Jamie Dettmer is associate editor and a foreign affairs columnist for POLITICO.

Cast your mind back to last year, when European leaders scrambled back and forth across the Atlantic, seeking to patch up tattered relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

After the Oval Office brawl where a scolded Zelenskyy pushed back against Trump and his vice president before being ejected from the White House, then-U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron led the effort to engineer a call between the pair, during which the Ukrainian president expressed regret about the meeting — but fell short of apologizing.

Likewise, after Trump’s August summit in Alaska with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Starmer and his top security adviser Jonathan Powell worked feverishly alongside other European leaders to rescue the broken relationship between Kyiv and Washington. They even came up with a ceasefire plan and got U.S. buy-in. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte also did some heavy lifting.

But this time, after Trump unveiled a controversial diesel deal with Russia and called — once again — for Zelenskyy to step down, the European reaction has been less febrile. Of course, they have offered Kyiv strong rhetorical support and unveiled more Russia sanctions, but there has been no frantic, panicky outreach effort to Trump to mediate a speedy repair.

Why not?

Because the Trump shock factor is wearing off, hazards Ukraine’s former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “The primary answer is that they have got used to him,” he told POLITICO. “They have all had an immunity shot, and they don’t feel as scared as they did last year.”

“Another reason is they’re drowning in their own problems,” he added. “And I think that first they feel they have to try to figure out how what Trump is doing will impact them — how big their bill will become as a result.”

European leaders are not scrambling like they did last year because Trump is “losing his leverage,” said Lia Quartapelle, an Italian lawmaker from the opposition Democratic Party who is vice chair of the parliament’s Foreign and European Affairs Committee. “We realize he cannot be trusted and we are on our own,” so there’s little point lobbying him.

According to the Financial Times, EU officials plan to urge Zelenskyy to tone down his increasingly sharp remarks about Trump, fearing they are only inflaming the situation. Starmer’s successor, Andy Burnham, is positioning himself as someone who can “lay the ground” for a reconciliation, he explained to the House of Commons Wednesday. 

Nonetheless, the calmer reaction to Trump’s maneuvers stands out, acknowledges Daniel Fried, a former senior U.S. diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs under U.S. President George W. Bush.

“The Europeans seem to have taken Trump’s measure,” Fried told POLITICO. “They want to avoid the worst. They want to mitigate the damage over the next two years while Trump is in office. They do work with people in the Trump administration with whom they can work. And there are such people.” 

Speaking from Warsaw, fresh from attending a recent security conference in the Polish capital, he said the Europeans understand now that much of what Trump does is performative and has a short life span — like the Russian diesel deal, which has a shelf life of two or three days, he said. “I’m not sure it’s going anywhere as it is utterly impractical and legally questionable, and it isn’t clear the Russians actually can supply the diesel,” he said. In other words, why get worked up about it?

Fried said in his conversations with European leaders and officials, he has detected increasing exasperation with the overall inconsistency of the American position: “Trump wants Europe to do more militarily, but it must buy American,” he said. “But we can’t sell to the Europeans because of our needs, so they will have to wait even though they can’t build it themselves. Nonetheless, they have to carry the load in Ukraine without us. That’s utterly inconsistent, and they are exasperated by it.” 

And they’re just tired of having Trump jerk them around, Fried added. “One thing they are trying to avoid is having Trump snap his fingers and they come flying. Because then it looks like they are at Trump’s beck and call and are his supplicants, and they don’t want to do that. Besides, if they fly out and talk him into something, how long will what he agreed to last?”  

Of course, the Europeans can also console themselves with the high chance of Trump reversing himself. “There is a pattern,” said Kuleba. “He launches a cavalry attack … and then retreats. That’s what we saw in February last year. That’s what we saw in November 2025. And that’s what we will see this time too.”

EU leaders meet today for their first chance to beef about the budget face to face.

On the show, Zoya Sheftalovich and Sarah Wheaton dive deeper into why leaders look increasingly unlikely to reach an agreement on the EU’s next money pot by December. Plus, Zoya obtained a document revealing deepening relations between Russia and Slovakia. Will that be a cause for concern around the Council table?

Next up, Zoya spoke with Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius on stage yesterday. His main message? Europe should boost its defense capabilities and stop relying so heavily on U.S. military support.

And finally, ECB President Christine Lagarde plugged her upcoming memoir at a press conference … is she allowed to do that? 

If you have a question or comment, don’t hesitate! message us on our WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Articles mentioned in this episode:

• “How to watch the EU leaders’ summit like a pro.”
• “Slovakia deepening ties with Russia, document shows.”
• “Lagarde’s book plug raises questions about ECB ethics standards.”
• “Weakened Macron and Merz sink hopes of a quick EU budget deal.”

BRUSSELS — Slovakia is reviving a dormant cooperation forum with Moscow, putting Russia’s gas and oil supplies, nuclear fuel and the treatment of Russian athletes high on the agenda of their first such meeting in five years, according to a Russian government note obtained by POLITICO.

The note, written by Russian Science and Higher Education Minister Valery Falkov, says Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár agreed during an Aug. 20 video call to hold a meeting of the Russian-Slovak Intergovernmental Commission in Moscow.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico said Wednesday the meeting is scheduled for Nov. 25. The Russian note — which is dated Sept. 10 — initially set the date of the meeting as Oct. 26-27.

The IGC, which covers economic, scientific and technical cooperation, has been dormant since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The last meeting was the commission’s 21st session, held in Bratislava on Nov. 12, 2021.

The meeting comes as Moscow finds openings in other international arenas. The U.S. has invited Vladimir Putin to December’s G20 summit in Miami, while the International Olympic Committee has provisionally lifted its suspension of the Russian Olympic Committee and urged sports bodies to ease restrictions on Russian athletes.

Asked about the purported agenda for the IGC, the Slovak foreign ministry directed POLITICO to Blanár’s public statements after the Aug. 20 call. “We pursue a policy in all directions and maintain dialogue with all countries that are interested in pragmatic cooperation with us for the benefit of the Slovak Republic’s national interests,” Blanár said at the time.

The Russian foreign ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

The renewed push for warmer Slovak-Russian relations follows Fico’s May 9 visit to Moscow, where he met Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during Victory Day commemorations. It comes after Viktor Orbán’s defeat in Hungary’s April election, which cost Putin one of his closest partners in Europe and forced him to look elsewhere for EU allies.

Months before losing the election to Péter Magyar, Orbán rebooted the Russian-Hungarian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, which had been suspended for several years after the 2022 invasion. Magyar’s government did not confirm to POLITICO whether the commission would go ahead next year.

EU leaders, including Fico, will gather in Brussels on Thursday for a two-day summit focused on issues including energy prices and support for Ukraine, with the country’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expected to join them for a conversation on Friday.

Oil imports and cultural integration

In the August video call, Blanár raised Slovakia’s opposition to the EU’s phaseout of Russian gas imports and asked to discuss supplies at the Moscow meeting, according to the document, which POLITICO could not independently verify but bears the hallmarks of a legitimate Russian ministerial note. Slovak representatives also stressed the importance of continued Russian oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline and welcomed regular shipments of nuclear fuel for Slovak power plants, according to the note.

Slovakia remains heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas, and Fico has argued that ending imports would raise costs. When the two leaders met in Moscow on May 9, Putin said Russia would do everything to meet Slovakia’s energy needs.  

The agenda for the meeting next month reaches beyond energy, according to the document. The sides plan to explore working groups on culture, tourism, agriculture and environmental protection, and to discuss the status of the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Bratislava.

Falkov also records Blanár’s opposition to what the note calls the “discrimination against Russian athletes” at international competitions, noting the issue is to be discussed at the IGC meeting.

The International Olympic Committee lifted the suspension of the Russian Olympic Committee in July and said its previous recommendations restricting Russian athletes’ participation no longer applied. World Archery lifted restrictions on Russian athletes and officials in August. FIFA President Gianni Infantino has also called for Russia to be allowed back into international football.

The approach echoes Moscow’s recent effort to lock in closer ties with Orbán’s Hungary. Budapest and Moscow in December agreed on a 12-point plan to expand cooperation in areas including energy, trade and culture. The plan was signed by then Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko after talks in Moscow in December. The Slovak note points to a similar breadth of ambition.

The Kremlin’s outreach to Fico shows how Moscow can use energy ties to pull individual EU countries away from a united stance on Ukraine. Putin made a similar pitch in Washington last weekend: After a call with the Russian leader, President Donald Trump said Russia would supply diesel to U.S. and global markets to bring down fuel prices. The deal would provide revenue to Moscow while weakening efforts to maintain a united front against the Kremlin.

But there are questions over whether Putin can follow through on his pledge to Trump. Ukraine has been stepping up drone strikes on Russian refineries, aiming to disrupt fuel supplies and cut revenue for Moscow’s war effort. Kyiv said this month that strikes had disabled 51 percent of Russia’s oil-refining capacity.

As the United States looks towards Russia for diesel, European leaders are doubling down on their support for Ukraine.

On the show, hosts Zoya Sheftalovich and Ian Wishart unpack all the ways the EU plans to put its money where its mouth is and help Kyiv. Expect it to be the talk of the town at this week’s meeting of leaders at the European Council summit.

Next, exclusive polling coming out of Spain shows that 58% of Spaniards fear tensions with Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla could spiral into an armed conflict in the next 10 years. We discuss what this means for a country that’s heading into a snap election at the end of next month.

Speaking of Spain, we’re launching Madrid Playbook today! For our Spanish-speaking listeners, subscribe why don’t you?

Finally, Ursula von der Leyen may have been smiling in influencer videos filmed after her State of the Union speech, but behind closed doors, her comms teams was furious.

Questions? Comments? Let us know on our WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Articles mentioned in this episode:

• “Poll: Spaniards say Ceuta crisis could spark armed conflict with Morocco.”
• “Ukraine’s FM: Russia’s war budget makes the case for using frozen assets now.”
• “EU approves biggest Russia sanctions package since invasion began.”
  

The EU approved its biggest package of sanctions against Russia since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, targeting the Kremlin’s ability to make missiles.

The bloc’s foreign ministers approved the package during a meeting in Luxembourg, adding 1,600 new listings “targeting Russia’s military-industrial complex,” the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas said on X.

“This is the single largest expansion of our sanctions list since Russia started its war,” she added. “More than half are connected to the production chain for ballistic missiles.”

The new listings follow the removal of Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, two of Russia’s wealthiest men, from the sanctions list last month after heated, down-to-the-wire talks between EU capitals.

Monday’s approval was a formality after EU countries agreed on the sanctions list in earlier talks.

“We are making it significantly harder, slower and more expensive for Russia to produce the weapons it uses to kill Ukrainians,” Kallas said.

The sanctions list will last for three years before it needs to be renewed.

Andrii Sybiha is Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs

Europe can no longer remain immobilized on Russian assets. Now is the time to use them for Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

This decision, which is long overdue, would be a game changer that could shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor — particularly if taken alongside strong sanctions pressure. But to achieve this, we have to be faster and more decisive than Russia.

According to the latest reports, Russia plans to spend a record €180 billion on its military in 2027 — more than 40% above its 2026 defense allocation. And that is only part of the picture. The country’s draft federal budget allocates a combined €669 billion to defense and security for the 2027–2029 period.

These figures make clear Russia wants war. Moscow is increasing the pressure, intensifying its terror against Ukrainian civilians and raising the cost of defense for both Ukraine and Europe. But as the cost of war grows, it should grow faster for the aggressor.

The higher the price for Moscow, the sooner peace will be restored. Half-hearted pressure on Russia and half-measures in support of Ukraine will only prolong conflict and increase the overall price tag. Decisive steps can bring it to a close.

At the end of August, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland addressed the European Commission, urging renewed discussion on the full use of immobilized Russian assets. We are grateful to them. But it is now time to turn this discussion into a legal process: launch a permanent platform, engage experts and develop the decision.

Europe has taken the hardest step already. In 2022, the G7 immobilized some €300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, roughly €210 billion of them in the EU. In 2024, the G7 borrowed $50 billion for Ukraine against the future windfall profits on those reserves. And in December 2025, the bloc made the immobilization open-ended.

What remains undecided is the only step that matters: using the assets themselves.

Every argument for and against this has been heard, and the debate now revolves around its scope and how to mitigate associated risks.

The prevailing view is that the decision to use these assets must not expose any single country to disproportionate risk — above all Belgium, where most of the assets sit at Euroclear. We agree. To that end, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry proposed a clear plan to the European Commission: placing the assets under collective EU control, so that the decision to use them — and the liability for doing so — is European, not Belgian.

Belgium’s exposure is a reason to share the risk, not to do nothing.

Another common argument is that any decision must cover immobilized assets in every jurisdiction, not only those at Euroclear. Again, we agree — with one caveat: This can be done but on parallel tracks. Europe should not make its own decision contingent on protracted global coordination when its security is in peril.

Skeptics raise four objections of principle against the full use of these assets: that using them breaks the rule of law, that it undermines the euro as a reserve currency, that it gives away leverage in peace talks, and that Russia would retaliate by seizing Western assets.

Let’s take these arguments in turn.

On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.

Russia must be the one to pay for the damage it has caused and continues to cause, not European taxpayers.

We should be sending the right signal to Moscow: That it will not outlast our resolve.

We should be sending the right signal to skeptical audiences across Europe ahead of a major election year: That the rising cost of Ukraine’s defense will be covered at the expense of Russia.

Last but not least, we should be sending the right signal to the Ukrainian people: that they are not alone in confronting the aggressor.

The full use of Russian assets would bring tangible and immediate results, strengthening Ukraine on the frontline and bringing peace closer. After four years, Europe should no longer be immobilized on major decisions. It needs political will, collective commitment and a solid legal formula.

We urge EU leaders to make this vital decision without delay. And we look forward to the European bravery in taking this critical step.

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

A Russian attack that killed at least 17 people including three children in Ukraine are Moscow’s “thanks for the lifting on sanctions on diesel exports,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Saturday.

A series of strikes on the south-eastern city of Zaporizhzhia also injured at least 18 people, including three children, Ukraine’s state emergency services said on Saturday afternoon.

“People continue to be searched for under the rubble of destroyed houses. Rescue operations continue,” said Mykhailo Semikin, acting head of Zaporizhzhia regional military administration in a Telegram post.

“Today, Russia expressed its thanks for the lifting of sanctions on diesel exports by dropping five glide bombs on residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia,” Zelenskyy said on X.

The strikes took place just one day after U.S. President Donald Trump announced he would temporarily lift sanctions on Russian diesel in a bid to bring soaring prices down.

Ukrainian officials were meeting on the same day with European and U.S. officials in Miami in a fresh diplomatic push to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Zelenskyy criticized the deal on Friday and accused Trump of using the peace talks as a “smokescreen” while pursuing a deal with the Kremlin.

Even though the talks were supposed to last two days, the Ukrainian team decided to return home earlier then planned “because they managed to talk everything through earlier,” a senior official familiar with the matter told POLITICO. Ukraine will continue to bomb Russian oil refineries despite US-Russia deals, the official added.

The Ukrainian armed forces said Saturday they struck a major oil facility in Russia’s Samara region overnight.

Zelenskyy is currently busy coordinating with Europeans and preparing several high-level meetings, the official said. He spoke on Saturday with leaders of France, Norway and Finland.

“Russian strikes killed over 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days. Moreover, it has stepped up its hybrid attacks against Europe, both EU Member States and NATO Allies,” Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, said Saturday. “Suspending sanctions on Russian diesel provides Moscow with more revenues to wage war.”

“On Monday, EU Foreign Ministers intend to approve the biggest set of sanctions listings targeting Russia’s war machine since the start of the war,” Kallas added.

This article was updated.