BERLIN — A drone packed with explosives discovered at Leipzig Airport is raising fears of foreign interference in upcoming German regional elections in which far-right politicians have campaigned on fears of escalations with Moscow.

The drone — found at a strategic airport serving Ukrainian and NATO aircraft as well as a major DHL logistics hub — is being seen as evidence of a potential act by “foreign powers,” said German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt.

The Kremlin has been accused of seeking to sway September’s elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania, states in the former communist East Germany where pro-Russian sentiment remains strong and where the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party could take power for the first time at the state level.

“We do of course see that Russia attempts every day, in one way or another — through hybrid means and various measures — to exert influence here in Germany in a manner that seeks to undermine our democracy and erode trust in politics and politicians,” said Martin Giese, a foreign ministry spokesperson.

Russian disinformation campaigns have portrayed German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his government as warmongers. They aim to undermine the already unpopular chancellor and boost Russia-friendly forces such as the AfD and the far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) — both of which are strong in eastern Germany.

“The state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and in eastern Germany are, of course, a major target of Russian influence, because these are pivotal elections in the heart of Europe,” said Stefan Meister, a Russia expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

He said that it is too early to attribute the explosive-laden drone to Russia as investigations are still ongoing. But he added that Moscow is clearly waging a broad hybrid campaign targeting the region ahead of next month’s votes.

“This could be the first time right-wing populists come to power,” Meister said. “And with that, the chancellor might even fall — or at the very least, the coalition would be severely weakened — and a pro-Russian party would come to power in one of the federal states.”  

“There is a major campaign underway on the Russian side to influence these elections in favor of the AfD and the BSW,” he added. 

Polls show that the AfD has a chance of winning an outright majority in Saxony-Anhalt on Sept. 6 and is poised to be the largest party in Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania and is expected to perform well in Berlin when those states hold elections on Sept. 20.

Vulnerable transport hub

The drone incident risks raising fears in Germany that their country’s support for Ukraine is bringing the war closer to home.

The Leipzig-Halle airport has been a target in the past. In July 2024, an incendiary parcel caught fire at a DHL facility there shortly before it was due to be loaded onto an aircraft. European investigators later identified 22 suspects allegedly working for Russian military intelligence in the wider parcel plot. 

The airport is among Germany’s most strategically important transport hubs.

It is the home base for NATO’s SALIS airlift program, which gives nine participating countries access to Ukrainian Antonov aircraft capable of carrying oversized military cargo for national, EU and alliance missions.

The incident adds to a feeling of insecurity, which could help populist parties, said Meister.

“It’s once again obvious that we’re simply very vulnerable,” he said.

An interior ministry spokesperson said Wednesday that the government was monitoring a campaign it called “Matryoshka,” and regarded it as serious.

German officials said this week that fabricated videos that falsely accused candidates of corruption, sexual misconduct and other crimes appeared to have mimicked trusted outlets such as the German regional public broadcaster ARD and the U.K.’s BBC.

Independent researchers have gone further. Deutsche Welle counted more than 180 fake posts linked to Matryoshka targeting September’s three elections. The posts largely attacked candidates from centrist parties, while sparing the AfD and BSW, according to researchers.

Chris Lunday contributed to this report.

BERLIN — German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt has suggested a state actor was behind the explosive-laden drone that was found at Leipzig airport.

“We can’t rule out the possibility that foreign powers are behind this,” Dobrindt told public broadcaster ZDF Wednesday evening. “That will now be part of the investigation, but there are many indications pointing in that direction,” he said.

Dobrindt stopped short of naming Russia specifically in his statements but said that “a hybrid threat is evident” and that such threats do not originate from amateurs but are “often linked to foreign powers.”

“Of course, we all want to know which foreign powers are involved. But it would be reckless to give credence to any kind of speculation at this point,” he added.

Leipzig Airport serves as a strategic hub for NATO, including for military transports to Ukraine. The airport is also international courier service DHL’s largest European air hub and serves as a temporary home for some Ukrainian Antonov aircraft, protecting them from Russian attacks. The armed drone was found just meters away from such a plane, said officials Wednesday.

Armin Schuster, minister of the interior for Saxony — where Leipzig is located — told ZDF that the incident represented a new threat level.

“Without wanting to preempt the investigation, I would describe this as a suspected attack scenario because this is the first time we’ve had a drone that was also loaded with explosives,” he said. “That’s new.”

An airport worker found the drone Tuesday night. Officers disarmed the device by removing its detonator, which had failed to go off. In a separate incident at the same airport,  another flying object struck a DHL cargo aircraft as it was being diverted away from the airport after the explosive-laden drone was found.

The intelligence-sharing relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine has bounced back to previous highs, according to long-time Ukraine watchers — a welcome boost during a critical window of opportunity for the Ukrainian war effort.

Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), the intelligence committee’s ranking member and a longtime proponent of more U.S. assistance to Ukraine, told POLITICO he sees evidence of an improved intel-sharing agreement — and believes it’s helped Kyiv gain an advantage in Moscow’s four-year-long war.

“I don’t want to get into any specifics, but it has improved,” he said, adding that Ukraine’s use of long-range drones and missiles has allowed it to strike deep within Russian territory and strengthen its position.

In recent months, Kyiv has carried out more aggressive strikes across Russia, enabling it to take back territory and stabilize the front line. This has afforded the country more leverage as Ukraine looks to parlay battlefield wins to pressure Russia to the negotiating table.

Ukraine’s stronger footing also comes as U.S.-mediated talks to strike a peace deal with Moscow have stalled. Trump’s negotiating team, which includes Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, has been preoccupied with the Iran war, bumping Ukraine down its priority list.

But in that time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appears to have risen in President Donald Trump’s estimation as Kyiv has made gains against Russia.

In early July, a barrage of Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure forced Moscow — one of the world’s top fuel exporters — to halt its exports of diesel. The increased frequency of those kinds of targeted attacks has put the Kremlin in a tighter spot, creating what Kyiv has argued is a window of opportunity for Ukraine to leverage its current advantage to end the war.

Republican Sens. John Cornyn (R-Texas), another member of the intel committee, and Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, agreed that intel-sharing between the U.S. and Ukraine has increased at a moment of strategic importance.

“It sure seems like that,” Cornyn said. “Everybody loves a winner and looks like Ukraine has turned the tide.”

Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), a Democratic armed services committee member, told POLITICO he’s also seen signs of greater communication between Ukraine and the U.S.

“I was in Ukraine in April 2025 and I was there again in July 2026. 
And I detect more confidence in the communication,” Kaine said.

Cooperation from the U.S. has been key to Ukraine’s positive turn in fortune, said George Barros, the director of innovation and open source tradecraft at the hawkish Institute for the Study of War. Trump reportedly approved intelligence sharing for Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure last year, which have been essential to creating a “proper incentive structure” to push Moscow to the negotiating table, Barros noted.

The strikes, he said, were “supercharged,” and became significantly more effective when imbued with intelligence from the Americans, part of a “larger, more coherent strategy for how to actually create real costs.”

And American early warning systems, Barros added, have been alerting Ukrainians to incoming Russian missile attacks since the early days of the war.

The White House did not provide details on whether its intelligence-sharing relationship with Ukraine has expanded, though it stressed that Trump is focused on facilitating an end to the war.

“The President wants this war settled so the senseless killing ends,” said the White House spokesperson in a statement. “The President and his team remain committed to continuing to play a constructive role in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, and he remains optimistic that we’ll ultimately get a peace deal done.”

The CIA and ODNI did not respond to a request for comment.

Washington also stands to benefit from Kyiv’s intelligence, said John Herbst, who served as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2003-2006 and still maintains contact with officials in the country.

“There’s no doubt of the following: Ukraine has outstanding intelligence on Russia,” he said.

Zelenskyy has sought to put that intelligence to use. With Washington locked in a five-month war against Iran, the Ukrainian president prefaced his July visit to the Oval Office by claiming Kyiv planned to provide Trump with evidence that Russia was aiding Tehran.

“When you talk to Ukrainian intelligence officials, you hear confident insights into what is going on in Moscow, and not just in the Kremlin,” said Stephen Sestanovich, a fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Insights of a sort that justify a truly cooperative and reciprocal sharing arrangement.”

German counterterrorism authorities are leading an investigation into an explosive-laden drone that was found overnight at Leipzig airport, an important base for the NATO alliance.

An airport worker discovered the drone carrying an explosive device in a restricted cargo area late Tuesday, according to Dresden Public Prosecutor’s office and Saxony state police. A police bomb disposal robot examined the drone before officers disarmed the device by removing its detonator.

Airport officials temporarily suspended flights and diverted several aircraft. One of the diverted planes, a DHL cargo aircraft, struck another flying object while climbing away from the airport. After landing at Hanover airport, officials found signs of an impact on the aircraft’s nose.

Officials told WELT — which, like POLITICO, is part of the Axel Springer group — that the device’s detonator failed to function, preventing an explosion. They also said the drone was found just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov transport aircraft. According to the report, it contained Semtex, the explosive used in the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground.

Leipzig airport hosts the base of operations of NATO’s Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS), which gives participating countries access to Antonov cargo planes to transport military equipment. The airport is DHL’s largest European air hub and serves as an aircraft maintenance base for some Ukrainian Antonov aircraft.

According to WELT, security authorities have internally classified the incident as an attempted attack. No suspects had been detained as of Wednesday evening.

Germany’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt interrupted his summer vacation in Italy to meet officials in Leipzig.

Saxony’s Interior Minister Armin Schuster described the incident in a statement as “very serious security incident.”

Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Oleksii Makeiev, assumed Moscow could be behind the incident. “I hope that all the authorities in Germany will now establish the facts as well. But who else could it have been besides Russia?” he posited on WELT TV.

Russia’s embassy to Germany didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Lennart Pfahler contributed reporting from Berlin. This article has been updated.

The European Union has collected €1.4 billion in revenue from immobilized Russian central bank assets and will channel the proceeds to Ukraine, the European Commission announced Wednesday.

In a press release, the Commission said the payment, received Monday, was the “fifth transfer of its kind.” Since the assets have been immobilized, they have generated a total of €8 billion in windfall profits.

Brussels said 95 percent of the latest tranche would go through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, helping Kyiv repay EU and G7 loans, while the remaining 5 percent would flow through the European Peace Facility to meet Ukraine’s “pressing military and defence needs.”

“Once again we wake up to the news of horrible atrocities by Russia through its aerial attacks on Ukraine,” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote on X. “Russia must pay for the destruction it has caused. And we are using the proceeds from the immobilised Russian assets to make sure it does.” Von der Leyen said the EU was making “a further €1.4 billion” available to support Ukraine’s “continued resistance against Russia’s illegal war.”

Her comments came after one of the deadliest Russian attacks on Kyiv this year. Ballistic missiles and drones killed at least 17 people and wounded 44 overnight, striking residential buildings, warehouses and a railway station. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Wednesday that additional missile interceptors “could have saved lives” and blamed delays in Western air-defense deliveries for the mounting casualties.

Over €210 billion in Russian central bank reserves were frozen by the EU after Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Since 2024, financial institutions holding those assets have been required to ring-fence the extraordinary profits they generate, allowing Brussels to redirect the proceeds to Ukraine while leaving the underlying reserves untouched.

At this month’s NATO summit in Ankara, allies announced billions of dollars in new arms deals and reaffirmed their commitment to spend more on defense. European governments have made the pledge, and the money is real: European defense spending has doubled since 2019, and by 2030, European NATO member countries are projected to spend in excess of €800 billion a year, up €300 billion from 2025, with equipment spending alone nearly doubling.

But committing money is the easy part. The harder question is whether Europe’s defense industry can turn it into equipment fast enough to matter. Europe’s largest defense manufacturers’ order books now average more than five years for production, and some are closer to nine. Money is flowing in faster than industry can turn it into equipment. But a purchase order is not equipment that can be deployed on the ground and the air.

European countries have long duplicated capabilities rather than pooling them.

The bottleneck sits in the defense industrial system. Deterrence relies on the chain from funding to contracts, then through production, deployment into services, then rapid innovation in the field. Europe’s next goal comes after the spending promise. The continent fields six times as many weapons platforms as the United States, because countries have long duplicated capabilities rather than pooling them. Production ends up split across many small runs that never reach an efficient scale. Ukraine, under pressure, has shown how fast a defense system can move, adapting tactics in weeks and building drone detection networks from consumer electronics. Europe needs to catch up and then accelerate.

Four moves would help Europe accelerate.

The first is multi-speed procurement. Software-led systems such as drones and targeting improve in rapid cycles throughout their deployment and need procurement that can keep up. Israel’s Iron Dome started out as far less capable than it is today and improved continuously in service. European defense ministries have already set up high-speed procurement units with dedicated teams and greater risk tolerance. These need to become mainstream, rather than the exception.

Collaboration in procurement, maintenance and training brings costs down and delivery forward.

The second is military collaboration to reduce fragmentation. Collaboration in procurement, maintenance and training brings costs down and delivery forward. The Tempest project, where the U.K., Italy and Japan are jointly building a next-generation fighter, demonstrates the model: shared development costs that no single country could carry alone. Recent bilateral maritime agreements, and Romania’s use of EU funding to buy European while expanding production at home, show the same logic spreading.

The third is industrial consolidation, which is already underway and needs to move faster. Companies are driving it themselves. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales have agreed to merge their space divisions into a single joint venture with roughly €6.5 billion in revenue and 25,000 employees, and European defense mergers and acquisitions rose 35 percent year over year in the first half of 2025. McKinsey analysis finds that consolidation across key supply chain segments could unlock around €9 billion in annual synergies, more than the current equipment budgets of 24 of Europe’s 30 NATO members. The deepest opportunity sits below the big primes, among the thousands of tier two, three and four suppliers that still duplicate one another’s work. Europe can speed this up by harmonizing requirements, reducing national carve-outs and letting industry do the combining. Consolidation is only half the task. Europe also needs to build sheer capacity — more shipyards, more assembly lines, more of the physical plants that turn orders into hardware — and the capital to fund it. In several categories, Europe simply lacks enough places to build.

Real deterrence means difficult choices, and a public that understands the importance and the cost of security.

The fourth is regulatory unlocking. Full scale-up demands skilled workers retrained, accredited and security cleared from other industries; production sites with preapproved permitting; and alignment of export controls across European allies. These regulatory unlocks now need the same energy and focus as the funding commitment debate. 

Real deterrence means difficult choices, and a public that understands the importance and the cost of security. That conversation is only beginning in much of Europe. It must include the potential for “gray zone” cyber strikes on hospitals, arson at industrial sites, drones disrupting ports, undersea data cables cut — these have all occurred, but many citizens do not yet recognize this as having malicious intent.

The opportunity in getting it right is significant. McKinsey and GLOBSEC estimates indicate that every euro of spending on European-manufactured equipment generates two euros of revenue across the European supply chain, and an additional €165 billion a year in equipment spending could create up to 1.2 million jobs. The coming years will reveal how effectively Europe is able to scale up to protect its territory and citizens, and how much of the promised investment becomes lasting deterrence and European jobs. Getting there depends on the whole ecosystem — governments, industry and investors — moving together. Increased spending is important. Spending it effectively matters more.

Jonathan Dimson is a senior partner in McKinsey’s London office. Mikael Robertson is a senior partner in the Stockholm office.

NATO’s reliance on the “doctrines of World War II” and its slow adaptation to new forms of warfare make it unlikely Ukraine will ever join the alliance, said Kyiv’s Ambassador to the U.K. and former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi.

“For 12 years, I must have personally been working to ensure that we mastered NATO standards, and every year I listened to tales that we were about to join NATO. Unfortunately, we will never join it,” Zaluzhnyi privately told Ukrainian ambassadors in Kyiv on Monday, according to Ukrainian media.

Although “Ukraine needs technologies that are still available in NATO countries today,” like defenses against ballistic missiles, he said, “it is impossible to join an organization that possesses the doctrines of World War II with the level of development that exists in the armed forces of Ukraine.”

Russia has made deep changes to its forces under pressure from the war, and many politicians and intelligence officials worry it could be ready to attack a NATO country by the end of the decade.

Zaluzhnyi’s unusual rebuke underscores a growing change in the alliance’s relationship with Ukraine. The country has shifted from relying on European military support in the early years of the war to becoming one the continent’s most powerful and technologically advanced militaries — far ahead of Western forces in the mass production of drones, missiles and other key systems.

“Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security,” said NATO’s 32 leaders in a joint declaration at the alliance’s Ankara summit last month. In recent military exercises where NATO has invited Ukrainian troops to participate, allied forces have repeatedly been surprised by their tactics and drone use.

The comments are also notable given Zaluzhnyi’s widely rumored political ambitions. He was replaced as Ukraine’s top commander by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2024.

“Most likely, NATO will remain in the same form as it is, and will spend 12 years, like Ukraine, transitioning to the standards that need to be achieved in order to be at least half the level of the Russian Federation,” said the retired general.

Zaluzhnyi’s remarks also reflect an enduring Ukrainian frustration with the alliance for stalling its application to join despite officially floating the prospect of eventual membership in 2023. The U.S. and other allies remain opposed.

As a result, Zaluzhnyi said, Ukraine would instead opt to “be tied to blocs and alliances that will probably be formed,” citing the Joint Expeditionary Force — a 10-nation U.K.-led grouping of mainly Nordic and Baltic countries established in 2014 and designed to complement NATO.

“Most likely, we will talk about a European military security bloc,” added Zaluzhnyi.

NATO declined to comment, referring POLITICO to remarks made by alliance Secretary-General Mark Rutte in June, who reiterated the “irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO.”

Zaluzhnyi and Ukraine’s mission to NATO didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Veronika Melkozerova contributed reporting from Kyiv.