Andrii Sybiha is Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs

Europe can no longer remain immobilized on Russian assets. Now is the time to use them for Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

This decision, which is long overdue, would be a game changer that could shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor — particularly if taken alongside strong sanctions pressure. But to achieve this, we have to be faster and more decisive than Russia.

According to the latest reports, Russia plans to spend a record €180 billion on its military in 2027 — more than 40% above its 2026 defense allocation. And that is only part of the picture. The country’s draft federal budget allocates a combined €669 billion to defense and security for the 2027–2029 period.

These figures make clear Russia wants war. Moscow is increasing the pressure, intensifying its terror against Ukrainian civilians and raising the cost of defense for both Ukraine and Europe. But as the cost of war grows, it should grow faster for the aggressor.

The higher the price for Moscow, the sooner peace will be restored. Half-hearted pressure on Russia and half-measures in support of Ukraine will only prolong conflict and increase the overall price tag. Decisive steps can bring it to a close.

At the end of August, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland addressed the European Commission, urging renewed discussion on the full use of immobilized Russian assets. We are grateful to them. But it is now time to turn this discussion into a legal process: launch a permanent platform, engage experts and develop the decision.

Europe has taken the hardest step already. In 2022, the G7 immobilized some €300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, roughly €210 billion of them in the EU. In 2024, the G7 borrowed $50 billion for Ukraine against the future windfall profits on those reserves. And in December 2025, the bloc made the immobilization open-ended.

What remains undecided is the only step that matters: using the assets themselves.

Every argument for and against this has been heard, and the debate now revolves around its scope and how to mitigate associated risks.

The prevailing view is that the decision to use these assets must not expose any single country to disproportionate risk — above all Belgium, where most of the assets sit at Euroclear. We agree. To that end, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry proposed a clear plan to the European Commission: placing the assets under collective EU control, so that the decision to use them — and the liability for doing so — is European, not Belgian.

Belgium’s exposure is a reason to share the risk, not to do nothing.

Another common argument is that any decision must cover immobilized assets in every jurisdiction, not only those at Euroclear. Again, we agree — with one caveat: This can be done but on parallel tracks. Europe should not make its own decision contingent on protracted global coordination when its security is in peril.

Skeptics raise four objections of principle against the full use of these assets: that using them breaks the rule of law, that it undermines the euro as a reserve currency, that it gives away leverage in peace talks, and that Russia would retaliate by seizing Western assets.

Let’s take these arguments in turn.

On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.

Russia must be the one to pay for the damage it has caused and continues to cause, not European taxpayers.

We should be sending the right signal to Moscow: That it will not outlast our resolve.

We should be sending the right signal to skeptical audiences across Europe ahead of a major election year: That the rising cost of Ukraine’s defense will be covered at the expense of Russia.

Last but not least, we should be sending the right signal to the Ukrainian people: that they are not alone in confronting the aggressor.

The full use of Russian assets would bring tangible and immediate results, strengthening Ukraine on the frontline and bringing peace closer. After four years, Europe should no longer be immobilized on major decisions. It needs political will, collective commitment and a solid legal formula.

We urge EU leaders to make this vital decision without delay. And we look forward to the European bravery in taking this critical step.

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

LUXEMBOURG — EU finance ministers struck a compromise to beef up the bloc’s markets watchdog Friday, but the deal exposed divisions over national control and exemptions that critics say favor the biggest member countries.

Most finance ministers backed the Council’s position on MISP, a package of bills to integrate and police financial markets. At its heart is a plan to give the EU’s securities regulator powers to oversee major financial players — a flagship bid to make Europe a stronger investment hub, where European companies can seek investors without traveling to Wall Street.

But capitals stopped short of handing the future watchdog too much autonomy, triggering a hard rebuke from the European Commission.

“We deeply regret that the compromise now on the table falls significantly short of the level of ambition needed,” Finance Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque told ministers during Friday’s public Ecofin debate in Luxembourg. “We need [the European Securities and Markets Authority] to become an effective supervisor. The current compromise text would not allow for that.”

France spearheaded a last-minute push over dinner Thursday to strengthen the watchdog’s executive powers. Paris took issue with a rule that would allow nine national supervisors to force the watchdog’s executive board to submit draft decisions for further scrutiny before they’re adopted. The Irish EU presidency tweaked the rule overnight to limit national supervisors’ ability to delay decisions and preserve the watchdog’s power to act in emergencies, according to a compromise document obtained by POLITICO.

That was enough for France and most other countries. But not for the Commission, nor European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, who was equally critical of the Council compromise. Beyond the governance concerns, Albuquerque took aim at supervisory carve-outs that the Irish introduced to accommodate Germany’s push to exclude its stock exchange, Deutsche Börse, from EU oversight.

The carve-out club

The carve-out shields stock exchanges from direct EU supervision unless they meet certain thresholds for trading activity and cross-border reach. Spain’s stock exchange, Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, would also benefit from the carve-outs, triggering criticism from smaller EU countries that accused the waiver of granting the bloc’s largest nations preferential treatment.

Belgium was particularly critical because its Brussels-based securities depository Euroclear is expected to come under direct EU oversight and face supervisory fees, while some major stock exchanges could remain under national oversight. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever will take the issue to EU leaders at the end of next week.

“We cannot support the carve-outs. The package includes as many ins as there are outs,” Belgian Finance Minister Jan Jambon said during Friday’s public debate. “I think Germany has won in certain cases.”

As a peace offering, Berlin backed a review clause that would allow the Commission to revisit the carve-outs two years after the supervisory rules start applying. Any changes would require new legislation, however.

“The carve-out is temporary,” Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen, who backed the deal, told journalists Thursday. “If that exchange were to grow, it would also fall under [EU supervision]. This is also intended to ensure that Dutch companies or pan-European companies such as Euronext are not put at a disadvantage.”

Friday’s deal puts pressure on MEPs to agree Parliament’s position so negotiations on a final text can begin. The Commission hopes future legislative negotiations will provide a second chance to improve the text, which also threatens to increase pressure on the EU budget.

Under the compromise, the EU budget would shoulder 60% of the cost of ESMA’s activities not covered by industry fees, with national supervisors paying the remaining 40%.

“The Commission cannot accept a significant increase in the EU budget contribution in light of the difficult discussion at [the Multiannual Financial Framework],” Albuquerque said amid a bitter budget battle that threatens to shave hundreds of billions of euros off the proposed €2 trillion cash pot. “I sincerely hope that the European Parliament will be more ambitious.”

BRUSSELS — Germany’s push to exempt a national champion from future EU oversight could imperil a ministerial deal to integrate the bloc’s financial markets and compete with Wall Street.

Over the coming days, finance ministers will discuss the most contentious parts of their countries’ positions on Brussels’ “market integration and supervision package” of bills, or MISP. They’ll begin with a dinner on Thursday in Luxembourg, as the Council moves toward its official negotiating position.

The hope is that ministers will then sign off on the compromise deal, brokered by Ireland in its role as leader of the EU’s rotating presidency, at the ministerial Ecofin gathering on Friday. This would be a major step forward for the EU’s 10-year bid to create a U.S.-style capital market.

But a push by Germany to exclude one of Europe’s biggest stock exchanges from central EU oversight could turn dinner into a food fight.

This exemption remains in the current compromise position among EU capitals after Berlin refused to give up local supervision of its stock exchange behemoth Deutsche Börse over fears of job losses and ceding power to a bloc-wide entity, despite central supervision being one of the key tenets of the MISP package.

It’s sparked protests from smaller countries, which feel the compromise would disproportionately benefit their larger neighbors — and could scupper the entire deal.

The carveout is “polluting the whole debate” by giving a “huge gift to Germany” while other countries receive nothing in return for their support, one diplomat said.

Another went further. “No deal is better than a bad deal,” a senior EU official said ahead of Friday’s meeting.

One market

Securing a deal on MISP this year is central to the “One Europe, One Market” plan that the EU’s three political leaders in Brussels agreed to in April. EU governments have invested significant political capital into MISP in a bid to turn the bloc into an investment hub where innovative companies can find investors without having to leave for deeper pockets on Wall Street.

Getting sign-off from the EU’s 27 governments would be a major coup for Dublin, which is chairing legislative negotiations in Brussels until the end of the year.

However, six diplomats close to the negotiations gave contrasting views on whether a deal would be possible this week. According to one, anywhere from eight to 17 countries could band together to block an agreement.

The diplomats did concede that the countries opposing the carveout are not unified in their position, however, as they all want different things from a potential deal. But the Deutsche Börse issue remains the most contentious.

After the German government made it clear it would not support a deal on the package unless Deutsche Boerse was carved out, the EU’s six biggest economies came up with a plan over the summer to exempt the exchange from EU-wide supervision by the new “supercop” European Securities and Markets Authority.

The German state of Hesse, Deutsche Boerse’s current supervisor, has consistently opposed giving up the role, fearing job losses and waning influence if the exchange giant is instead overseen by ESMA. The carveout, based on trading thresholds and geographical footprint, would also benefit Spain’s main stock exchange and another German trading platform, Tradegate.

In practice, scoping out the German giant would hollow out the ambition of the MISP plan. Moving to a central supervision model for the EU’s biggest exchanges and other financial plumbing firms like clearinghouses and central securities-depositories has been the thorniest political issue throughout negotiations.

Although ESMA would still oversee large firms such as the stock exchange group Euronext and Nasdaq’s European arm, the watchdog would have fewer staff and less funding, and ultimately be less powerful if it were not responsible for supervising Deutsche BBörse 

The Belgian government in particular isn’t taking the plan lying down. According to two diplomats close to the talks, Belgium’s prime minister, Bart De Wever, could raise the subject at the European Council later this month if a majority of ministers push the carveout through.

Central to the Belgians’ frustration is the fact that their finance giant, the securities-depository group Euroclear, will move to ESMA supervision, while Belgium was shut out of talks among the “E6” supergroup of the bloc’s largest economies, according to multiple diplomats involved in the group’s formation.

If big countries won’t give up the Deutsche Börse carve-out, small countries could win changes to ESMA’s governance structure in exchange for supporting a deal, according to three of the diplomats. They want national finance watchdogs to have more influence in ESMA’s decision-making, while some also want changes to the authority’s funding structure. Large countries want ESMA to be overseen by an independent, powerful executive board akin to the European Central Bank’s. 

“It’s MESS, not MISP,” one diplomat quipped to POLITICO. 

Giovanna Faggionato contributed reporting.