us in. We need a separate document from the prison administration, they explain. We submit the additional paperwork but eventually have to leave.

A few days later, Kovacs calls from prison. He is allowed around 20 minutes on the phone each day, time he usually reserves for his family. But over the following weeks, he calls us repeatedly. “I also want to know how I ended up in here,” he says. He insists this is about justice, not himself. “I don’t value my own life particularly highly,” he says. “I’m not going to tell you how many times people have tried to kill me.” 

There’s a lot about what Kovacs says during our conversations that’s unclear. But on one point, at least, his account and the investigators’ findings agree: He transported a package. Where they disagree is whether he knew what was inside it, what it was intended for — and who was behind the operation.

Vasilij Kovacs, during the first hearing of his trial in Vilnius on April 17, 2026. | Mindaugas Kulbis/AP via Belga

According to the Lithuanian investigative files, Kovacs’ involvement in the affair began on June 27, 2024, when someone contacted him on Telegram with a request.

He barely knew the man, but the two had been introduced by a mutual friend: Andrei Baburov, a former Russian submarine commander who was also the godfather of Kovacs’ 11-year-old son. The two men had met through their shared passion for the sea. Kovacs is a sailor who occasionally earns money delivering yachts for their owners. He says he first met Baburov while transporting a yacht between St. Petersburg and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

The request sounded harmless. A courier had fallen ill, and Kovacs was asked to collect a package and take it urgently to Vilnius, nearly four hours away by car. He agreed, collecting the package from a locker outside a supermarket in Riga using a code sent to him on Telegram by the man Baburov had introduced him to. He insists he was not paid. “If I’m helping someone I know, I do it for free,” he says.

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That same day, he drove to Vilnius with his nephew. His contact on Telegram directed him to an underground parking garage. Kovacs parked outside, left the vehicle unlocked and walked away with his nephew. When they returned, the package had disappeared from the trunk. Kovacs says he had gone to buy a charging cable for his phone.

For Kovacs, that part of the job was done. But for the operation investigators have attributed to the GRU, things were only just getting started.

Burning parcels

Lithuanian investigators overseen by the Office of the Prosecutor General have reconstructed the movements of the devices used for the operation in painstaking detail, questioning witnesses and suspects, reviewing surveillance footage and digital evidence and analyzing DNA traces. The resulting files from the criminal investigation, compiling information from agencies in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, the U.K. and Germany, run at around 8,000 pages. They reveal a convoluted journey through the Baltic states, involving a succession of intermediaries, missed connections and improvised plans. 

The man believed by Polish and Lithuanian investigators to have collected the package from Kovacs’ car was another Ukrainian, a trained chef who had spent five years in a Russian penal colony after being convicted of rape. By the summer of 2024, he was living in Poland and receiving instructions through Telegram from a handler who promised him €4,000 a month.

A photograph from the investigation files shows Vasilij Kovacs, center, with his nephews. | WELT

The following day, the chef allegedly took the massage pillows to a holiday apartment rented under a false name. He also had tubes of cosmetics filled with potentially explosive nitromethane. A video filmed inside the Airbnb apartment and later found on a suspect’s phone shows four boxes containing the massage devices and cosmetic products.

According to the Lithuanian investigative files, another intermediary was supposed to come and get the devices but could not find the entrance to the apartment complex. The chef’s handler changed the plan and ordered him to activate the ignition devices himself. The chef refused, according to an indictment filed by Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office, obtained by the Global Reporters Network. The operation had to be reorganized. 

Over the following days, the boxes passed through several more hands. At one point, Lithuanian investigators lost track of them altogether. They suspected they might have traveled through Moldova. On July 13, 2024, they resurfaced in Riga, where Kovacs was drawn into the operation for a second time. 

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Once again, according to his account, Kovacs received a Telegram call from the acquaintance he barely knew. This time, he said, he thought he could hear Baburov in the background. He was asked to transport another shipment to Lithuania, described as “high-quality massage pillows.” On July 17, he drove to Vilnius with his nephew. 

There, another man collected his package and drove it to Kaunas, where on July 18 a Ukrainian who had traveled from Poland to Lithuania retrieved it. He, too, had a criminal past, having been convicted in Poland of cyber fraud and money laundering. His instructions came from a Telegram contact calling himself “Warrior.”

The Ukrainian packed four parcels containing the massage devices, tubes of potentially explosive cosmetics and various sex toys investigators believe were included as a distraction. He activated a timer and handed the parcels to the man who had previously failed to find the entrance to the holiday apartment. That afternoon, the man dropped off two parcels at a DHL office in Vilnius. They were addressed to Wimbledon in London and to Birmingham.

Top left, the charred massage pillow that caught fire in Leipzig. Next, four parcels marked with their destination cities in the trunk of a car, in a photograph taken by one of the accused; a Lithuanian intermediary dropping off the parcels at a DHL branch; and the fire at the DPD warehouse in Birmingham on July 22, 2024. | WELT

At 3:17 a.m. on July 20, customs officers in Leipzig inspected the parcel bound for London. They found nothing suspicious. The parcel was due to be loaded onto a plane to London. But at 5:45 a.m., it burst into flames while still on the ground. An expert report commissioned by Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office, dated August 30, 2024, offered a terse assessment: “Fire caused by deliberate action: plausible.”

Two days later, the second parcel caught fire in a warehouse in Birmingham. That shipment, too, had previously been inspected by customs officers in Leipzig. They had found nothing.

The Ukrainian man also sent two other parcels to Poland through the DPD shipping service. In the early hours of July 21, one of them burst into flames inside a truck near Warsaw. Polish investigators recovered the other intact.

The Kremlin’s recruits

For investigators, the parcel operation is a case study in how Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, now organizes its operations in Europe. “The July 2024 incident fully corresponds to the modus operandi favored by the GRU in recent years when planning and conducting operations,” according to a report by Lithuania’s State Security Department, also known as the VSD, obtained by the Global Reporters Network.

For years, the GRU sent its own officers abroad to carry out covert operations. But that became increasingly difficult after the failed assassination attempt against former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal in Britain in 2018 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years later. Now, the GRU leaves the dangerous work to others, increasingly relying on recruits directed through multiple layers of intermediaries. 

At the top of the chain are still Russian intelligence officers. The Lithuanian report identifies Denis Smolyaninov, who, according to a decision to sanction him by the Council of the European Union, recruited operatives for sabotage missions in Europe through social media. The VSD considered it highly likely that Smolyaninov and two other GRU officers were involved in the parcel operation. Smolyaninov did not reply to a request for comment sent via the Russian Press Service.

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The Lithuanian investigative files offered an unusually detailed picture of how the system worked. One of the alleged organizers was Andrei Baburov, the former submarine commander and godfather of Kovacs’ son. He allegedly coordinated the transport of the modified massage devices from Russia, drawing on old contacts, including former naval comrades and acquaintances in the Baltic states. Baburov did not reply to a request for comment.

Such personal connections are typical, according to the VSD. Recruits are often linked through “family or social ties,” the Lithuanian report says. Many have financial problems, no jobs or criminal records. They are recruited for individual assignments and do not necessarily know what lies behind them. The less they know, the less they can reveal if they are arrested. And anyone who gets caught can be replaced. “Their main motivation is the desire to make money quickly,” the report states. 

Two years after the parcel attacks, operations of this kind had become a growing concern for European security agencies. In August 2026, two explosive-laden drones detonated at Leipzig/Halle Airport, while a third crashed into a Ukrainian cargo aircraft. Among the suspects was a longtime acquaintance of Smolyaninov.

Shortly afterward, two Bulgarians allegedly threw incendiary devices near defense companies in Munich. Investigators suspected the GRU was behind the incident. In Romania, a fire broke out next to an arms factory. Starlink installations were set ablaze in Poland and Bulgaria, leading to further arrests. The GRU has seemingly turned the disposable-agent model into a mass-production operation. 

Disposable

On the phone, Vasilij Kovacs sounds agitated. Speaking rapidly in Russian, he tries to explain himself, only to circle back over the same ground. “It was a crime committed so that it would be solved,” he says.

In Kovacs’ trial, the witnesses for the prosecution have already testified and the defense is preparing to call its own. With hearings scheduled well into January, a verdict is a long way off. Kovacs sees himself as the victim of a conspiracy. He believes the Russians deliberately drew him into the affair to make him, a Ukrainian citizen, a convenient villain. European investigators, he argues, only identified the most obvious participants without pursuing the people truly behind the operation. 

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He says it was Baburov who lured him into the trap, but he does not believe his former friend worked for the Kremlin. “They threw him away, too,” Kovacs said. Baburov, he says, was an opponent of the Russian government.

Kovacs is reluctant to answer questions about himself. Asked about his background, he says he was born in western Ukraine and had worked as a businessman. Had he worked at sea? “I’m just an amateur.” Then he interrupted: “But let’s move away from talking about me.”

He prefers to discuss what he sees as inconsistencies in the investigation. The weight of the massage pillows he transported does not match the weight of the parcels eventually shipped, he says. In his cell, he has filled a sheet of paper with tightly packed notes. Why are key figures behind the operation standing trial in Warsaw rather than Vilnius? What information was being withheld from the Lithuanian court? If the cargo had passed through Moldova, why was it not inspected at the border?

Kovacs, center, and other suspects, during their first hearing in Vilnius on April 17, 2026. | Mindaugas Kulbis/AP via Belga

Other questions he’s less eager to address. What about the pistol with its serial number filed off, or the cellphone jammer found at his home? He was only renting the property, he says. They did not belong to him.

A photograph from the opening of his trial shows Kovacs sitting in the dock, unshaven, wearing a baseball cap beneath a hood. He looks tired. In another photograph, taken before his arrest, he sits on a motocross bike with his grandson perched in front of him, showing the boy how to hold the handlebars. He’s wearing the same cap, but with the bill turned backward. He looks carefree, almost boyish.

Viola Lisija, Kovacs’ 37-year-old daughter, knows the man in that photograph better than almost anyone. “He may be the person I’m closest to in my life,” she says. On the day he was arrested, she was supposed to meet him. She was at a playground in Riga with her son, now 7, when she learned what had happened. “My son loves his grandpa very much,” she says.

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Her father had arrived in Latvia as the Soviet Union was collapsing. He initially worked in forestry before going into business, buying and selling forest land and acquiring stakes in Russian companies, including a shoe factory and an ice cream manufacturer. “Those were probably his best years,” Lisija said.

Around 2014, Russian authorities accused Kovacs of being a Ukrainian spy, according to his daughter. He was forced to stop traveling to Russia and give up his business interests there. Back in Latvia, he occasionally earned money sailing yachts from one port to another for their owners.

His background may help explain why Kovacs was of interest to the people behind the parcel operation. He had contacts in Russia, traveled between the Baltic countries and occasionally took on assignments. His daughter believed his previous troubles with the Russian authorities might also have made him a target.

Kovacs and his grandson, before his arrest. | Vasilij Kovacs

Yet parts of her father’s life remained a mystery even to her. Had he ever moved in shady circles? “I really don’t know,” Lisija says. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, she noted, entrepreneurship and organized crime were often intertwined. Her father came from a different era. She says she never saw her father with a gun. “There were never any stories that made me think: Aha, he’s disappearing at night or doing something strange.” 

Kovacs is struggling in prison. He has high blood pressure and complains of headaches. His family, too, is close to breaking point. Lisija’s son misses his grandfather. Every other day, the boy asks about him. She tells him Grandpa is at sea.

“I tell him he’s enjoying life to the fullest,” Lisija says. “I say, ‘He loves the sea, he’s a captain, and he’s off on long voyages around the world.’” 

For now, at least, the boy believes her.

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Lennart Pfahler is an investigative reporter at WELT. Artur Weigandt is a freelance journalist based in Prague. 

The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network harnesses the resources of the company’s newsrooms to publish ambitious scoops, investigations, interviews, opinion pieces and analysis. It allows journalists — including those from POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, The Telegraph, Onet and Fakt — to collaborate on major stories for an international audience of hundreds of millions across platforms: online, print, TV and audio.

Wirecard fugitive claimed he toppled Sebastian Kurz in messages to Russian spy

8 November 2026 at 17:57

Jan Marsalek, the fugitive former Wirecard executive suspected by multiple countries of spying for Russia, claimed that he had helped to bring down Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, according to documents obtained by the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, of which POLITICO is a part. 

Marsalek said he had been involved in an operation that had “successfully toppled” Kurz, who stepped down amid corruption allegations in 2021. 

The messages, detailed in investigation files seen by the Telegraph and the Global Reporters Network, were sent to Orlin Roussev, a spy-ring leader who received instructions from Marsalek and has since been jailed in Britain for espionage. The documents contain no independent evidence of the role Marsalek says he has played in Kurz’s downfall. 

If substantiated, Marsalek’s claims would be a clear indicator of the Russian state interfering directly in the political leadership of an EU country. The Kremlin has long sought to sow division and destabilize governments across Europe, according to assessments by multiple security agencies. 

Marsalek is one of the world’s most wanted men and has been on the run since June 2020 when his company, German tech giant Wirecard, collapsed with a €1.9 billion hole in its books.

Since his escape, he has been accused of working for the Kremlin for more than a decade while British police say he is involved in espionage on an “industrial” scale. He is wanted for fraud and is being investigated for spying in several European countries, including his native Austria.

Kurz was the world’s youngest leader when he first became chancellor of Austria in 2017 at the age of 31. But his stratospheric rise, which saw him hold the post twice, was marred by corruption allegations, including that public money was used for political advertising on his behalf. 

When members of Marsalek’s spy ring, led by Roussev, were arrested in the U.K., police seized hundreds of thousands of messages detailing operations plotted from British soil.

Some of these messages were shared with authorities, including Austrian officials, who are currently investigating whether their spies provided information to Marsalek and, in turn, to Russia.

‘Messy story’

One of the investigative files, examined by the Global Reporters Network, contains messages sent by a man whom authorities have identified as Marsalek, using the alias “Rupert Ticz,” on October 22, 2021.

Marsalek mentions a “guy” who “was actually working for us for a while,” adding: “now he’s the victim of a witch-hunt by the team of the former chancellor.”

He goes on to say that “we’ve successfully toppled” the former chancellor “by confiscating the mobile phone” of a friend of the then chancellor, who, according to Marsalek, was managing his “secret campaign financing.”

Marsalek then shared a link to an article about the corruption allegations against Kurz and the phone which had been seized from one of the leader’s closest associates, Thomas Schmid, a former senior official in Austria’s Finance Ministry.

Schmid’s phone had been seized in November 2019. The extensive communications recovered from the device subsequently became important evidence in several corruption investigations.

In October 2021, prosecutors carried out raids involving Kurz’s government and his political party, the ÖVP, over allegations concerning the misuse of public money for politically favorable opinion polls and media coverage. 

Pressure from the investigation led to Kurz announcing that he was stepping down. Two weeks later, Marsalek wrote to Roussev that it was “quite a messy story”.

Later in the conversation, he referred again to the political consequences of the information recovered from the phone, saying: “And the rest of the chats ‘killed’ the chancellor.”

The documents contain no independent evidence that Marsalek actually organized the seizure of the phone.

Russian ties

Marsalek’s links to Austria’s former domestic intelligence service, the BVT, have been investigated extensively and a number of senior spies and police officers are accused of handing him information for use by the Russian state.

The messages between Marsalek and Roussev are contained in Austrian police files investigating “support for a foreign intelligence service – interference in Austrian politics.” The documents also refer to possible offenses relating to elections, breaches of official duties and corruption.

An assessment of the messages by investigators notes that “Marsalek stated unequivocally that ‘they’ had ‘toppled’ the chancellor in a successful operation.”

“Marsalek thus admitted to Roussev that he had been involved in the confiscation of this mobile phone,” the report continues

The investigators therefore interpreted the conversation as Marsalek claiming involvement in the seizure of a phone that had contributed to the chancellor’s downfall.

The same assessment notes that it remained unclear whether Marsalek’s reference to “the guy” who had worked “for us” meant Wirecard or a Russian intelligence service.

Kurz declined to comment on the messages or the investigators’ assessment.

At the time the messages were sent, Marsalek was living in Moscow and carrying out work primarily for Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), British prosecutors have said.  

Roussev was one of a number of Bulgarians arrested in the UK on suspicion of spying on behalf of Russia. They were later convicted and Roussev was jailed for ten years and eight months.

The group organized surveillance operations targeting Kremlin opponents and investigative journalists and discussed kidnapping as well as planning disinformation campaigns.

The network also had access to sensitive Austrian government information. In May 2025, The Telegraph revealed that three mobile phones belonging to senior Austrian Interior Ministry officials had ended up in Russia.

These were different phones from Thomas Schmid’s device, which Austrian investigators seized in November 2019. No connection between the two incidents has been established.

Kurz’s downfall

The reference to a confiscated phone concerns one of the most important pieces of evidence in Austrian political corruption investigations of recent years.

Schmid was a senior figure in the Finance Ministry and a close associate of Sebastian Kurz. He later became head of the state-owned holding company ÖBAG.

His mobile phone was seized by Austrian investigators on November 12, 2019, and police recovered extensive communications, including messages that had previously been deleted.

Those messages later became part of several corruption investigations concerning political appointments, government advertising and allegations about the use of public money for party-political purposes.

On October 6, 2021, Austrian prosecutors searched the Federal Chancellery, the Finance Ministry and the headquarters of Kurz’s Austrian People’s Party.

The searches were part of an investigation into allegations that taxpayer money had been used to finance politically favorable opinion polls and media coverage.

The investigations led to Kurz announcing his resignation as chancellor on October 9, 2021.

Marsalek’s message to Roussev was written 13 days later, nearly two years after Schmid’s telephone was seized.

By then, details of the case including reports about thousands of intimate photographs on Schmid’s phone, which Marsalek joked about, had already appeared in the local press.

Marsalek has been out of reach of European authorities for years, and the Global Reporters Network was also unable to contact him for comment.

“The Russian secret services like causing havoc and chaos and disruption,” Ed Arnold, senior associate fellow at Royal United Services Institute think tank, told the Global Reporters Network. “But even if they don’t cause it, they are more than happy to exploit it and make political disagreements or fissures worse.”

He said Marsalek might have been “overplaying his hand” by emphasizing his role in the downfall of Kurz, adding: “If you want to make a name for yourself in this world as some kind of fixer, you need some kudos.” 

“Russia wants to destabilize our free democracies,” Manfred Weber, the German leader of the EPP in the European Parliament, told POLITICO. “It must be unequivocally ruled out that Russian intelligence services can interfere in democratic and judicial processes … These events must be thoroughly investigated.”

A spokesperson for the Federal Ministry of the Interior said that they could not comment on ongoing investigations into Marsalek’s network. 

The spokesperson told the Global Reporters Network that the “Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service does not provide information or comment on ongoing investigations or proceedings, nor does it disclose information concerning specific individuals”. 

The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network harnesses the resources of the company’s newsrooms to publish ambitious scoops, investigations, interviews, opinion pieces and analysis. It allows journalists — including those from POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, Onet, The Telegraph, and Fakt — to collaborate on major stories for an international audience of hundreds of millions across platforms: online, print, TV and audio.

Merz’s conservatives poised to nominate Germany’s first woman president

6 November 2026 at 21:02

BERLIN — Bavarian politician Ilse Aigner is set to become Germany’s next president, making her the country’s first woman to hold the office, according to two senior conservatives with knowledge of the matter.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative bloc and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) will nominate Aigner to succeed outgoing German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the officials told BILD, which, like POLITICO, is part of the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network. Both officials were granted anonymity to discuss internal party matters freely. Aigner’s nomination will officially be announced Monday, according to the officials.

Aigner, who previously served as agriculture minister under former German Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2008 to 2013, is currently president of the Bavarian State Parliament. She is also a member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

The CDU and CSU form a joint parliamentary bloc in the Bundestag and are part of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament. Merz intends to inform senior CDU politicians Sunday that Aigner will be the bloc’s candidate, the two officials said.

Steinmeier’s second five-year term ends in March 2027. He is not eligible for re-election. His successor will be elected on Jan. 30, 2027. The German presidency is largely ceremonial, with the chancellor setting the government’s policy agenda.

Bavaria’s CSU premier, Markus Söder, suggested Aigner as a candidate back in April. The CSU has long dominated Bavarian politics but has never produced a German chancellor or president. Prominent SPD and Green politicians have also signaled their support for Aigner in recent weeks.

Brandenburg’s SPD state premier, Dietmar Woidke, described Aigner as “the perfect candidate” who knows German politics “inside out,” he told POLITICO’s Berlin Playbook on Friday.

The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network harnesses the resources of the company’s newsrooms to publish ambitious scoops, investigations, interviews, opinion pieces and analysis. It allows journalists — including those from POLITICO, The Telegraph, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, Onet and Fakt — to collaborate on major stories for an international audience of hundreds of millions across platforms: online, print, TV and audio.

‘I don’t trust them’: Lithuanian president warns Putin’s provocations will continue

6 November 2026 at 09:03

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda doesn’t think a conventional Russian attack on NATO territory is likely for now, but expects Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s provocations to continue.

“I don’t think Russia is currently ready for large-scale operations,” he said in an interview with WELT, which, like POLITICO, is part of the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network. “Russia’s resources are tied up on the Ukrainian battlefield, and Russia is not succeeding there.”

“But Putin is testing us and moving ever closer to Article 5, NATO’s collective defense commitment,” he added.

According to Nausėda, the Russians want to observe how the alliance responds to so-called hybrid attacks, which are suspected to have included drone incursions, cyberattacks and arson, among other things.

The hybrid war will therefore continue, not only on NATO’s eastern flank but also in Germany, Denmark and other countries, Nausėda explained. Russia is testing “how determined we are and whether we will respond collectively when certain red lines are crossed,” the Lithuanian president said.

Nausėda, an economist who has led Lithuania since 2019, also sees no serious willingness in Moscow to enter into negotiations to end its war against Ukraine before next spring.

Moscow will use the winter months to keep up the pressure on Ukraine through air strikes on cities, he said. “The Russians will only pretend to negotiate. I don’t trust them.”

Putin will make demands that are unacceptable to Ukraine from the outset, he added. “If Ukraine gets through this winter, and I am convinced that it will, the chances of serious talks will improve in 2027. I don’t expect them any earlier.”

Joe Stanley-Smith contributed to this report.

The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network harnesses the resources of the company’s newsrooms to publish ambitious scoops, investigations, interviews, opinion pieces and analysis. It allows journalists — including those from POLITICO, The Telegraph, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, Onet and Fakt — to collaborate on major stories for an international audience of hundreds of millions across platforms: online, print, TV and audio.

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