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The year is 2030 and French President Marine Le Pen’s sweeping overhaul of both her own country and the EU shows no sign of slowing down.

The Berlaymont, or the European Commission’s HQ, has been repurposed as the Ministry of National Sovereignty, except for the 13th floor —the current work base and living quarters of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — which is now a cat cafe.

Other buildings in the EU Quarter of Brussels (or, as it’s now known, the 21st arrondissement) have not been so lucky. Most have been razed to the ground. Some have been occupied by disgruntled former EU staff, who are refusing to leave and have set up a working group to discuss a future roadmap that will feed into a discussion on how to bring back a European Union that Le Pen has largely destroyed.

Largely, but not completely. There is still an official EU office; the corner table in the branch of sandwich shop Exki near the Schuman roundabout (ironically, Le Pen used some of the money saved from dismantling the EU to finish the roundabout as planned). It is staffed 24/7 by Maroš Šefčovič, and he has a plentiful supply of leaflets.

Le Pen had more in store for the EU after her crushing 2027 presidential election win over Kylian Mbappé (who won a primary against Raphaël Glucksmann to be the unity centrist candidate, which was decided by who could do the most keepie-uppies).

The phrases “non-paper,” “stakeholder” and “trilogue” have been consigned to la poubelle de l’histoire. The European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee were closed down within weeks of Le Pen taking office, which shocked millions of Europeans who had no idea they ever existed. The European Parliament building is still there but is now occupied by a strange breed of zombie-like creatures wandering aimlessly through the corridors in search of something to do. No one can tell the difference.

Von der Leyen was, as Le Pen promised would happen, sent back to Germany where — in a somewhat unexpected move — she has become chancellor, succeeding Angela Merkel, who herself came out of retirement and orchestrated a coup to bring down current Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Anyway, back to 2026 and an EU reeling from a Le Pen speech in which she pledged to turn the Commission into a “secretariat” in the service of its member countries, and scrap some institutions altogether.

Le Pen gave her speech in Brussels on Wednesday and caught the train from Paris to Gare du Midi — if you haven’t been, imagine what the train station in Hell would look like, but with paninis. According to POLITICO’s railways correspondent, Miles Trackman, Le Pen was close to running into Michel Barnier, a former French prime minister (and who among us hasn’t been French prime minister?) and fervent Europhile who was spotted at the Paris station at the same time.

The question being asked in Brussels circles (and everything in Brussels goes around in circles) is: “Will Le Pen do a Meloni?” — as in, will she soften her stance if elected? The future of the Schuman roundabout may depend on it.

CAPTION COMPETITION

“This? Just an ordinary car. Definitely not a getaway car. Why would I need to get away? It’s not as if I’m a lame duck whose country is on fire.”

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“The drinks are on me. The bugs are on you.”  

by Giovanni Cellini

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a right to be angry. 

In a wretched month for Ukrainians, ahead of a fast-approaching frigid winter, Donald Trump’s “very big and important deal” to acquire millions of tons of diesel fuel from Russia couldn’t have come at a worse time.

The U.S. president’s plan to lift sanctions on Moscow to allow diesel imports came as a sucker punch for most Ukrainians enduring barrages of jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles, with civilian casualties mounting.

The question for Zelenskyy is just how angry he can actually afford to be.

“His showing his frustration is understandable, but there are downsides,” said Tim Willasey-Wilsey, a former British diplomat and fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. 

The Ukrainian president immediately dubbed Trump’s deal a “weak decision” and “a gift to Putin” that will fund Russia’s war. Even more defiantly, he approved further drone strikes on Russian refineries, prompting Trump to call for Ukrainians to replace Zelenskyy as their leader.

Zelenskyy shows no signs of heeding Trump’s command to “better damn well stop” striking at Russia’s energy industry. That’s very much a continuation of his loss of patience this year, which has seen him sharpening his rhetoric toward both critics and allies, rebuking European leaders for moving too slowly with support, trading barbs with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and openly questioning Trump’s approach to the war. 

The tougher tone reflects mounting exasperation in Kyiv — especially with the U.S. president. Ukraine’s defense resilience and innovations with drones and missiles have augmented Zelenskyy’s confidence and readiness to push back. And yet, venting his frustration is not without risks.

Willasey-Wilsey suspects Zelenskyy may be calculating that Trump could emerge weakened from next month’s midterms, especially as some Republicans are already breaking ranks over the diesel deal. But the Ukrainian leader risks provoking Trump into cutting off vital U.S. intelligence support or pressuring Elon Musk to disable SpaceX’s Starlink internet service, on which Ukraine’s military heavily relies. 

Zelenskyy may be underestimating “how dangerous a wounded Trump could be” for Ukraine, warned Willasey-Wilsey.

The Trump administration has also threatened to halt a program through which allies purchase U.S. weapons for Ukraine, the Financial Times reported Monday. That would cause a major upheaval in supplies and force Kyiv to rely even more on its European allies, who are already struggling to rearm.

But Zelenskyy is standing firm. He insists Ukraine will only halt strikes on Russian oil refineries if Moscow ceases its air barrage. “Any de-escalation steps must be mutual,” he wrote on Telegram.

He has backing from an unlikely quarter: opposition lawmakers who are usually fierce critics of his leadership.

Even former President Petro Poroshenko, a bitter political rival, defended Zelenskyy against Trump’s call for his replacement.

“If anyone needs a new leader, it is Russia,” Poroshenko said in comments. “For me, the key question is simple: Are we any closer to a full and unconditional ceasefire? That is the only lens through which any move should be assessed.” 

Trump’s calls to replace Zelenskyy ironically strengthen the Ukrainian leader’s position at home, opposition lawmaker Mykola Knyazhitskiy said.

“There’s no greater campaigner for Zelenskyy than Donald Trump,” he added. “After every such conflict, Zelenskyy’s approval rating rises both in Ukraine and among our allies, particularly in Europe.” 

But Trump’s ability to force Kyiv into a settlement has diminished, according to Nathalie Tocci, who advised two former EU foreign policy chiefs. Having already withdrawn most American support, Trump has reduced his leverage over Ukraine and Europe, she argues. He could still inflict considerable damage by suspending intelligence sharing, but she doubts he would do so indefinitely or halt weapons sales. “If money is involved, I can’t see him pulling the plug on sales,” she said.

But the fear in Kyiv is that Trump’s pursuit of a deal with Moscow will come at Ukraine’s expense.

Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, a prominent opposition lawmaker and former deputy prime minister, sees little prospect of Putin compromising. “He’s not ready to stop the war or even agree a ceasefire,” she said.

“From my understanding, all the other ‘deals’ which have supposedly been discussed by U.S. negotiators with the Russians have been only about the capitulation of Ukraine and basically the country ceasing to exist as a free, independent, sovereign state.”

That likely explains Zelenskyy’s open anger. He knows that antagonizing Trump comes at a price. But so does appeasing a U.S. president who seems increasingly willing to do business with Putin. For Ukraine, neither option is good. 

Andrii Sybiha is Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs

Europe can no longer remain immobilized on Russian assets. Now is the time to use them for Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

This decision, which is long overdue, would be a game changer that could shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor — particularly if taken alongside strong sanctions pressure. But to achieve this, we have to be faster and more decisive than Russia.

According to the latest reports, Russia plans to spend a record €180 billion on its military in 2027 — more than 40% above its 2026 defense allocation. And that is only part of the picture. The country’s draft federal budget allocates a combined €669 billion to defense and security for the 2027–2029 period.

These figures make clear Russia wants war. Moscow is increasing the pressure, intensifying its terror against Ukrainian civilians and raising the cost of defense for both Ukraine and Europe. But as the cost of war grows, it should grow faster for the aggressor.

The higher the price for Moscow, the sooner peace will be restored. Half-hearted pressure on Russia and half-measures in support of Ukraine will only prolong conflict and increase the overall price tag. Decisive steps can bring it to a close.

At the end of August, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland addressed the European Commission, urging renewed discussion on the full use of immobilized Russian assets. We are grateful to them. But it is now time to turn this discussion into a legal process: launch a permanent platform, engage experts and develop the decision.

Europe has taken the hardest step already. In 2022, the G7 immobilized some €300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, roughly €210 billion of them in the EU. In 2024, the G7 borrowed $50 billion for Ukraine against the future windfall profits on those reserves. And in December 2025, the bloc made the immobilization open-ended.

What remains undecided is the only step that matters: using the assets themselves.

Every argument for and against this has been heard, and the debate now revolves around its scope and how to mitigate associated risks.

The prevailing view is that the decision to use these assets must not expose any single country to disproportionate risk — above all Belgium, where most of the assets sit at Euroclear. We agree. To that end, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry proposed a clear plan to the European Commission: placing the assets under collective EU control, so that the decision to use them — and the liability for doing so — is European, not Belgian.

Belgium’s exposure is a reason to share the risk, not to do nothing.

Another common argument is that any decision must cover immobilized assets in every jurisdiction, not only those at Euroclear. Again, we agree — with one caveat: This can be done but on parallel tracks. Europe should not make its own decision contingent on protracted global coordination when its security is in peril.

Skeptics raise four objections of principle against the full use of these assets: that using them breaks the rule of law, that it undermines the euro as a reserve currency, that it gives away leverage in peace talks, and that Russia would retaliate by seizing Western assets.

Let’s take these arguments in turn.

On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.

Russia must be the one to pay for the damage it has caused and continues to cause, not European taxpayers.

We should be sending the right signal to Moscow: That it will not outlast our resolve.

We should be sending the right signal to skeptical audiences across Europe ahead of a major election year: That the rising cost of Ukraine’s defense will be covered at the expense of Russia.

Last but not least, we should be sending the right signal to the Ukrainian people: that they are not alone in confronting the aggressor.

The full use of Russian assets would bring tangible and immediate results, strengthening Ukraine on the frontline and bringing peace closer. After four years, Europe should no longer be immobilized on major decisions. It needs political will, collective commitment and a solid legal formula.

We urge EU leaders to make this vital decision without delay. And we look forward to the European bravery in taking this critical step.

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

Welcome to Declassified, a weekly humor column.

This column has, once again, been overlooked for the Nobel Prize in Literature — although there’s still hope for the Peace Prize.

Asked by Declassified if it could justify this blatant discrimination, the Nobel committee hung up the phone.

Politicians can, of course, make great writers, and several have won Nobel’s literature prize, including Britain’s Winston Churchill in 1953, and Peru’s Mario Vargas Llosa in 2010. The latter — who ran for president in 1990 — won the prize “for his cartography of structures of power and his trenchant images of the individual’s resistance, revolt, and defeat.” But has he ever referred to British Conservative grandee Jacob Rees-Mogg as a “Haunted Pencil”? No, he has not.

There are, however, a lot of very bad books written by politicians.

Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson — very much the “Winston Churchill if you ordered him off Temu” — published a book in 2004 called “Seventy-Two Virgins — A Comedy of Errors” (the last four words also being the summary of his Covid policy) about a terrorist group targeting the U.S. president on a visit to London. It was described in the Guardian some 15 years later — after Johnson became prime minister — as ” sexist, racist, fundamentally undiplomatic.”

But the undisputed king when it comes to politicians letting out their inner writer is France.

In 2023, Bruno Le Maire, then the country’s economy and finance minister, published the novel “Fugue Américaine,” which drew instant criticism and mockery, mainly because of an explicit sex scene (unhappy French people were quick to point out that they had been screwed by the government for years).

Then there’s Marlène Schiappa, former government minister and writer of raunchy books under the pen name Marie Minelli, with titles such as “Osez les sexfriends,” “Sexe, mensonge et banlieues chaudes” and “Comment transformer votre mec en Brad Pitt en 30 jours.” When she was junior social affairs minister, Schiappa appeared on the cover of Playboy, although she was not naked in the magazine (great news for those who buy Playboy only for the articles). 

Former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing published several erotic novels, including “La Princesse et le Président,” which features sex scenes set in the presidential palace.

But perhaps the most intriguing of all is current President Emmanuel Macron, whose erotic novel about the early days of his romance with Brigitte has, alas, never seen the light of day. Perhaps he’s keeping it back for political gain and will promise to publish the steamy tome if the people of France promise to vote for a centrist candidate in April’s election.

CAPTION COMPETITION

“Hello, my name is Vladimir, and I’m looking to date someone who shares my interests: Horse riding, driving vintage cars and war.”

Can you do better? Email us at pdallison@politico.eu or get in touch on X @POLITICOEurope.

Last time, we gave you this photo:

Thanks for all the entries. Here’s the best one from our mailbag — there’s no prize except the gift of laughter, which I think we can all agree is far preferable to cash or booze.

“And now, let’s pray the opposition don’t get to 42%.”

by David Kemp