Texas Attorney General-elect Nathan Johnson. | Katina Zentz/San Antonio Express-News via Getty Images
If you paid attention to Supreme Court litigation during the Biden administration, you would have noticed a surprisingly high number of cases with names like Biden v. Texas or United States v. Texas. Texas’s outgoing attorney general, Ken Paxton, once bragged that he sued the Biden administration 106 times during his time as Texas’s top legal officer.
But the Republican Party’s entire legal strategy was dealt a very serious blow during Tuesday’s electoral landslide for Republicans. One of the casualties was Mayes Middleton, the Republican who hoped to succeed Paxton as attorney general. For the first time since the late 1990s, Texas’s top lawyer will be a Democrat, Attorney General-elect Nathan Johnson.
Texas’s central role in political litigation won’t end entirely, but this upset means no more lawsuits brought by the state of Texas that seek to impose the Republican Party’s policies from the bench. In the nearly three decades since a Democrat has served as Texas’s attorney general, Republicans have used their control over the state AG’s office to shape everything from immigration policy, to environmental regulation, to who receives overtime pay.
But, thanks to Johnson’s victory this week, they will no longer control one of the most powerful litigation shops in the United States.
Three reasons why Texas is so central to the Republican Party’s legal strategy
The Texas attorney general role is such an important prize for Republicans for three reasons. One is simply that Texas is a big, wealthy state that employs many lawyers. The attorney general alone oversees nearly 750 attorneys, about as many as you may find in a large multinational law firm. So Texas can afford to divert several — or even several dozen — of these lawyers into partisan litigation.
The second reason is that Texas’s federal courts are unusually friendly to Republicans, and they follow unusual rules that all-but-guarantee that the Republican Party will win short-term victories in many cases.
Many of Texas’s federal trial courts effectively allow litigants to choose which judge will hear their case. That means that when Texas (or any other litigant challenging a Democratic policy) files a lawsuit, it can often handpick a judge who will embrace legal arguments that most judges would find ridiculous. In 2022, for example, anti-abortion activists selected Matthew Kacsmaryk, a Trump-appointed judge known for far right religious views andhis reactionary views on sexuality, to hear their lawsuit seeking to ban the abortion drug mifepristone. Kacsmaryk promptly complied with their request — although his decision was eventually tossed out by a unanimous Supreme Court.
The immediate upshot of Johnson’s victory is that the Texas AG’s office will soon be less relevant than it has been for many years.
After being heard by a handpicked trial judge, moreover, federal cases in Texas appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which is dominated by MAGA-aligned judges and is one of the few courts in America where the median judge is more sympathetic to Republicans than the median Supreme Court justice.
The Supreme Court, in fairness, often reverses this outlier appeals court. But the justices typically only grant about 60 of the 7,000 to 8,000 petitions asking them to review lower court decisions. So, once a Democratic litigant loses in the Fifth Circuit, their only recourse is to beg for mercy from a Republican Supreme Court that ignores most of the cases that are brought to its attention.
And even when the Supreme Court does reverse the Fifth Circuit, it often delays that decision long enough to hand Republicans a significant policy victory. In 2021, for example, Kacsmaryk ordered the Biden administration to reinstate a Trump-era border policy. Though the Supreme Court eventually reversed Kacsmaryk, it sat on the case for nearly an entire year — leaving Kacsmaryk’s injunction in place the entire time.
Similarly, after MAGA Judge Drew Tipton issued an unlawful order limiting the Biden administration’s authority over Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Supreme Court allowed Tipton’s order to remain in effect for 11 months before finally intervening.
Notably, both of these lawsuits were brought by Paxton, in his role as Texas attorney general.
Of course, now that Texas will no longer bring the same mix of partisan cases to the Fifth Circuit, private litigants may still do so — the mifepristone case, after all, was filed by anti-abortion groups and by anti-abortion doctors, not by Paxton. But that brings us to the third reason why Republican control of the Texas attorney general’s office is so important to the party’s legal strategy: States are particularly effective plaintiffs in federal litigation.
The Constitution only allows a plaintiff to bring a federal lawsuit if they can show that they were injured in some way by the defendant they are suing — a requirement known as “standing.” This requirement often trips up litigants who wish to challenge a federal policy that they find objectionable, but that doesn’t actually impose any special obligations upon them. The mifepristone litigation fizzled, for example, because none of the plaintiffs could show that they were harmed in any way by the fact that mifepristone is legal. As the Supreme Court explained, “a plaintiff’s desire to make a drug less available for others does not establish standing to sue.”
But the Supreme Court said in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) that states are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis,” so states are often allowed to bring suits that private litigants cannot. And a large state like Texas often has many expenses and revenue streams that are impacted by virtually any federal policy. In 2015, for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas had standing to challenge a major Obama-era immigration program because the program would allow more immigrants to reside in the state of Texas, and that would cost Texas money because it would have to issue these immigrants driver’s licenses.
Of course, Texas is only one of three states within the Fifth Circuit. Once Johnson is sworn in as Texas’s Democratic attorney general, the Republican attorneys general of Louisiana and Mississippi will still be able to bring cases to this MAGAfied court. And they will enjoy the same “special solicitude” the courts give to Texas. But both the Mississippi and the Louisiana AG’s offices are much smaller than Texas’s. So they will likely only have the resources to bring a fraction of the number of partisan lawsuits filed by Paxton.
The Texas AG’s office was also a major pipeline for talented Republicans to advance their careers
No doubt because the Texas attorney general’s office played such an important role in shaping the Republican Party’s legal strategy, it was an attractive employer for many talented Republicans who spent a few years working in this office before moving on to bigger things.
Though Paxton lost his bid for the US Senate on Tuesday, it’s notable that Texas Republicans chose the sitting AG as their Senate candidate. Outgoing Texas Gov. Greg Abbott, a Republican, is also a former Texas attorney general. As is outgoing Republican US Sen. John Cornyn. Texas’s other senator, Republican Ted Cruz, spent five years as Abbott’s state solicitor general.
Similarly, two of the leading contenders for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham, also previously held high-level positions in the Texas AG’s office. With Democrats now set to control the Senate for Trump’s last two years in office, it’s hard to imagine any nominee will be confirmed to the Supreme Court for as long as Trump is president. But Oldham, at least, is still young enough that he could remain a contender in a future Republican administration.
These striverslaunched very successful careers in the Texas AG’s officebecause Texas’s unusually right-wing federal courts allowed lawyers who worked in that office to be extraordinarily successful in advancing Republican policy goals, and in sabotaging Democratic administrations.
The immediate upshot of Johnson’s victory is that the Texas AG’s office will soon be less relevant than it has been for many years. Democrats won’t be able to wield this office in the same way that Republicans did, because Texas’s far-right federal courts aren’t going to start striking down Republican policies just because a Democratic state AG asks them to do so. But, at the very least, Democrats just neutralized one of the most powerful weapons in the Republican arsenal.
Protesters for and against transgender athletes competing in women's sports gather outside the Supreme Court on January 13, 2026, in Washington, DC. | Heather Diehl/Getty Images
There was one significant surprise during the Supreme Court’s Tuesday argument in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, a case asking whether Colorado may require schools that accept state funding to treat LGBTQ families and students the same way they treat anyone else. For a brief moment, Chief Justice John Roberts seemed like he might break with his Republican colleagues and uphold Colorado’s policy.
St. Mary arises out of a program that provides state-funded preschool to all Colorado children. Families are allowed to choose which school they wish their young child to attend, and private religious schools are eligible to participate in this program. But state law also prohibits any school that receives this funding from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
The plaintiffs include Catholic-identified schools that wish to exclude the children of same-sex couples, but that claim they should nonetheless be funded by Colorado’s taxpayers.
In recent years, the Court has followed a consistent pattern in cases that pit religious conservatives against LGBTQ Americans — religious conservatives always win. As several justices noted during Tuesday’s arguments, the Court’s legal doctrines governing these cases are incoherent and often seem to call for illogical results. But the pattern still holds. When a religious conservative seeks an exemption from a state or federal law that prohibits anti-LGBTQ discrimination, this Court gives them the exemption.
As Roberts pointed out early in the St. Mary argument, these plaintiffs are asking the Court to reach beyond its previous precedents. In Carson v. Makin(2022), the Court required Maine to include religious schools in a tuition voucher program that, under Maine law, only funded secular private schools. But Colorado’s program includes religious schools.
Colorado is perfectly willing to subsidize Catholic schools. It merely insists that those schools, like all other preschools in Colorado, must treat gay and trans people the same way they treat anyone else if they receive taxpayers’ money. If a Catholic school (or any other religious school, for that matter) does not wish to comply with this condition, it may still operate. It just won’t receive money from the state.
Yet, while Roberts’s first questions during Tuesday’s argument suggested that he might consider voting in favor of Colorado, none of his five Republican colleagues appeared open to that position (although Justice Amy Coney Barrett did ask some questions suggesting that she may hand Colorado a narrower loss than the Court’s right flank would prefer). And, by the end of the argument, even Roberts seemed sympathetic to the orthodox Republican position that, when LGBTQ rights conflict with religious conservatism, the religious party wins.
This suggests that soon, taxpayers will be required to fund discriminatory institutions, even in states where such discrimination is forbidden by law.
The two partisan factions on the Supreme Court live in completely different universes in religion cases
Roberts’s early question aside, one thing that was absolutely clear from Tuesday’s argument is that the Court’s Democratic minority and its Republican majority bring completely different values to the table in cases like St. Mary.
All three of the Court’s Democrats expressed concern that, if their Court doesn’t someday draw a line in the sand and say that religious conservatives do not receive literally any accommodation that they ask for in federal litigation, then that will lead to immoral results and prevent important American institutions from functioning.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for example, asked why, if religious schools are permitted to discriminate against gay people, aren’t they also allowed to discriminate against Black people? What if, for example, someone who sincerely believes that racial segregation is mandated by God opens up a school that excludes Black children?
Similarly, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson asked about a hypothetical school which teaches that only boys, and not girls, should be taught mathematics. Under the plaintiffs’ legal theory in St. Mary, why wouldn’t this school be entitled to an exemption from state laws requiring all schools to teach certain subjects, including math, to all students?
Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan asked deputy US solicitor general Sarah Harris (the Trump administration, naturally, supports the anti-LGBTQ side in St. Mary) whether ordinary public schools would be subject to a rule requiring states to accommodate the religious beliefs of anti-LGBTQ parents. When Harris indicated that they would, Kagan then asked why the parent of a public school student couldn’t demand that their child be educated in a different classroom than the children of same-sex parents — or demand some other accommodation that public schools would find it very difficult to provide?
But the Republican justices dismissed these concerns, with many of them suggesting that religious objectors may demand an exemption from nearly any law. The dominant view among the Court’s Republicans appeared to be that any law that imposes obligations on a religious conservative must survive a rigid legal rule known as “strict scrutiny,” the most skeptical level of review that courts apply in constitutional cases.
Nearly all government policies that are subjected to strict scrutiny fail, so, if strict scrutiny applies in cases like St. Mary, that would mean that religious conservatives nearly always prevail. Though, in fairness, Eric Rassbach, the plaintiffs’ lawyer in St. Mary, did suggest that a ban on race discrimination might be the rare law that can be enforced against religious schools. So, under the Republican justices’ approach, religious schools may not be allowed to exclude Black students. But they’d have free rein to violate many other laws.
With the exception of Roberts, the only Republican on the Court who seemed open to a more nuanced rule than simply applying strict scrutiny in every case was Barrett. And it’s not like Barrett was particularly sympathetic to the state.
Still, Barrett did float a way to decide this case that may be slightly narrower than many of her Republican colleagues’ views. Briefly, Barrett drew a distinction between a school that outright forbids the children of same-sex parents from attending, and a school that allows these children to attend, but only if the parents sign a statement denouncing homosexuality and agreeing to restrictions on their personal conduct — such as never appearing together at the school at the same time, so that no one can see that one of the school’s students has two parents of the same sex.
Barrett seemed to suggest that perhaps the Court could uphold Colorado’s ban on absolute exclusion, while simultaneously permitting religious schools to impose these humiliating obligations on same-sex families. As a practical matter, however, it is unclear how this rule would differ from one endorsing total exclusion of gay parents, because what parent would agree to these restrictions?
In any event, after Tuesday’s argument, it is hard to imagine the Court handing Colorado, or same-sex parents, anything that resembles a real win. Whether the Court endorses allowing schools to exclude same-sex parents entirely, or embraces something like Barrett’s rule, the practical result is likely to be the same. Religious conservatives get what they want; LGBTQ Americans must yield to the interests of those conservatives.
Loss aversion is a phenomenon in psychology and behavioral economics. Defined simply, it means that the pain experienced from a loss is felt twice as much as winning. In politics, that intensity manifests itself in motivation. If you take something away from people, they are going to feel it more acutely than promising them something, and the theft produces a backlash.
That’s what appears to be happening right now with Black voters. Across the country, they have been lining up to vote early, presumably against Donald Trump and the Republican Party’s MAGA agenda, in astonishing numbers, particularly in the South. That this comes only six months after the Supreme Court gutted the Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais should not come as a surprise.
In the Trump era, Republicans have become experienced at taking rights away from the American people. For women, it was the roll back of their constitutional rights when the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in 2022, sparking a backlash in that year’s midterm elections. Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, immigrants have come under assault from a xenophobic administration intent on carrying out mass deportations via masked, secret police rampaging through neighborhoods. The LGBTQ+ community, and trans people in particular, have seen their rights stripped away.
To many Black Americans, the GOP’s agenda and behavior will not have come as a surprise. After all, it’s been at the core of their history going back to before the country’s founding.
These policies have come as a shock to some Americans who never thought Trump would go there, and they have also opened the eyes of others to the cruelty at the heart of MAGA, overseen by the highest court of the land. But to many Black Americans, the GOP’s agenda and behavior will not have come as a surprise. After all, it’s been at the core of their history going back to before the country’s founding.
Black Americans know what it means to have their civil rights taken away from them. They understand fully the fear of being targeted by brutal, marauding gangs of armed men. In the decade following the Civil War and the passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments, Black people began to participate fully in civil society. Mississippi elected two Black U.S. senators and a lieutenant governor, and former slaves and their offspring enjoyed freedom of speech, movement and opportunity. But the white members of Southern society would not let that stand, and as soon as the federal government withdrew its troops, they stepped in with legal and social barriers to deny Black Americans their rights, this time backed by vigilante and state violence that became Jim and Jane Crow.
Almost a century had passed by the time Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965, a period characterized by subjugation and violence by the white majority. But Black America kept fighting, against all odds, until they won.
This year, we have seen yet another attempt by reactionary politicians and judges to turn back the clock. After the Callais decision, several Southern states reverted immediately to form and radically redrew their congressional districts to favor the white majority, making it much more difficult for voters to elect a Black federal and state representatives.
They may come to regret that decision. This isn’t 1955 (or 1855) anymore, as much as Donald Trump would like to make it so, and the Black community is once again mobilizing. According to experts, early voting data is showing something unexpected: The vote is being driven by young voters rather than just those who went through the earlier battles. It’s muscle memory for the Black community.
After 2024, when Trump won a surprising 15% of the Black vote — nearly doubling his share of 8% in the 2020 election — Republicans thought they were defying history to make great inroads within the community. Then, incredibly, the administration began attacking Black America. The result is what some politicos are calling a “Blacklash,” and it could very well be decisive in some places where nobody expected the Democrats to do well. And even if it doesn’t result in flipping seats, it’s a shot across the bow.
In Mississippi, prosecutor and former judge Scott Colom, who is Black, is running an excellent race against Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith, the GOP incumbent. Colom has made some very clever advertisements which have garnered a lot of national attention, but Republicans and Democrats alike had largely ignored the race until just a couple of months ago. Polling has tightened, and the GOP has dispatched an influx of luminaries, including Trump himself. For the first time in years, Democrats from Bill Clinton to Kamala Harris, along with a long line of senators, have descended on the state to support Colom. Former President Barack Obama even cut an ad for him. Mississippi has the largest population of Black voters of any state in the country. If Colum gets a big Black turnout with just enough disaffected whites, he could win.
Louisiana, after giving birth to the case that saw the Supreme Court’s conservative majority gut the Voting Rights Act, has been winnowed down to one majority Black district in a state that is one-third African-American. But there has been a surge in Black participation akin to what is seen in presidential years, which could prove decisive in a race for Louisiana’s open Senate seat that has been a sleeper until the last couple of weeks. According to a recent poll, Republican Julia Letlow and Democrat Jamie Davis are tied. Among voters who have already cast their ballot, Davis — who is Black — holds a six-point advantage, and 34% of early votes have been cast by Black Louisianans.
Then there’s South Carolina, which has seen Trump make three desperate appearances to shore up Darline Graham’s torpid campaign. The endangered incumbent, foisted upon South Carolina Republicans by the president himself following the sudden death of her brother, Sen. Lindsey Graham, is not getting the job done. As numbers cruncher Nate Silver pointed out, a recent New York Times poll showing the race essentially tied is not an outlier; she is in deep trouble. As of late October, the Times reports, “Black voters accounted for around 28 percent of early votes, while making up around 20 percent of the overall electorate in recent cycles. The trend is not unlike what we’re seeing in Georgia and North Carolina thus far.” If that holds true through Election Day, we could see the biggest upset of the whole campaign, largely due to Black South Carolinians saying “Enough is enough.”
In a few short hours, all the ads, mailers, signs and rallies will mercifully come to an end. I am cautiously optimistic, but like many, I’ll never celebrate prematurely again. There is good reason, though, to feel more positive than we have in a long time. Trump and his acolytes have overreached. Opting for the big tech credo of “move fast and break things,” they vastly overestimated their abilities — and the American people’s tolerance.
They have also aroused a group of Americans who know what it is to lose their rights and privileges. With all that history and so many battles, Black Americans have shown what it takes to never give up.
The Trump administration’s final bid to get the Supreme Court to interfere in the midterms, at least before Election Day, focuses on California. | Win McNamee/Getty Images
Here’s a hot take: The outcome of the 2026 midterms is unlikely to turn on close races in California. California has no statewide races that are expected to be close, and it is a solid blue state that recently redrew its US House maps to maximize Democratic gains.
So it’s a bit baffling that the Trump administration’s final bid to get the Supreme Court to interfere in the midterms, at least before Election Day, focuses on California. On Monday, the eve of the election, President Donald Trump’s Justice Department asked the justices to order California to “segregate” as many as 20,000 ballots and place them in a special pile where they may never be counted.
The case emerges out of a list of over 20,000 names that the Trump administration first sent to California on October 13, asking election officials to separate their ballots and verify the voters’ eligibility. The administration claims that these individuals are “likely” noncitizens, but that they are nonetheless registered to vote in California.
But it is unlikely that many — or even, potentially, any — of the names on this list are actually noncitizens who are registered to vote in California. Shortly after receiving Trump’s list, Los Angeles County officials took a sample of 200 names from the list to see if they are actually noncitizens who appear on the state’s voter rolls. In their preliminary review, they determined that nearly 40 percent of the names on the list belong to people who were born in the United States (and thus are almost certainly US citizens), and that 56 percent of the individuals on the list either canceled their registration or their registration is no longer active. Over 70 percent have never voted in California.
Again, this is only a preliminary review. It is likely that further investigation will determine that even more of these individuals are either citizens or not actually registered to vote in California.
This high error rate, moreover, closely mirrors a similar drama that played out earlier this year in Nevada. The Trump administration initially claimed that as many as 16,000 noncitizens appear on that state’s voter rolls, but when they later flagged a list of supposed noncitizen voters for Nevada officials, only 185 names appeared on the list. Nevada later determined that all 185 of these individuals are, in fact, citizens.
So Trump wants the Supreme Court to interfere in the 2026 midterms based on a list of 20,000 names that is completely unreliable, and that may not identify a single actual person who is both registered to vote in California and a noncitizen. And even if all 20,000 of these individuals did cast a vote in the upcoming midterms, moreover, it is unlikely that they would change the result of any election. Just shy of 11 million people voted in California’s 2022 midterm elections, so the 20,000 people identified by Trump’s administration are a tiny fraction of the California electorate.
And, on top of that, Trump’s lawyers are not even asking the Supreme Court to disenfranchise these 20,000 people — at least not yet. At this early stage of the litigation, Trump’s lawyers merely seek a court order requiring California to set these individuals’ ballots aside to determine if they are citizens or not.
None of what Trump’s lawyers are asking for is legal. But the most striking thing about this case, which is known as United States v. California, is its weakness. Even if the justices agree with the Trump administration’s extra-legal claim that it can require a state to set aside ballots based on a highly dubious allegation that some of those ballots might belong to a noncitizen, that decision is unlikely to change the result of any 2026election — although it could potentially allow this administration to sow chaos in 2028.
Trump’s legal arguments are garbage
Just in case there’s any doubt, there is absolutely no legal basis whatsoever for the Supreme Court to rule in favor of Trump’s administration.
For starters, Trump’s lawyers rely on a statute which makes it a federal misdemeanor for some noncitizens to vote in a federal election. Notably, nothing in this statute regulates the state of California, or any other state. It does not prohibit state officials from counting any ballot, or require them to segregate any ballots into a special pile. This statute merely empowers the federal government to bring criminal charges against an individual noncitizen who votes illegally.
If the Trump administration actually believes that any of the 20,000 names on its list are noncitizen voters, in other words, then its recourse is to gather enough evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one of those individuals violated federal law. Then it can charge that individual with a crime and potentially obtain a conviction. The statute simply does not permit federal courts to order segregation of ballots.
Meanwhile, a separate federal law requires states to “complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” So it’s actually illegal for California to comply with a request to remove the supposed noncitizens from its voter rolls, because this request came within 90 days of a federal election.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court said less than two weeks ago in Scanlan v. Coalition for Open Democracy (2026), federal courts “should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Trump’s lawyers filed their brief to the justices in the California case on the literal eve of an election.
Finally, as Judge Mark Bennett, a Trump appointee, explained in an opinion arguing that Trump must lose this case, it is unlikely that California could comply with an order requiring it to segregate the contested ballots even if it wanted to. The state says that segregating these ballots “would be a logistical and administrative nightmare” because the list “does not contain the information necessary to identify voters; the Registrar has no established system for segregating ballots; and trying to create one now risks shutting down the system the Registrar needs to run the entire election.”
Additionally, Bennett writes, California “also lack[s] the ability to verify voters’ citizenship status before December 4, 2026—the deadline for counties to certify their election results to the Secretary of State.”
Given these flaws in Trump’s case, it is unlikely that even this Supreme Court will order California to set aside the contested ballots. And, if Trump somehow does prevail, it is also unlikely that such a decision would change the result of any 2026 race.
That said, in the unlikely event it does happen, a decision favoring Trump in California could allow him to interfere with the 2028 election — because it would enable the Trump administration to harass state election officials by sending them fabricated lists of “noncitizens” that the state would have to scramble to process while it was also trying to run an election.
But it is still unclear what Trump is trying to accomplish by bringing the California case to the justices on the day before an election, when even this Supreme Court is unlikely to rule in Trump’s favor.
If this is the extent of Trump’s efforts to overturn an election that is expected to end badly for his Republican Party, then those efforts are unlikely to amount to anything at all.
Law enforcement officers detain an activist outside the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building during a protest opposing ICE operations, in Minneapolis on March 1, 2026. | Kerem Yucel/AFP via Getty Images
Let’s say that you’re savagely beaten by a federal officer despite the fact that you committed no crime. Or maybe your home is ransacked by FBI agents who didn’t even bother to get a warrant. Or maybe you’re shot in cold blood by immigration officials engaged in a paramilitary occupation of your home city.
Now, the Court is poised to finish the job. On November 9, the Court will hear Nielsen v. Watanabe, a case that could eliminate all remaining hope that someone targeted by a federal officer with no regard for the Constitution might be able to hold that officer accountable in court. Among other things, the justices could use Nielsen to overrule its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971), which established that federal law enforcement officers may sometimes be sued if they violate someone’s constitutional rights.
Bivens was rooted in something very similar to the Spider-Man Rule — with great power comes great responsibility. As the Court explained in Bivens, a federal officer who acts unlawfully “in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” And thus the Constitution must offer some remedy to people who are injured by such an officer.
But Bivens quickly fell out of favor in the Supreme Court as its membership moved rightward. The Court’s current, Republican majority is so unrelentingly hostile toward Bivens that it is hard to imagine any plaintiff prevailing in a Bivens suit before this Court. The Court’s most recent decisions have described Bivens suits as a “disfavored judicial activity.” In one decision, they’ve said that it is “doubtful that we would have reached the same result” if Bivens were “decided today.” And they’ve instructed judges to reject Bivens claims if there is “any rational reason (even one)” to do so.
In Nielsen, the same justices who wrote these lines are now being asked to overrule Bivens altogether. Even if they decide not to go that far, they’ve already done so much to carve up Bivens that there is virtually no hope for anyone who sues a federal officer for violating their constitutional rights.
The last time the Court ruled in favor of someone who sued a federal officer under Bivens was Carlson v. Green (1980), a decision that allowed the estate of a man who died in prison due to poor medical care to sue prison officials under Bivens. The Nielsen plaintiff, a formerly incarcerated man named Kekai Watanabe, raises a similar claim to the one in Carlson. Watanabe was assaulted by fellow inmates, and received some medical care for “severe back pain.” But when he asked to be treated in a hospital, that care was denied.
He claims that, for months, he “received only intermittent and short-term treatment for pain, often over-the-counter medication,” despite repeated requests for more care. After seven months, according to his brief, Watanabe was finally given an X-ray, which revealed that he had a fractured tailbone and that “bone chips had migrated into the surrounding soft tissue.” Watanabe also claims that he was never given treatment by a medical specialist, and “remains in tremendous pain today.”
A federal appeals court concluded that Watanabe’s legal claim “is identical to Carlson in all meaningful respects,” and thus his lawsuit against a prison health provider could move forward. Though the Supreme Court “has cautioned against extending Bivens remedies,” the lower court explained, “it has consistently maintained that” Carlson is “still good law.”
On the one hand, the appeals court is correct that Watanabe alleges a legal violation that is very similar to the one in Carlson. In both cases, someone incarcerated in a federal prison alleged that their Eighth Amendment rights were violated because the prison did not provide them with adequate medical care. So that does suggest that Watanabe should be allowed to bring a Bivens claim for as long as Carlson remains good law.
Still, the Court’s recent cases tell judges to rule against Bivens plaintiffs if there is “any rational reason” to do so. And there are certainly some distinctions that can be drawn between Carlson and Nielsen. The plaintiff in Carlson, for example, had an asthma attack and died within hours, while Watanabe is still alive and his medical condition played out over many months. The defendants’ lawyers in Nielsen also argue that Congress has changed the law governing suits brought by federal prisoners in ways that make their case meaningfully different from Carlson.
These distinctions are fairly minor. But if judges are really supposed to look for any rational reason to deny Bivens claims, then these distinctions are almost certainly enough. Again, it’s hard to imagine this Supreme Court ruling in favor of any Bivens plaintiff, including Watanabe. In Nielsen, the lawyers asking the Court to overrule Bivens claim that, since Carlson, the Court has rejected 13 different suits raising Bivens arguments.
For what it is worth, the legal debate over Bivens focuses on whether Congress must specifically authorize suits against federal officers before those suits can move forward. The Court’s Republicans claim that the absence of such a law means that no suits against federal officers are allowed (a federal law does authorize suits against state officials who violate constitutional rights).
Meanwhile, proponents of Bivens argue that the 1971 decision merely added coherence to a long line of pre-Bivens decisions permitting suits against federal officials — some of which stretch back to the early 1800s. As the Court said in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. (1949), “the principle that an agent is liable for his own torts ‘is an ancient one and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities.’”
But it matters little who is correct about this debate, because Republicans control six seats on the Supreme Court, and those six justices are fully dug into their opposition to Bivens.
The biggest open question in Nielsen, in other words, is whether the Court will take the defendant’s lawyers up on their invitation to overrule Bivens in its entirety. Just a few years ago, a decision overruling Bivens would have been a very big deal. But, in light of the Court’s decisions holding that judges should look for reasons to deny Bivens claims, little of Bivens remains to be further undermined by this Court.
Federal officials already enjoy such broad immunity from suit that an opinion overruling Bivens will probably do little more than rescue judges from the menial task of hunting through legal records in Bivens cases, searching for a reason to rule against the plaintiff.
The episode illustrates a larger development in Trump’s second presidency. Across disputes involving federal spending, government agencies and military operations, the administration has asserted authority that is either restricted by law or that the legislative branch has reserved for itself.
But responsibility for enforcing those limits is increasingly falling to organizations, institutions and individuals outside of the legislative branch.
As a scholar of the American presidency and deliberative democracy, I pay close attention to how the nation’s chief executive exercises power and communicates with the public.
When presidents are allowed to break rules and disregard democratic norms without consequence, I worry that citizens will grow cynical and lose faith in the idea of self-government.
As this happens, citizens may come to see the law as something that applies selectively, depending on who holds power, and lose confidence in the institutions responsible for holding their leaders accountable.
They may also begin to accept the absence of accountability as a normal feature of political life, weakening the public expectations on which democratic government depends.
Practical immunity
Congress is not the only branch of government demurring from holding the president accountable.
In “Trump v. United States,” the court held that former presidents cannot be criminally prosecuted for actions taken under powers the Constitution gives exclusively to the president. Along with this “absolute immunity,” the justices also granted “at least presumptive immunity” for other official acts.
In their decision, the court’s conservative majority extended the meaning of official conduct to the “outer perimeter” of presidential responsibilities and prohibited courts from examining a president’s motives when determining whether an act was official.
The ruling only addressed criminal liability and did not curtail Congress’ constitutional authority to investigate presidential conduct, control federal spending, enact statutory restrictions and, in serious cases, pursue impeachment.
Their acquiescence is helping create a new form of official protection, which I call “practical immunity.” In using this term, I am borrowing from the work of scholars who study abuse in the American penal system.
Those thinkers argue that legal obstacles, institutional hesitation and political incentives sometimes make it difficult to hold public officials accountable, even when the law suggests there has been illegal conduct.
That is what appears to be increasingly happening now with Congress, the courts and the president.
When Congress stops defending its laws
The television ads case illustrates the conundrum of practical immunity.
In opposing the temporary restraining order, the Trump administration’s attorneys did not contest the argument asserted by the plaintiffs – Common Cause and two unions – that the expenditures violated federal appropriations law. Instead, they said the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. They also argued that the case was moot because the advertising campaign was ending.
Those arguments failed in court. Yet the administration’s defense demonstrated how elusive enforcing a law can be when Congress fails to assert its constitutionally granted role, even when the underlying legal restriction is clear. To win, a plaintiff must establish a concrete injury and persuade a judge to intervene. While this happens, the disputed conduct often continues.
An ABC News story on the political ads praising President Donald Trump, who used taxpayer money to air the ads.
The separation of powers divides authority among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government to prevent too much power from becoming concentrated in any one place.
The architects of the Constitution anticipated that officials in different branches would compete to preserve their authority. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison argued that maintaining the balance established by the separation of powers depended on the ambitions of public officials coming into conflict. Members of Congress could be expected to resist presidential encroachments because those encroachments diminished their own power.
Fierce partisanship has complicated this arrangement.
Legal scholars Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have shown how political competition mostly now happens inside and between parties, rather than among branches of government. When one party controls Congress and the presidency, legislators may become more invested in advancing their party’s agenda than they are in defending their institution’s constitutional authority.
The result is a political system in which a president can act in ways that may violate federal law, undermine democratic norms and encroach on Congress’ constitutional authority.
Madison’s constitutional design assumed that public officials would defend the powers entrusted to them. The danger to the American constitutional system emerging in Trump’s second term is that congressional leaders have begun to regard those powers as expendable, allowing the president to exercise authority under conditions of practical immunity. He faces little fear of meaningful institutional consequences.
On November 3, the Supreme Court will hear St. Mary Catholic Parrish v. Roy, which squarely presents the question of whether the Constitution authorizes discrimination by religious schools. | Kent Nishimura/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images
For years, the Supreme Court has flirted with the question of whether religious conservatives may simply ignore laws prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ Americans. The Court’s Republican majority frequentlyrulesin favor of business owners and institutions that refuse to serve gay or trans people. But these cases often rely on ad hoc reasoning that seems designed to give religious conservatives a narrow win without resolving broader questions about whether people with anti-LGBTQ religious views have an absolute right to violate civil rights laws.
On November 3, however, the Court will hear St. Mary Catholic Parrish v. Roy, which squarely presents the question of whether the Constitution authorizes discrimination by religious schools. Given the Court’s past behavior in similar cases, it’s hard to imagine St. Mary ending in anything other than a victory for religious groups that wish to exclude sexual or gender minorities.
The case also presents another, related question: When does the Constitution require states to subsidize religious institutions? The Republican justices’ recent decisions suggest that they are eager to make taxpayers spend a great deal more money to promote religion.
The case concerns a Colorado law that pays for preschool education for all 4-year-olds in the state. Families with eligible children may choose from a broad range of private and public schools, including religious schools. But the state also bars schools that participate in this program from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
Religious preschools that discriminate may continue to operate in Colorado. Although Colorado does have a broad ban on anti-LGBTQ discrimination, that ban exempts places that are “principally used for religious purposes.” So the sole issue in St. Mary is whether Colorado’s taxpayers must fund religious schools that engage in discrimination.
Until fairly recently, the question of whether a state would fund religious education was up to the state itself. In 2002, the Court ruled in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that states had broad leeway to decide whether to fund religious education. They could, if they chose to, set up private school voucher programs that include religious schools. But they could also choose only to fund secular education.
In Carson v. Makin (2022), however, the Supreme Court abandoned this permissive approach. The casestruck down a Maine program that offered private school tuition vouchers to students in sparsely populated areas where it was not cost-efficient for the state to operate a public school. Maine law provided that these vouchers could only be used at “nonsectarian schools,” but the Court’s Republican majority held that school voucher programs must include religious schools.
The Colorado preschool program at issue in St. Mary, in contrast to the program in Maine, does not bar any school from participating because it teaches religion or is affiliated with a particular faith. The program merely requires all participating schools — be they Catholic, protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or secular — to comply with an anti-discrimination law.
The question in St. Mary, in other words, is whether religious schools can not only demand taxpayer funding, but also demand exemptions from generally applicable rules that apply to all other schools that accept that funding — essentially requiring taxpayers to pay for institutions that discriminate.
The St. Mary plaintiffs want the Supreme Court to join together separate lines of religion cases
The Court’s Republican majority has spent more than a decade remaking how the Constitution approaches religion — or, at least, rewriting the Court’s own precedents interpreting the Constitution’s provisions governing religious rights.
One of those provisionsguarantees everyone the right to “free exercise” of their own faith, while the other prohibits the government from creating an “establishment of religion.” Broadly speaking, the Court’s recent decisions have read the first provision expansively, while simultaneously reducing limits on the government’s ability to advance religion — or even holding that the government is constitutionally required to fund religious institutions.
The St. Mary plaintiffs ask the Court to marry two branches of its recent religion decisions — one of which governs when people who object to a law on religious grounds are exempt from following it; the other asks when the government must fund religious schools.
The first branch involves the Constitution’s free exercise clause, and this Court has fairly consistently held that, whenthe interests of religious conservatives conflict with LGBTQ Americans — or, really, anyone who takes a relatively liberal approach to sexuality — religious conservatives win. If you are a religious conservative, and you want an exemption from a law barring discrimination against LGBTQ people, this Court will make up a reason why you should win.
That said, while this Court consistently favors religious conservatives over queer people, the Court’s cases governing when a person of faith is exempt from a law that they object to on religious grounds are fairly incoherent and have not articulated clear legal rules.
In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court held that these exemptions are not available when someone challenges a “neutral law of general applicability,” meaning that the law applies with equal force to both religious and non-religious people or institutions.
But Smith is, to put it mildly, not a beloved decision. Congress tried, semi-successfully, to overrule it when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. And the Court’s most recent religion cases often read like the justices are looking for an excuse not to follow Smith.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), for example, the Court ruled in favor of a Christian baker who refused to bake wedding cakes for same-sex couples. But the Court grounded that decision in facts very specific to the case, and Masterpiece Cakeshop offers judges little guidance on how they should decide other religion cases that don’t involve these unusual facts.Similarly, in Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021), the Court dodged a showdown over whether to overrule Smith and again resolved the case based on facts that were unique to that case.
These are just two examples of the Court finding ways to not follow the rule it laid out in Smith, without overruling Smith or otherwise announcing a broad legal rule that governs free exercise cases.In their brief to the justices, the St. Mary plaintiffs list “at least eight different categories of cases where Smith does not control.”
It appears that the Court has kept Smith in this strange limbo state — neither overruled nor followed in many cases — because several of the justices aren’t sure what legal rule should exist in its place. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in Fulton, Justice Amy Coney Barrett said outright that, while there are “serious arguments that Smith ought to be overruled,” she wasn’t yet prepared to do so because she wasn’t sure “what should replace Smith.”
Still, the one thing that is clear from this Court’s recent precedents is that religious conservatives routinely prevail over LGBTQ Americans. The current Court has not disturbed decisions from the 1980s that held that religious business owners must pay taxes and comply with workplace regulations such as the minimum wage, but it consistently comes up with a reason to permit religious conservatives to engage in anti-LGBTQ discrimination whenever that issue comes up.
That’s bad news for same-sex couples in Colorado, and a sign that the St. Mary plaintiffs are likely to prevail.
The current crop of justices appear to be either unable or unwilling to come up with a coherent legal doctrine that can guide judges hearing religious liberty cases.
The second line of cases at issue in St. Mary, meanwhile, deal with government subsidies. Nearly a quarter century ago, the Supreme Court held that states may fund religious education if they choose, but that they aren’t required to do so. The Court’s current majority, by contrast, handed down a series of decisions suggesting that separation of church and state is itself unconstitutional. These decisions culminated in Carson, which held that states that offer vouchers to pay for private school tuition must allow these vouchers to be spent at religious schools.
So, realistically, there’s little chance that the plaintiffs in St. Mary will not succeed. If you accept both Carson and the Court’s decisions elevating religious conservatives over LGBTQ people, then it’s not like these plaintiffs’ argument is much of a stretch. It is nothing more than the logical next step in the Court’s broader efforts to shield religious conservatives from anti-discrimination laws, while also requiring nonbelievers to fund those conservatives’ schools.
Carson established that a state violates the Constitution’s free exercise clause when it denies a government subsidy to a religious school. Meanwhile, the Court’s cases involving religious exemptions to the law are doctrinally incoherent, but the one theme that does unite them is that religious conservatives should not have to follow laws protecting LGBTQ people from discrimination.
It is likely, in other words, that Colorado taxpayers will soon be constitutionally required to fund schools that refuse to serve the children of same-sex couples — or that otherwise engage in anti-LGBTQ discrimination that violates Colorado law.
The Court is likely to hand down another ad hocdecision that doesn’t explain how judges are supposed to approach religious liberty cases
That suggests that Barrett’s confusion over what should replace Smith has not abated, and that her confusion is shared by at least some of her colleagues. Notably, her concurring opinion in Fulton was joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. So it is likely that the Court is dodging the question of whether to overrule Smith because it’s hard to form a majority for a new approach that does not include either Kavanaugh or Barrett.
But until the Court develops a new framework governing when religious objectors may ignore generally applicable laws that apply equally to secular and religious actors, the Court’s religious liberty cases will remain a muddled mess.
Which does not mean that St. Mary will be an insignificant decision — it’s obviously a very big deal if the Supreme Court rules that taxpayers are constitutionally required to fund schools that discriminate against LGBTQ families. But the current crop of justices appear to be either unable or unwilling to come up with a coherent legal doctrine that can guide judges hearing religious liberty cases.
Instead, they keep making up reasons why LGBTQ people must lose each individual case.
Former Rep. Mary Peltola, a Democratic from Alaska and US Senate candidate, speaks during the 2026 Alaska Fisheries Debate with Senator Dan Sullivan, a Republican from Alaska, not pictured, in Kodiak, Alaska, on September 12, 2026. | Nathaniel Wilder/Bloomberg via Getty Images
President Donald Trump’s Justice Department filed a lawsuit on Thursday seeking to block former Democratic Rep. Mary Peltola’s victory in the 2026 US Senate election. If you’re confused by this development, you should be. Because the election won’t happen for more than a week.
The case arises out of an odd candidacy that might undercut incumbent Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan’s reelection bid against Peltola. A man named Dan J. Sullivan also secured a spot on the ballot, and Republicans fear that the not-Senator Sullivan’s presence on the ballot might trick voters who wish to vote for the incumbent into voting for the not-senator instead.
In the abstract, it’s a fair concern. But there are two reasons to doubt that not-Senator Sullivan will attract many voters who actually wanted to vote for the Republican. According to a sample ballot published by Alaska’s Division of Elections, Sen. Sullivan will be identified as a “Registered Republican” and as the “Incumbent,” so voters will be told which Dan Sullivan to vote for if they wish to reelect the one who is actually a senator.
Additionally, Alaska uses ranked-choice voting, a system where voters rank candidates in order of preference, and votes cast for losing candidates are redistributed to voters’ next choice. So an Alaska voter who wants to reelect the Dan Sullivan who is actually a senator, but who is confused as to which Dan Sullivan is the incumbent, can simply rank both Dans Sullivan as their top two choices, and the ranked choice system should ensure that their vote is counted as a vote for Senator Sullivan (and against Peltola).
The question of whether not-Senator Sullivan may appear on the ballot, moreover, has already been litigated. Initially, the Alaska Division of Elections, which is led by a Republican, attempted to disqualify the not-senator because it concluded that he did not seek election to the Senate in “good faith.” Not-Senator Sullivan sued, and an Alaska court ordered him reinstated as a candidate because “the Division’s decision to exclude Mr. Sullivan from the primary ballot was based on a ‘good-faith’ requirement that does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, the Alaska Statutes, or the implementing regulations adopted by the Division” — that is, there is not actually a law that prevents the not-senator from running, even if he is intentionally running as a spoiler candidate.
This lower court order was affirmed by the Alaska Supreme Court last June. If Republicans thought that this decision violates federal law, they could have asked the Division of Elections — which, again, is run by a Republican — to appeal to the US Supreme Court.
Instead, they appear to have let the issue lie until less than two weeks before Election Day, when Trump’s Justice Department filed a new, federal lawsuit claiming that not-Senator Sullivan’s presence on the ballot is somehow illegal, and asking a federal court to preemptively block a Peltola victory in the upcoming election. Trump says that he personally told the Justice Department to file this suit.
It is difficult to find an actual legal argument, much less a persuasive one, anywhere in the Trump DOJ’s complaint initiating the lawsuit. Trump’s lawsuit also runs afoul of something called the “Purcell principle” — a concept that, ironically, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the same day that the Trump administration filed its suit — which says that federal courts should be reluctant to intervene in election-related disputes when the election itself is about to happen.
It is likely, in other words, that the Trump administration’s attempt to overturn a Democratic victory that hasn’t even happened yet will fail. But the mere existence of this new lawsuit, which is known as United States v. Alaska, is an ominous sign that the Trump administration will use every tool in its shed to overturn Democratic victories in the upcoming election.
So what are the actual legal arguments in the Alaska case?
It is a bit of a stretch to even describe the Justice Department’s complaint in this case as a “legal” document, as the complaint does not so much as point to any law that either not-Senator Sullivan or the state of Alaska may have violated, and instead vaguely alludes to legal sources that use terms like “integrity.”
Specifically, the Justice Department points to a federal law which says that it has four purposes, one of which is to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.” It also points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bullock v. Carter (1972), which said that “a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.”
But the statute that Trump’s lawyers quote, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, does not concern which candidates’ names should appear on the ballot. As its name suggests, it is a law about voter registration, and it imposes requirements on states, such as requiring them to register voters when those voters obtain a driver’s license.
Similarly, while Bullock does include a single line indicating that states may enact laws targeting “frivolous or fraudulent candidacies,” nothing in the opinion suggests that sharing another candidate’s name makes someone’s candidacy frivolous or fraudulent. The decision itself concerned unusually high fees charged to a candidate for public office in Texas, and the Court concluded that Texas’s fees were unconstitutional.
The line about “frivolous or fraudulent candidacies,” meanwhile, was included to clarify that states still have some power to regulate ballot access. While Bullock concluded that Texas’s fees were excessive, the opinion also suggests that states may impose more reasonable filing fees on candidates to discourage unserious candidates from seeking office. Alaska, for example, charges a modest filing fee of $100 to US Senate candidates.
The Trump DOJ’s entire argument, in other words, appears to turn on the fact that it identified two legal sources that use the word “integrity” in contexts that bear little resemblance to the Alaska case.
Nevertheless, Trump’s lawyers claim that the court must prevent Alaska from certifying a Peltola victory “pending an investigation to determine whether votes cast for Daniel J. Sullivan were meant to be cast for Senator Sullivan.”
This lawsuit also cannot be squared with one of the Republican Party’s favorite legal doctrines
Even if Trump’s Justice Department had a persuasive argument that leaving not-Senator Sullivan on the ballot is illegal, they should still lose Alaska because they waited too long to file the case.
In Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006), the Supreme Court warned that “court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls,” and it added that this “risk will increase” as Election Day draws closer. More recent decisions, many of them joined only by the Court’s Republicans, have read this “Purcell principle” quite expansively to forbid federal courts from issuing election-related decisions in the months leading up to an election. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has even claimed that Purcell prevents federal courts from issuing election-related decisions as soon as nine months before the general election date.
Supreme Court decisions invoking Purcell to shut down lower court orders altering a state’s election rules are now very common in the weeks leading up to an election. On Thursday, for example, the Court relied on the Purcell principle to block a lower court order that would have made it easier for college students to vote in New Hampshire. The Court began its decision with this line: “This Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”
Trump’s DOJ, meanwhile, did not even file its lawsuit seeking to preemptively invalidate a Peltola victory until less than two weeks before Election Day. If Purcell means anything, it must mean that a federal court cannot force Alaska to kick a candidate off the ballot mere days before a federal election.
American elections aren’t what they used to be: Thanks to relentless, politically driven gerrymandering, fewer and fewer congressional seats are truly competitive. Millions of Americans are locked into districts where their vote will never elect the party of their choice.
But gerrymandering is also notoriously hard to fix. Many sitting lawmakers owe their seats to districts that have been wildly contorted to create secure seats. So asking legislators to ban gerrymandering often means asking them to endanger their own jobs.
Nevertheless, the stars may soon align for opponents of partisan electoral maps. Last time Democrats controlled the US House, they passed a bill that sought to eliminate gerrymandering. That bill died in the Senate. But, if the polls are correct, Democrats are poised to take both houses of Congress in November. If President Donald Trump remains an albatross around Republicans’ necks through 2028, Democrats could soon control both elected branches of government.
That’s good news for opponents of gerrymandered maps, because, as recent developments show, any viable solution to congressional gerrymandering will have to come from Congress and not the states. Some blue states, such as California and Virginia, had previously enacted constitutional amendments intended to halt gerrymandering in those states. But Democrats are now trying to bypass those bans because they prevent blue states from countering Republican gerrymanders in red states.
Key takeaways
Democrats may soon have the votes in Congress to ban gerrymandering, but they still must overcome a hostile Supreme Court.
Some of Democrats’ top priorities, such as fixing the Supreme Court’s decisions enabling racial gerrymandering, are almost certainly off the table. Others, like independent redistricting commissions, could run into trouble.
Still, the Constitution should give Congress broad authority to tell states how they must draw maps to make them fair and nonpartisan.
Still, even if Democrats win the next two federal elections in historic landslides, they then must overcome the final boss monster standing between the United States and fair elections: the Supreme Court.
And unless the Court’s membership changes dramatically, that will be no easy task. Until fairly recently, the Supreme Court often blocked racial gerrymanders — those intended to lock voters of a particular race out of power — and it at least held open the possibility that a state’s maps could be struck down because of excessive partisanship.
Now, by contrast,many of the Court’s redistricting decisions read like a love letter to partisan maps. The Court’s Republican majority held in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) that federal courts are forbidden from hearing cases alleging that a particular legislative map was drawn to benefit one political party. More recently, in Louisiana v. Callais (2026), the Court’s Republicans abolished longstanding safeguards against racial gerrymandering, ushering in a new wave of maps that favor white Republicans in the South.
There’s no way to guarantee that a Republican Supreme Court won’t simply make up a reason to toss outa Democratic voting rights law, no matter what that law says. Still, there are strategic ways to mitigate that risk.Opponents of gerrymandering can maximize the likelihood that redistricting reforms will survive judicial review by paying close attention to what the Supreme Court has already said about race, election law, and other related topics. Many of the Court’s recent cases suggest that Democrats may want to tweak their approach to a federal redistricting law — and the Court’sopinions give clues into how.
Don’t even think about passing a law that mentions race
The most obvious trap that Democrats could fall into when drafting an anti-gerrymandering bill is to mention race, or otherwise draw racial distinctions of any kind.
Until just a few months ago, the federal Voting Rights Act offered some of America’s strongest protections against gerrymandering. A 1982 amendment to that law prevented many racially polarized states — often states where white people vote Republican and Black people vote for Democrats — from drawing maps that maximized white power. This had the side effect of limiting partisan gerrymandering in that space, because requiring these red states to draw more Black-majority districts meant electing more Democrats.
But the Republican justices effectively repealed this amendment, which was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, in Callais.That’s because all six of the Court’s Republicans swear fealty to an idea known as “colorblindness” — the idea that any law that draws racial distinctions, no matter the purpose, is equally repugnant. Under this theory, laws that aim to lift up historically disadvantaged racial groups are legally indistinguishable from the laws that codified Jim Crow. So, if a new act of Congress requires states to consider race when they draw legislative maps, that new law will almost certainly be struck down by this Court.
Congress takes an extraordinary risk, moreover, if it inserts a race-based provision into a broader law governing redistricting, even if the vast bulk of that law does not concern race at all. NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) is one big example of how that could go wrong: In that case, four of the Republican justices claimed that the entire Affordable Care Act must be struck down because those four concluded that just two provisions of the law are unconstitutional.
The current Court is both much more conservative and much more Republican than the one that heard NFIB — and probably will be just as motivated on the issue of gerrymandering as they were on Obamacare — so a majority of its members could potentially order an entire act of Congress repealed if they deem one provision in that law unconstitutional. And, even if they do not go that far, they still might carve giant holes in a law because of one provision that mentions race.
Democrats seem to understand these limitations: The last time Democrats controlled the House, it passed two significant voting rights bills (both of which died in the Senate). The For the People Act is an omnibus bill that includes many of the Democratic Party’s ideas to improve elections, including several provisions targeting gerrymandering. Meanwhile, the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act seeks to undo many of the Supreme Court’s attacks on the Voting Rights Act, the landmark law barring race discrimination in voting, while also enhancing some of the VRA’s protections.
Democrats’ decision to, well, segregate racial reforms from their other voting rights proposals shows that they understand many of the tactical decisions they need to make because of this Court. By placing race-related reforms in the John Lewis Act, while passing non-race-related ideas in the separate For the People Act, Democrats reduce the likelihood that the later bill will fall. It would be extraordinary, even for this Supreme Court, to strike down one law because five or more justices deem an entirely separate law unconstitutional.
But let’s say the Democrats decide the best way to get gerrymandering reform through early next year is by reviving the For the People Act. That bill’s anti-gerrymandering provisions do still contain some references to race which Democrats may want to strip out in an abundance of caution. The bill, for example, would require states to draw their congressional districts using a commission made up of Democrats, Republicans, and people affiliated with neither party. One provision of this bill provides that the pool of potential members of these commissions should be screened to ensure that it is “representative of the demographic groups (including racial, ethnic, economic, and gender) and geographic regions of the State.”
Because this provision requires the government to consider race, this Court would very likely strike it down. If that happens, the Court might simply excise the reference to race from the broader statute and leave the rest of it intact, but there’s a danger that this Court could strike down all of the For the People Act’s provision calling for congressional maps to be drawn by independent commissions — or even possibly the entire Act.
SoIf Democrats decide the best way to enact gerrymandering reform early next year is by reviving that bill and finally getting it passed, they may want to strip out any mentions of race in an abundance of caution.
Relying on independent redistricting commissions to draw congressional districts is a dicey proposition with this Supreme Court
At least eight states currently use independent commissions to draw legislative maps, and several other states involve commissions in their mapmaking process. It’s a promising model because empirical research does suggest that these commissions are effective in reducing partisanship in legislative maps. One recent study, for example, found that moving from legislatively drawn maps to commissions “would increase the share of competitive seats within a state from 25 percent to 38 percent on average.”
The idea behind an independent commission is to take the task of drawing maps away from a partisan state legislature, and give it to a multipartisan body tasked with drawing maps that favor neither major political party. The For the People Act adopts this model. It proposes that each state should have a 15-member commission consisting of five Democrats, five Republicans, and five people affiliated with neither major party. Elected officials and their immediate family, candidates for office, significant political donors, and lobbyists are all barred from commission membership.
But there’s a constitutional problem with this approach, which arises out of a surprisingly banal question: Who, exactly, would employ these commissioners?
One possibility is to make them federal officials. But if these commissioners are employed by the federal government, the Constitution would probably classify them as “principal officers,” which would mean that they would have to be chosen by the president and confirmed by the Senate. And, in any event, the Court’s “unitary executive” cases establish that, if these commissioners count as federal officials, either the president or one of the president’s subordinates would have to have the power to fire them at-will.
Classifying the mapmaking commissioners as federal officials, in other words, would defeat the purpose of creating the redistricting commissions in the first place — because the commissioners would be partisan officials and not independent actors.
The For the People Act attempts to get around this problem by calling for state-run commissions. It requires each state to “establish a nonpartisan agency,” which will appoint commissioners to draw the state’s maps. But under the Supreme Court’s “anti-commandeering” doctrine,a doctrine that precedes the Roberts Court,the federal government is typically forbidden from ”issu[ing] direct orders to the governments of the States.” So that suggests that Congress may neither order a state to appoint these commissioners, nor control how a state’s commissioners draw the state’s maps.
In fairness, there is a plausible argument that the anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply to federal laws governing congressional elections. The Constitution allows states to determine the “Times, Places and Manner” for holding such elections, but it also permits Congress to “make or alter such Regulations.” So that suggests that, when Congress writes laws governing congressional elections, it may effectively rewrite a state’s laws to conform to the federal government’s wishes.
Still, this argument is untested. And the question of whether Congress can require states to set up redistricting commissions would ultimately be decided by a Supreme Court with a 6-3 Republican majority that is often hostile toward voting rights legislation. The fate of a federal law requiring states to set up their own commissions would depend on six Republican political appointees who were confronted with a law whose very purpose is to take the Republican Party’s gerrymandering tactics off the table.
Maybe these justices would set partisanship aside and allow a law calling for mandatory state-run commissions to exist. But Congress takes an enormous risk if it bets the future of redistricting on an untested legal theory that, at least, plausibly violates the anti-commandeering doctrine. If the Republican justices want to strike such a law down, they won’t have to work hard to come up with an argument for doing so.
Democrats may want to reconsider whether to rely on independent commissions as their primary solution to gerrymandering. At the very least, they should insert language into the For the People Act stating that, if the commissions are struck down, some alternative mechanism to restrict partisan gerrymandering will immediately spring into effect.
So what can Congress do?
Though independent commissions and race-conscious attempts to combat gerrymandering may be vulnerable to constitutional challenges, Congress’s power to “make or alter” the rules governing congressional elections is in the Constitution, and it isquite broad. That should permit Congress to order the states to draw maps using congressionally determined criteria.
Indeed, Congress has long exercised this power to dictate how states must draw their congressional districts. In 1842, for example, Congress required every state to elect members of the US using single-member districts. This law lapsed in 1929, but a similar law was put back into place in 1967. That law, which provides that no congressional district may “elect more than one Representative,” remains on the books today.
Right now, this law prevents states from enacting many promising reforms, such as proportional representation, but the fact that this law has existed for so long suggests that Congress does, in fact, have broad power to dictate how states draw congressional districts.
Some of the Court’s older precedents, moreover, also suggest that Congress’s power over congressional elections is expansive. Recall that the Constitution itself gives both state lawmakers and Congress authority to determine the “Times, Places and Manner” for holding these elections. States typically get the first crack at determining their own election laws, but Congress can “make or alter such Regulations.” In Smiley v. Holm (1932), the Court said that the power to determine the times, places, and manner for holding these elections includes the power “to provide a complete code for congressional elections.”
So that suggests that Congress may lay out a “complete code” governing how congressional districts should be drawn — assuming, of course, that Congress does not violate some other provision of the Constitution, such as the rules against race discrimination.
An act of Congress governing redistricting could take many forms. Congress might, for example, repeal the ban on multi-member districtsestablished by the 1967 law,and implement proportional representation. Such a system could be set up in different ways, but in the simplest version, voters would cast a ballot for the party they want to control Congress, rather than voting for an individual candidate. Seats would then be allocated to parties based on the percentage of votes that party received. So if the Republican Party received 40 percent of the vote in a state with 10 House members, the GOP would get to pick four of those members of Congress.
Alternatively, Congress could retain the one-member-per-district rule, but implement rules governing how those districts must be drawn. The For the People Act, for example, lays out several criteria that the Act’s independent commissions must use when drawing congressional maps. Among other things, districts must “respect communities of interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions to the extent practicable.” The act would also prohibit states from redrawing their maps outside of the 10-year cycle established by the US census.
The bill also proposes several mathematical methods, which have names such as the “efficiency gap,” or the “Seats-Votes Curve,” that may be used to evaluate whether a particular map gives an unfair advantage to one political party.
As I’ve already explained, it is unclear whether Congress could actually create independent redistricting commissions. But a law mandating that congressional districts must be drawn in a particular way could still be enforced by a different body — the federal judiciary. If a state drew a map that violated Congress’s new rules, voters or political candidates in that state could file a lawsuit, and a court could order the state to come into compliance with federal law.
That said, one problem with this solution is that litigation often takes a long time. Historically, states that drew illegal maps that were eventually struck down by the courts often got to run one or more elections under the deficient maps before a court could determine that they were unlawful and must be replaced.
Another potential solution is that Congress could require states to “preclear” new maps with federal officials — borrowing from a method the original Voting Rights Act of 1965 used to prevent states from implementing racist maps before those maps could be challenged in litigation. Under that law, some states had to preclear new election rules with either the Justice Department or a DC-based federal court.
Though the Supreme Court effectively neutralized the VRA’s preclearance provision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), much of the Shelby County decision criticized the VRA for applying preclearance only to some states and not others. So it is possible that this Court might uphold a new preclearance regime that applies to all 50 states. And even if it will not, Congress could adopt a belt-and-suspenders approach — requiring states to preclear their maps and permitting individual citizens to sue in order to challenge those maps. That way, if preclearance is struck down, lawsuits could still move forward.
There is no telling how this Supreme Court, which often makes up new legal rules that cannot be found in the Constitution’s text, would approach a federal law governing how states must draw their congressional maps. But existing precedents suggest that Congress would have broad discretion to design these rules how its members see fit. Outside of the racial context, the Court’s precedents largely limit which institutions may be placed in charge of redistricting or how members of those institutions are selected or removed. They place far fewer restrictions on the substance of federal election law.
Could judges be given the task of drawing maps?
Another way to potentially insulate the mapmaking process from partisan politics is for Congress to pass a law requiring maps to be drawn by judges, who are at least nominally nonpartisan. Virginia’s constitution, for example, provides that its districts shall be drawn by the state supreme court if the state legislature and a redistricting commission are unable to agree on legislative maps.
Unfortunately, the For the People Act’s proposed process for creating these judge-drawn maps may beunconstitutional. That’s because the Constitution only permits federal courts to decide matters arising out of “cases” or “controversies” — meaning that the matter is presented to the court in a proper lawsuit where a plaintiff, who was actually injured in some way by a defendant, sues that defendant.
The For the People Act seems to contemplate a kind of public hearing, presided over by three judges, where any “interested members of the public may appear and be heard and present testimony” on what a state’s maps should look like. This process, in other words, does not really resemble a lawsuit, where a plaintiff and a defendant both make adversarial arguments and a judge determines which one of them is correct.
Although the bill does indicate that an individual plaintiff may trigger a hearingby filing a formal request with an appropriate court, this individual doesn’t really resemble a party to a lawsuit, in part because they do not appear to have any greater ability to present evidence to the three-judge panel than any other member of the public.
That said, these deficiencies in the For the People Act could probably be fixed with fairly minor tweaks.Instead of allowing any random member of the public to call for a hearing, the bill should identify specific classes of individuals — be they voters within a state, candidates, or political parties — who have standing to sue the state. The ensuing hearing should be conducted like a lawsuit, with both the plaintiff and the state presenting their own arguments for how to design the state’s maps. If Congress also wants the court to consider arguments from the public at large, those arguments could be submitted in amicus briefs.
And, of course, the bill should also lay out a legal criteria that judges can use to determine if a particular map is legal.
The biggest challenge for lawmakers probably won’t be the Constitution. It will be coming up with a solution that actually prevents partisans from drawing biased maps.
At least under current law, Congress has broad discretion to lay out nationwide rules governing congressional mapmaking. A federal law mandating proportional representation, or requiring states to draw compact districts, or mandating that states must use a particular mathematical model to construct maps that are free from partisan bias, or potentially even a law allowing judges to draw maps, would all likely be constitutional — even according to this Supreme Court.
But the fact that a particular law is constitutional does not mean that it will be effective in increasing the number of competitive districts and reducing the role that partisans play in the mapdrawing process.
The most challenging task facing Congress — or, at least, a future Congress that actually wants to do something about gerrymandering — is coming up with rules that actually force states to draw fair maps. It would be a tragedy if Congress enacts a law requiring states to use a particular method to design its districts, only to discover that this method does not actually prevent states from drawing partisan gerrymanders.
In a 2016 speech, for example, former Attorney General Eric Holder mocked states that draw districts that are “only contiguous at low tide” or that are “shaped like a contorted snake.” And he suggested that states should be required to draw maps which ensure that “people who live near each other, and who have similar interests” vote in the same district. Holder, in other words, seemed to suggest that compact districts are superior to ones that spread out throughout much of a state.
But this proposal could actually make some states’ maps more biased. That’s because Democrats tend to cluster together in cities, while Republicans tend to spread out more in rural and suburban areas of a state. So, if a state’s mapmaking process fetishizes drawing nearby voters together into the same district, Democrats may all be packed into urban districts that are so overwhelmingly Democratic that many of the votes cast in these districts will be wasted. Republicans, meanwhile, could be spread out across multiple districts to ensure that their votes are counted more efficiently.
These challenges don’t mean that federal lawmakers should abandon the project of halting partisan gerrymandering. But it does mean that they should proceed with some caution. The worst outcome would be if Congress required states to use a particular method when they draw their maps, and then that method did not achieve what Congress intended it to achieve.
Avoiding this outcome, moreover, will be more difficult because Congress may need to choose second-best solutions to reduce the likelihood that the Supreme Court strikes the entire law down.
It would be better if Congress could address partisan redistricting without an increasingly partisan Court breathing down its members’ necks. But Democrats cannot choose which justices sit on the Supreme Court at the moment they gain a congressional majority large enough to actually legislate. Absent extraordinary events, they will need to do their best to draft a law that this Court will not sabotage.
The plaintiffs in the case K.M.K. v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Association effectively want the Supreme Court to bar trans women from women’s sports teams at high schools and universities. | Heather Diehl/Getty Images
One of the last decade’s most consequential changes to how the Supreme Court operates is the growth of the so-called shadow docket — a process that allows the justices to decide cases unusually quickly, and often without full briefing or oral argument.
Historically, the Court would typically allow contentious legal issues to percolate in the lower courts for months or even years before the justices agreed to decide one of those issues. Then they’d spend months reading briefs, hearing arguments, and debating the case amongst themselves before they finally issued an opinion. This slow process existed because the Supreme Court is the final word on many legal questions — the Court can even override Congress if it claims a law is unconstitutional — and so it should be cautious before it hands down a decision that cannot easily be displaced.
A new case, which recently arrived on the Court’s shadow docket, embodies all the reasons why America’s highest Court should act carefully and slowly. K.M.K. v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Association involves a highly contentious issue — the plaintiffs in the case effectively want the Supreme Court to bar transgender women from women’s sports teams at high schools and universities, even in states that support trans inclusion in sports.
It also involves an appalling sexual assault allegation. One of the plaintiffs in the case is a high school women’s team wrestler who is identified only by her initials because she is a minor. She claims that one of her wrestling opponents, who is transgender, “forcefully” penetrated the plaintiff’s vagina with her fingers during a match.
As a memo from the local prosecutor’s office points out, if these allegations are true then K.M.K. is the victim of a very serious crime — rape in the third degree. The prosecutor’s office, however, decided not to prosecute because it concluded that it could not prove that a sex crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt. Among other things, prosecutors spoke to the referee who officiated the match, and he said that “nothing stood out to him during the match” and that “after watching the video of the match, he could not say that the suspect’s hand placement was ‘anything out of the ordinary.’”
The school district, meanwhile, says that it has reviewed video of the match, interviewed both competitors, and that its investigation into the allegation is “still ongoing.”
K.M.K., in other words, is exactly the sort of case that the justices should step away from, sending it back down to the lower courts to gather more information and to fully think through the difficult legal issues presented by the case. Setting aside the horrifying allegations against her one-time opponent, K.M.K.’s lawyers — most of whom work for a Christian right law firm, the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) — make novel legal arguments that ask the Court to make broad pronouncements that go far beyond its previous precedents.
One of their arguments, if taken seriously by the justices, could potentially make it impossible for any school athletes, whether cis or trans, to participate in competitive sports of any kind.
There is a very real risk, in other words, that the Supreme Court will, if it moves too quickly in this case, harm millions of school athletes throughout the country. The factual question of whether a particular wrestler committed a crime is separate from the legal question of whether federal law strips states of their authority over trans participation in women’s sports. And this legal question deserves more deliberation than the Court can give it if it decides this case on the shadow docket.
So what are the actual legal issues in K.M.K.?
In West Virginia v. B.P.J. (2026), the Supreme Court warned that judges should not be given the power to decide which athletes may compete on a women’s sports team. “The legislatures and the schools are better equipped — and under the Constitution, are the more appropriate entities,” Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote for his Court, “to assess the competing medical and scientific considerations and draw appropriate lines.”
B.P.J., of course, was a loss for transgender rights. The Court rejected a constitutional challenge to state laws that forbid trans women from playing on school sports teams within that state. But the legal question in B.P.J. was whether laws barring trans women from women’s sports are allowed — a question that the Court’s Republican majority answered in the affirmative. A victory for the plaintiffs in K.M.K., by contrast, would likely establish that no state may permit trans women to compete on women’s sports teams, regardless of what the people of that state want.
This Court is often skeptical of claims by trans rights advocates, and it almost always resolves disputes between cultural liberals and religious conservatives in favor of the religious right. That said, this Court has thus far respected states’ rights on another contentious issue that is a high priority for the religious right: abortion. Although the Court’s Republican majority overruled Roe v. Wade and eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, it has rejected some attempts to restrict abortion in blue states — including by repeatedly ruling against litigants who seek to ban the abortion medication mifepristone.
So it is, at least, possible that this Court will follow a similar path in K.M.K. and conclude that the question of which team trans women should play on should be answered by the states and not the Supreme Court.
Broadly speaking, ADF raises two legal arguments against Washington state’s policy allowing trans women to play on women’s sports teams. It claims that Title IX, a federal law that bars “sex” discrimination by most schools, implicitly requires those schools to have sports teams that only cisgender women may play on. It also claims that the Court’s recent decision in Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026), which requires public schools to out trans students to their parents even if the students wish to keep their gender identity secret, also requires those schools to exclude trans women from women’s sports.
There’s no reason for the Supreme Court to decide either of these questions now, however. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in Lux v. Rodrigues (2010), when a party that lost in the lower courts seeks an injunction from a Supreme Court justice before their case is fully litigated in those lower courts, they must demonstrate that “the legal rights at issue are ‘indisputably clear.’” This rule, like many old rules disfavoring shadow docket decisions, exists to prevent the justices from rushing into a decision that may later prove unwise.
There is no plausible argument that Title IX “indisputably” bars trans women from women’s sports. That’s because, just a few months ago in B.P.J., the Court held that it was not deciding the question of “whether, under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, schools may allow biological males who identify as female to participate on girls’ and women’s sports teams.” So that’s a recent Supreme Court precedent holding that the answer to this legal question remains open.
Moreover, as the school district points out in its brief, the Court has never held that a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of their child includes a right to dictate which rules will be used by school sports teams. If such a right existed, a parent might insist that a school bar players of a particular race. Or they might demand that their child be allowed to play football without being tackled.
Competitive team sports simply cannot exist if one player’s mother is allowed to demand changes to the rules that neither the league nor the other players support.
In any event, at this stage in the litigation it should be enough for the Court to say that the unique right claimed by K.M.K.’s mother — the right to dictate which rules a multischool competitive sports league will use — is not “indisputably clear” under current law.
What should happen when the Court eventually decides whether blue states may allow trans women to play on women’s teams?
It is, to borrow from Lux, indisputably clear that the Court should not give the K.M.K. plaintiffs the sweeping policy change that they seek in a shadow docket ruling. But the justices cannot avoid, forever, the question of whether federal law forbids trans women from playing on women’s teams. So how should they resolve this question when it is more properly presented to them?
Let’s dispose of the plaintiffs’ Mirabelli argument first. While the Court has held that parents have some right to direct the education of their children, prior to Mirabelli, this right was construed narrowly. One older case held that states may not forbid parents from sending their children to private schools. Another held that the government may not bar teachers at these schools from teaching the German language.
Prior to the Court’s barely explained decision in Mirabelli, however, the Court had never held that parents may dictate how public schools operate, and the school district’s brief in K.M.K. cites several court decisions warning against giving parents too much authority over public schools. (The Court did hold, in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), that parents who object to a school’s curriculum on religious grounds may opt their children out of certain lessons. But the K.M.K. plaintiffs do not raise a religious objection.) As the Supreme Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), states may “restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways.”
It’s clear from Mirabelli that the Court’s Republicans do not share this caution about judicial control over public schools. But, because Mirabelli was so thinly reasoned, it’s also impossible for outside observers to determine why these justices want an unprecedented amount of control over public schooling, or whether they have good reasons for asserting this new power.
I will simply reiterate the school district’s objection that, once the Supreme Court opens the door to parents dictating which rules will be used in school sporting competitions, the lawsuits will not end with parents seeking to kick trans women out of women’s sports. The next parent may object to their child wrestling Black people. Or they may demand that their child be given protective gear that gives them a competitive advantage. Some parents may also demand rules changes that conflict with changes demanded by other parents. And there is no principled way to distinguish these requests from a request to exclude trans women.
There are myriad problems, meanwhile, with the K.M.K. plaintiffs’ Title IX argument. That statute provides that schools that receive “Federal financial assistance” may not exclude individuals from “any education program” on “the basis of sex.” This statute has long been read to require equal treatment of men’s and women’s sports by schools that receive federal funds.
But, as the school district argues in its brief, Washington schools do not discriminate on the basis of “sex” — which the Court has defined to mean sex assigned at birth in this context. Instead, they classify athletes on the basis of gender identity. There is one team for all people who identify as male, whether trans or cis, and another team for all people who identify as female. Social conservatives may object to this arrangement, but it does not classify students based on their sex assigned at birth at all.
The K.M.K. plaintiffs’ argument is also undermined by federal regulations implementing Title IX. Those regulations provide that schools generally should not separate women and men in sports, but that they “may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” It is quite a stretch to read regulations saying that schools “may” have sex-segregated teams to say that schools must ensure that their teams are strictly sex segregated.
Finally, recall that Title IX only applies to schools that accept federal funding — schools have the option of rejecting Title IX’s requirements if they also forego federal grants. This matters because, as the Court recently held in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections (2026), “Congress must clearly and unambiguously alert a grant recipient to any condition on federal funds.”
Thus, if there is any ambiguity about whether Title IX requires schools to exclude trans women from women’s sports, that ambiguity must be resolved against imposing any requirements on public schools. Title IX may only be read to ban trans women from women’s sports if it “clearly and unambiguously” does so.
Again, there’s no reason for the justices to resolve either of these questions because, at this early stage in the litigation, the Supreme Court should simply decline to decide K.M.K. because the plaintiffs’ legal rights are not “indisputably clear.” But this Court is often impatient, especially in cases involving culture war issues. Mirabelli was also a shadow docket case, but that didn’t stop the Court’s Republicans from inventing a new legal rule compelling teachers to out their trans students.
There’s a serious risk, in other words, that this Court will rush to decide K.M.K. before it fully considers the legal arguments on either side, or even learns whether the genuinely shocking allegations raised by the plaintiffs have merit.
Samuel Alito Jr., associate justice of the US Supreme Court. | Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images
Justice Samuel Alito’s new book, So Ordered: An Originalist’s View of the Constitution, the Court, and Our Country, isn’t going to set the world on fire with its bold new ideas. It’s mostly a collection of Alito’s old speeches.
But if the book treads familiar ground, the reception to it among writers who share Alito’s broad alignment with the political right is quite surprising. Threerecentreviews of Alito’s new book — all by right-leaning authors — sound a lot like the longtime liberal criticisms of Alito.
Key takeaways
Justice Samuel Alito has a new book, where he calls himself an “originalist.”
But several conservative writers disagree, pointing out that Alito is really just concerned with reaching results that he likes.
Ultimately, originalists need Alito more than Alito needs them, because without Alito’s flexible approach to judging, this Court couldn’t consistently reach conservative results.
All three of these reviews accuse Alito of engaging in results-oriented decision-making — meaning that he often seems to start with the outcome that he prefers, and then comes up with a rationale to justify that outcome. This, they argue, is at odds with Alito’s fairly recent decision to label himself an “originalist,” an approach to judging that’s long been sold as a way to keep judges from mistaking “their own predilections for the law.”
Originalism, for the uninitiated, is the idea that the only legitimate way to interpret the Constitution is to ask what its words meant at the time it was ratified. It’s more than just a fashionable idea among many Republican lawyers and judges. Many legal conservatives view originalism as a central part of their professional identity, and powerful conservative organizations like the Federalist Society have long evangelized originalism as the one true way to interpret the Constitution.
Yet, a consistent theme in the critical reviews of So Ordered is that Alito’s actual approach to judging cannot be squared with his decision to label himself an “originalist” in the book’s title. As Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith, a conservative who has written critically about originalism in the past, writes in his review of the book: “Alito’s embrace of the originalist label is also likely to come as a surprise to people on the left and the right.”
Goldsmith, who led the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel during the second Bush administration, writes in his review of the book that early proponents of originalism, including Scalia, often sold it as a more restrained alternative to “a liberal conception of judging called ‘living constitutionalism.’” Goldsmith says that approach, which was ascendant among liberals several decades ago but has since fallen out of favor, read the Constitution as an adaptable document whose meaning could evolve to deal with “current needs.”
Conservatives needed an intellectually consistent way to put the brakes on that impulse, and originalism was their answer.By treating the Constitution as an inflexible charter whose meaning was fixed at some distant point in the past, Scalia and his fellow travelers hoped to “limit or reverse the progressive transformation of American society set in motion by Supreme Court decisions that had expanded criminal-defense rights, ended prayer in public school, recognized the rights to contraception and abortion, strengthened voting equality, and supported affirmative action and busing.”
Now that movement conservatives control the Supreme Court, however, it’s less clear whether originalism is still useful to conservatism. As Jason Willick, a conservative Washington Post columnist, writes in his review of Alito’s book, “originalism can get in the way of the right’s ambitions.” Sometimes, an honest application of originalism produces liberal results.
Willick interprets Alito’s book as an attempt to “keep the marriage” between conservatives and originalism together. But if that’s true, it is an open marriage. Alito is happy to make originalist arguments when they suit his preferred outcomes. But his greatest value to conservative Republicans is often that he is willing to write non-originalist opinions that reach the result his team desires, but that a more principled originalist would view as beyond the pale.
On the surface, the fact that conservative intellectuals are starting to notice, and criticize, Alito’s weak commitment to one of the conservative legal movement’s core ideas might indicate that a schism is forming between committed originalists and more flexible partisans like Alito. Perhapsthe conservative legal movement is becoming a victim of its own success?
In So Ordered, Alito seems to be suggesting the opposite: He’s offering proof that a judge can still identify as an out and proud originalist, even if they enjoy frequent flings with the right-wing version of “living constitutionalism.”
More broadly, if Democrats hope that the growing tension between Republican judges’ preferred methodology and their ability to reach reliably conservative results will lead to more liberal outcomes, they should expect to be disappointed. Alito, despite his apostasy, is still one of the most celebrated figures in the Federalist Society, the powerful conservative bar association that has long evangelized originalism as the one true way to interpret the Constitution.
What is Alito’s actual approach to judging?
So Ordered offers a simple way for judges whose originalist and conservative identities are in tension to resolve that tension: They can continue to self-identify as “originalists,” while still reaching whatever result they want in the most important cases.
Alito hasn’t always described himself as an originalist. In fact, at times he’s openly mocked originalism. In a 2011 argument about how the First Amendment applies to violent video games, Alito responded to an originalist question from Justice Antonin Scalia by quipping, “I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video games. Did he enjoy them?”
In their reviews, both Goldsmith and Willick highlight Alito’s statement that originalism can only survive as “anything other than a minor academic curiosity” if it is “widely viewed as generally producing good results.” But, as Willick notes, this raises an important question: “Viewed as producing good results by whom?”
The actual approach to judging Alito describes in So Ordered, the libertarian author Damon Root writes, sounds “much more like the results-oriented ‘living constitutionalism’ that originalists are supposed to oppose.”
Goldsmith, Willick and Root are hardly the only right-leaning thinkers to notice Alito’s thin commitment to originalism. There is also Alito’s closest ideological ally on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas.
That provision says that the Treasury may not pay money unless Congress allows that spending through “Appropriations made by law.” As Thomas explained in the Court’s opinion in CFPB, this constitutional provision merely establishes that Congress must identify a “specified source of public money” that an agency may draw upon when it funds that agency. Because the CFPB cleared this low bar, it is constitutional.
Alito’s dissent, meanwhile, did not really make a legal argument against the CFPB. Instead, he spent the bulk of his dissent discussing centuries-old conflicts between England’s Parliament and its king, which eventually inspired the drafters of the Constitution to place appropriations in Congress’s hands. Yet, as Thomas writes, Alito “never connects its summary of history back to the word ‘Appropriations.’” Alito simply listed a bunch of historical facts that are tangentially related to the legal question before his Court, then leapt to the conclusion that the CFPB is unconstitutional.
Alito, in other words, did not actually practice originalism when he wrote this dissent. As Alito concedes in So Ordered, originalism isn’t simply the idea that judges should rely on historical sources when deciding cases. It is, in Alito’s own words, “the theory that constitutional provisions should be understood to mean what the public would have taken them to mean when they were adopted.” Originalists, in other words, are supposed to use history to determine what the words of the Constitution mean, not to vomit historical anecdotes onto a page before reaching an irrelevant legal conclusion.
So Alito’s CFPB dissent is not originalist, but it is entirely consistent with the results-oriented approach to judging that even his conservative critics have begun to notice. One of Alito’s major projects as a justice appears to be attempting to dismantle anything accomplished by President Barack Obama. The CFPB was created by the financial reform legislation that Obama signed in 2010. Alito has also tried three times to kill Obama’s signature legislative accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act.
Beyond his unapologetic partisanship, Alito is, as law professor Neil Siegel wrote in a 2017 review of the justice’s career, “the primary judicial voice of the many millions of Americans who appear to be losing the culture wars.”
In So Ordered, for example, Alito repeatedly brings up an argument against same-sex marriage that he first raised in his dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court’s landmark marriage equality decision. Same-sex marriage should remain illegal, Alito claims, because its legalization “will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.” Alito feared that, once gay equality became enshrined in the law, Americans who reject that equality “risk being labeled as bigots.”
But this isn’t even a legal argument, much less an originalist one. The First Amendment’s free speech clause protects the right to call someone a bigot, even if Alito believes that the charge is unjustified. And the First Amendment’s guarantee that everyone may freely exercise their religion allows believers in liberal faiths to teach others that God abhors discrimination. The Constitution has never been understood to deny civil rights to a group of people because someone might speak disparagingly about individuals who oppose that right. If it did, constitutional rights could not exist.
All of which is a long way of saying that Alito’s conservative critics are right to label him a results-oriented judge. He has no real commitment to a principled theory of interpretation like originalism. His approach to individual cases often turns on whether the defendant is a Democrat or a Republican. And many of his opinions do not so much make legal arguments as, to borrow thewords of Lionel Trilling, rely on “irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas.”
Originalists need Alito more than Alito needs originalism
Originalism is a powerful tool in the hands of judges who wish to radically change how the Constitution is understood. In the American legal system, courts typically follow a principle known as stare decisis — Latin for “to stand by things decided” — which holds that judges should almost always follow the legal rules laid down by previous decisions, even if a judge does not like how that earlier case was decided.
Originalism, by contrast, posits that a judicial decision’s legitimacy flows, not from its alignment with prior precedents, but from the judge’s understanding of how the words of the Constitution were originally understood. This allows judges who wish to toss out longstanding legal rules to wrap their opinions in the trappings of America’s founding, and to paint judges who honor stare decisis as betrayers of the Constitution’s true meaning.
Historically, originalism has been used by liberals and conservatives alike to justify dismantling legal rules they despised. Franklin D. Roosevelt-appointed Justice Hugo Black, for example, wielded originalist arguments to attack precedents that undercut the New Deal, or that otherwise interfered with progressive economic legislation.
Similarly, conservatives like Alito use originalist rhetoric to undermine liberal precedents that they abhor. Alito’s opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), which abolished the constitutional right to an abortion, is chock-full of originalist arguments that “until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law.”
But one problem with the Constitution’s early history, at least if you are a results-driven judge, is that it does not map perfectly onto anyone’s modern-day political beliefs. While originalism sometimes gives judges strong arguments that they can use to undermine previous Supreme Court decisions, a results-oriented judge like Alito will inevitably want to reach outcomes that originalist arguments cannot support.
But the dearth of originalist arguments against affirmative action has not stopped this Court from implementing its preferred racial policies. As Goldsmith notes, only three members of the current Court — Thomas, plus Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett — “regularly try to practice originalism, and they do so very unevenly.” So, when the Republican justices wish to reach a result that cannot be justified by originalist arguments, the opinion is typically authored by one of the Court’s three non-originalist Republicans.
Republicans, in other words, would be in rough shape if they actually filled the Supreme Court with principled originalists. The conservative legal project depends on flexible, results-focused justices like Alito, who will reach ideologically correct conclusions even when originalism calls for a more liberal result, and who will sign their name to opinions that may make their originalist colleagues quietly cringe.
Does that mean that originalist rhetoric will fade in Republican legal circles? It’s certainly possible. In So Ordered, Alito gives a mixed review of the work of Adrian Vermeule, a Catholic conservative law professor at Harvard who argues that legal conservatives should abandon originalism altogether because it constrains their ability to impose their own vision of the “common good.”
Trump, meanwhile, has had a falling outwith the Federalist Society. While the Federalist Society successfully pushed Trump to appoint outspoken proponents of originalism to the bench during his first term, many of his second-term nominees’ primary qualification is their personal loyalty to Trump. At least three of his former criminal defense lawyers are now US Court of Appeals judges.
At the same time, some members of the Court’s Democratic minority appear to be taking a page from Justice Black’s playbook. Liberals who disagree with the current Court’s precedents will often find that constitutional history supports their preferred outcomes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, in particular, often wields originalist arguments to disparage her Republican colleagues’ approach to race.
So it’s certainly possible to imagine a future where Republicans abandon originalism in favor of Trump’s personalism or Vermeule’s unapologetically results-driven approach. Democrats, meanwhile, could become outspoken originalists because originalism gives them a vocabulary they can use to argue against applying stare decisis to the Roberts Court’s most right-wing decisions.
But this future is not inevitable. The most important lesson taught by Alito’s new book is that judges do not need to hold any principled legal views in order to identify as an “originalist.” Regardless of how partisan your rulings are, calling yourself an originalist is enough.
Update, October 21, 11:45 am ET: The Supreme Court released a brief order on October 21, which ruled against the Trump administration’s request to deny gender-affirming care to transgender prisoners. The order is two sentences long. It is temporary. And it does not explain the Court’s reasoning. So it is not clear why the Court ruled against Trump or even whether Trump will lose if this case reaches the Court again after it has be fully litigated in lower courts. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito dissented.The article below was originally published on October 13.
On the first day of his second term, President Donald Trump issued an executive order requiring the Bureau of Prisons to “ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex.” Issued alongside a record 26 other orders that day, it was an unsurprising development, because Trump had made this issue one of the centerpieces of his 2024 campaign.
The fate of that executive order, as well as the US Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) memoranda implementing the order, is now before the Supreme Court in a case called Trump v. Kingdom. And, while this case obviously has high stakes for incarcerated transgender people specifically, the Court’s resolution of this case could potentially have far greater reach — cutting off many cis and transgender people’s access to healthcare while they are incarcerated.
That’s because one of the central questions in Kingdom — though this issue is not yet before the justices — is when the Constitution requires prisons to provide medical care to incarcerated people.In Estelle v. Gamble(1976), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes on the government an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” People in prison, after all, cannot simply drive themselves to the hospital if they get sick. If the prison does not give them adequate medical care, they will suffer untreated and potentially die.
For procedural reasons, the Court is unlikely to opine on whether Estelle requires prisons to provide gender-affirming care to trans people right away. But the question of when the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide medical care to incarcerated people is front and center in the Kingdom case, which means the Court could potentially use Kingdom to limit all imprisoned people’s access to healthcare — or even to undercut the Constitution’s protections against cruel and unusual punishments more broadly.
Ironically, this case also arises out of a famous political blunder by pro-trans advocates. In 2019, when then-Sen. Kamala Harris was seeking her party’s 2020 presidential nomination, the ACLU circulated a questionnaire to candidates that asked if they would use presidential authority “to ensure that transgender and nonbinary people who rely on the state for medical care — including those in prison and immigration detention — will have access to comprehensive treatment associated with gender transition, including all necessary surgical care?”
Harris responded that she would, and also said that she “pushed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to provide gender transition surgery to state inmates” while she was state attorney general.
Years later, during his 2024 debate with Harris, Trump claimed that the then-vice president “wants to do transgender operations on illegal aliens that are in prison.” And not long after, his opposition to gender-affirming care for trans people in prison became a keypart of his campaign.
It’s unclear why the ACLU thought it was a good idea to shine a light on this issue in 2019 because, at the time, the BOP provided gender-affirming care to people in federal prison. The ACLU — which represents the pro-trans side in the Kingdom case — now argues that transgender people in federal prison have had access to at least some forms of gender-affirming care “since at least 1992.”
Indeed, Trump’s own administration concluded in a 2018 memo that the Bureau of Prisons’ “statutory mandate to provide basic medical and mental health care” to incarcerated people obligated it to provide “pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., cross-gender hormone therapy), hair removal and surgery (if individualized assessment indicates surgical intervention is applicable)” to transgender people in prison if their doctors determined that these interventions are “medically necessary care.”
In any event, regardless of why Trump fixated on cutting off trans healthcare for people in federal prison, Kingdom is now before the Court. That means that the fate of trans people in prison — and, if the Eighth Amendment issue eventually reaches the Court, all incarcerated people — is now in the hands of a Republican Court that is oftenhostile to trans litigants, and that has, at times, signaled that it wants to drastically roll back the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
What are the legal issues in the Kingdom case?
At least since Estelle, the Court has held that people who are incarcerated are not also sentenced to live and die without medical care. As the Court said in Brown v. Plata (2011), “a prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”
Under Estelle and Brown, transgender people often have a right to gender-affirming care during their incarceration. As the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Edmo v. Corizon (2019), such a person must show that they have a “serious medical need” for such care — typically by demonstrating that the care was prescribed to them by their health provider. But the Constitution does not permit prisons to deny medically necessary care to incarcerated people.
In Kingdom, the ACLU raised this Eighth Amendment argument in the lower courts, but those lower courts ruled in favor of transgender people in prison on different, much more technical legal grounds.
Both the ACLU and the lower courts that heard Kingdom argue that the Trump administration did not comply with this obligation when it cut off care for trans people in prison.
Among other things, the district court that heard this case determined that the administration cited “zero evidence from its own medical or mental health care professionals to support its conclusions” against providing transgender healthcare. While the Trump administration argues that providing gender-affirming care makes prisons less safe, the district court also noted that “the government has not cited a single instance of gender-affirming care giving rise to safety concerns despite having provided such care for many years.”
Is this a persuasive legal argument against the Trump administration’s new policy? I think it is. And so did three federal judges that previously heard the Kingdom case. But the fate of trans people in prison is now in the hands of a Supreme Court that rarely rules in favor of transgender litigants, and that has a history of handing down legally incoherent opinions that are inconsistent with the Court’s own precedents, and that also deny legal rights to trans people.
The current Court’s uncertain commitment to the Eighth Amendment
Because the lower courts that heard Kingdom did not rule on the Eighth Amendment question, Kingdom should not currently give the justices an opportunity to roll back Estelle. But, in the likely event that this Court rejects the ACLU’s argument that the Trump administration did not adequately explain its new policy, the case will return to the lower courts and the Eighth Amendment issue will be fully litigated — teeing up the Eighth Amendment question for the justices to decide in the near future.
This issue could arise, moreover, at the exact moment that some justices are pushing for sweeping changes to how their Court understands the term “cruel and unusual punishments.” Indeed,at least some of the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment precedents suggest that the Republican justices want a wholesale rewrite of the Court’s previous precedents laying out what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Since the mid-to-late twentieth century, the Court has held that, in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s words, the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Thus, as certain forms of punishment grow more uncommon, they become more constitutionally dubious.
This “evolving standards of decency” framework is front and center in nearly every major Supreme Court decision interpreting the Eighth Amendment for the last five or six decades, including Estelle.
In Bucklew v. Precythe (2019), however, the Court’s Republican majority seemed to abandon this framework. Although decades worth of pre-Bucklew decisions established that a punishment is unconstitutional if it is considered cruel and unusual today, Bucklew suggested that a method of punishment is unconstitutional only if it“had fallen out of use” at “the time of the founding.”
Thus, if taken seriously, Bucklew’s new approach to Eighth Amendment cases would dramatically expand the government’s power to impose harsh punishments. The late Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, argued that a Bucklew-like approach to the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the government from executing most intellectually disabled offenders, and that it does not limit the government’s ability to impose excessive punishments for minor crimes.
In fairness, some of the Court’s post-Bucklew decisions are inconsistent with the framework the Court laid out in that case. So at least some of the justices who joined Bucklew may have since decided that it’s a bad idea to toss out the Court’s entire framework for Eighth Amendment cases. But Bucklew was one hell of a warning shot over the bow of the Eighth Amendment. And the mere fact that the Bucklew decision exists means that advocates for humane punishments must hold their breath any time this Court is asked whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.
In the worst-case scenario for people in prison, a case like Kingdom could inspire the Republican justices to overrule — or, at least, drastically limit — decisions like Estelle and Brown. That would mean that all incarcerated people, regardless of their gender identity, could lose access to medically necessary care unless the government decides to give it to them as an act of grace.