The European Parliament has figured out how to pass controversial legislation … just bypass the full vote of all 720 MEPs.

Today on the show, Zoya Sheftalovich and Ian Wishart discuss how cross-party leaders are worried that the plenary’s shifting alliances — particularly with the rise of the far right — could blow up legislation that expert lawmakers have already negotiated at the committee stage. The bypass method could come in handy for the EU’s next long-term budget.

Next, NATO allies are considering the biggest overhaul of their military planning in at least two decades — by prioritizing Russia and deprioritizing conflicts further away. We go inside the ongoing talks.

Finally, the EU today unveils its new Digital Fairness Act, which aims to help consumers online. But NGO Finance Watch says the proposal falls short when it comes to protecting people from fin-fluencers.

Have you ever fallen for an online get-rich-quick scheme? Let us know! Message us on WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Articles mentioned in this episode:

• NATO seeks to prioritize fighting Russia and shrink forces for missions abroad.
  

How the tiny, self-governing British island of Jersey unintentionally became Europe’s front line in the multibillion-dollar global cannabis industry.

PARIS — Far-left presidential hopeful Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party set out leaving NATO and nationalizing defense companies in its official platform released Friday.

“Immediately withdraw from NATO’s integrated command and then, in stages, from the organization itself. Reject the tribute demanded by the United States of 5% of GDP devoted to defense spending,” read France Unbowed’s 222-page program.

However, France under Mélenchon would still provide assistance to European Union countries under EU treaties, the document added, echoing what the far-left leader previously told POLITICO.

An increasing number of polls place Mélenchon in second place in next year’s high-stakes election to replace President Emmanuel Macron. The top two vote-getters go on to a second round, which could see Mélenchon facing off against far-right leader Marine Le Pen, who also pledges to take France out of NATO’s integrated command.

Unlike Le Pen’s far-right party, France Unbowed does not explicitly say it would stop providing assistance to Ukraine — but it does insist on the need for a diplomatic solution. Any peace agreement would need to lean on “collective security guarantees, between the belligerents and with the rest of Europe.”

France Unbowed wants more arms regulation, including of lethal autonomous weapons systems and nuclear weapons.

The far-left party is also pushing back against the “space arms race,” including by pledging to close NATO’s space center in Toulouse, but says France should have the means to guarantee its sovereignty. Unlike most other political parties, France Unbowed has strong interest in space policy, and argues in its presidential platform that France should acquire a space shuttle.

France Unbowed lawmakers have previously pushed for France to procure Dassault Aviation’s Vortex, a European reusable orbital spaceplane program spearheaded by the French aerospace manufacturer.

Overall, France should invest more in so-called critical enablers, meaning military equipment in areas such as communications, intelligence and logistics that are currently mostly provided by the U.S. via NATO. “They must be produced as a matter of priority,” the party wrote.

It also wants to nationalize some of the country’s main defense companies including ArianeGroup.

A more detailed platform specifically on defense will be released later, a France Unbowed lawmaker told POLITICO.

FRANKFURT — The race to replace Christine Lagarde has reached fever pitch after she officially announced her intention to depart the European Central Bank in February next year.

The two leading contenders are familiar figures from the eurozone’s central banking circuit: Spain’s Pablo Hernández de Cos, a measured economist with a reputation for quiet authority, and Dutchman Klaas Knot, a former hawk whose years on the ECB’s governing council left a more complicated legacy.

A recent Bloomberg survey of economists gives de Cos a slender lead: 12 respondents picked him, against nine for Knot. The survey offers a snapshot of expert preferences, not a forecast of the outcome. EU leaders will make the appointment, with national claims and other ECB vacancies likely to shape negotiations.

The choices will also be influenced by horse trading over what will likely be a package deal with the opportunity to fill the two executive board seats that will be vacant in January and May.

Softly spoken de Cos

An economist with a Ph.D. from the University of Madrid, de Cos joined the Bank of Spain in 1997, moved to Frankfurt in 2004 to be an adviser to the ECB’s executive board, before returning to the Spanish central bank. He rose through the ranks to become governor, serving from 2018 to 2024. In this role he restored the Bank of Spain’s reputation after a series of missteps before and during the financial crisis.

His achievement was implicitly acknowledged by his appointment to two terms as chair of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the global standard-setter for bank regulation. He now runs the Bank for International Settlements, the institution often described as the central bankers’ central bank.

His style is low-key: a modest dove, meaning that he is more attentive than hawks to growth and employment alongside inflation. Still, when inflation surged in 2022, de Cos backed the ECB’s shift toward higher rates. Equally, he has little time for governments that put off essential pension system reforms, having published a sharp critique of the Pedro Sanchez government while at the Bank of Spain. 

His case

De Cos has long been groomed by Lagarde’s predecessor Mario Draghi, whose voice continues to carry a heavy weight in European economic debates and may influence the preference of some countries as they mull who to place at the top of the Frankfurt institution.

As France faces mounting debt pressures, de Cos’ experience as a senior Bank of Spain economist during the eurozone crisis could convince EU governments that he is the best fit. Galo Nuño, vice dean and professor of economics at IE University and a former alternate member of the ECB governing council, called it “a huge advantage.”

His challenges

The political arithmetic, however, could work against the Spaniard. France is keen to secure the role of the ECB chief economist, which becomes vacant in May 2027. Some officials may want to avoid pairing the ECB presidency and chief economist roles with candidates from highly indebted countries.

With inflation above target and the eurozone having lived through a severe inflation shock in 2022, some leaders may prefer a candidate with a more clearly hawkish record.

Enter: Klaas Knot.  

Knot: Hawk turned pragmatist

Knot also has a strong economic background, boasting a Ph.D. from the University of Groningen. After early positions at the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, he moved into senior roles at the Dutch Finance Ministry and returned to the DNB, which he led from 2011 to 2025. He has also chaired the Financial Stability Board, the global body tasked with monitoring risks to the financial system.

For much of Draghi’s presidency, Knot was a staunch hawk who publicly challenged the ECB’s stimulus measures. In September 2019, he called the package “disproportionate.”

His relationship with the ECB’s leadership was more harmonious under Lagarde. He supported both her pandemic crisis response package, PEPP, as well as the Transmission Protection Mechanism — a potentially more radical tool than any brought in under Draghi which allows the ECB to buy up unlimited debt of a single EU member country.

Knot remained an early advocate of raising rates when inflation took off but came to be described as a pragmatic hawk and team player.

His case

Supporters argue that a hawkish president could help the ECB support Southern European economies during a debt crisis while reassuring consumers and investors that the bank remains committed to price stability.

Knot’s former role as chair of the G20’s Financial Stability Board could also boost his case. Berenberg chief economist Holger Schmieding argued that “the question who may be best placed to deal with potential financial turbulences will likely play a key role in the choice of new ECB leaders.” This role was also Draghi’s springboard.

His challenges

Germany’s ambitions could be a stumbling block, as Northern European hawks will have had their turn with Knot. EFG Bank chief economist Stefan Gerlach said: “If Knot is appointed, then Germany can hardly argue that it is its turn to appoint the president after him.”

Some veteran governors still view Knot’s public break with Draghi as disloyal.

What happens now?

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said a decision would be taken by year-end, with eurozone ministers set to gather under the banner of the European Council in mid-December.

When it comes who will win the race, the history could cut both ways.

Nuño, who has seen both candidates in action, said each brings monetary-policy expertise and the political pragmatism needed to manage the challenges ahead.

The choice, then, will turn on which mix of policy temperament and political arithmetic EU leaders want at the top.

As Europe’s energy ministers meet in Brussels this week, they are weighing legitimate concerns around energy security, affordability, and the pressures facing businesses and households.

The European Commission’s proposal to delay selected EU Methane Regulation requirements for fossil-fuel importers is now moving quickly through the legislative process. Ministers have an opportunity to keep any adjustment tightly focused, while preserving the policy stability that companies and investors need to plan, invest and manage risk over the long term.

Investors need a stable framework against which companies can plan, manage risk and allocate capital with confidence.

For investors, the question is not whether implementation should be practical. It should. The question is whether a response to current pressures becomes a wider change to a framework that companies have already begun to implement.

Sixty investors, representing over €9.5 trillion in assets under management, have called for the EU Methane Regulation to be maintained and implemented as adopted. That statement pre-dated the Commission’s proposed one-year delay. Its central concern, however, is more relevant now: investors need a stable framework against which companies can plan, manage risk and allocate capital with confidence.

The regulation was designed with phased implementation. It gave companies, importers and national authorities time to prepare for stronger measurement, reporting and verification of methane emissions. It has helped bring methane from the margins into boardroom discussions, where it belongs.

Why methane matters to investors

For investors, methane performance can offer a useful view of how a company is run. It is an indicator of operational discipline, process safety and the quality of management oversight. By setting requirements for measurement, reporting and verification, the regulation can also improve the availability, consistency and reliability of methane data. That gives investors a stronger basis to compare companies and assess whether they are managing risks that could affect long-term value. Maintaining the regulation’s core provisions and avoiding any further delay would protect the progress already under way.

The EU’s position as a major oil and gas importer gives the Methane Regulation particular weight. Clear import requirements can improve the quality and comparability of emissions information across global supply chains. They can help create a more level playing field for companies supplying the European market, rather than allowing weak data or weaker controls to become a commercial advantage.

The choice is not between competitiveness, affordability and effective methane management. Europe can support all three.

This matters for competitiveness as well as climate-related financial risk. Energy affordability is a legitimate concern, particularly for businesses and households facing continued market volatility. But well-designed, practical rules can reward operational excellence, support informed investment decisions and give companies a clearer basis on which to plan, while implementation can be managed in ways that preserve market flexibility and limit unnecessary costs for consumers.

The choice is not between competitiveness, affordability and effective methane management. Europe can support all three. A three-year postponement, however, would not serve institutional investors, companies or Europe’s competitiveness.

Methane is often treated as a narrow technical issue. It is not. Reducing emissions from oil and gas operations is one of the quickest and most cost-effective ways to limit near-term warming. For companies, stronger measurement and reporting can also identify avoidable losses, improve operational performance and strengthen confidence among lenders and investors.

Companies and investors have already begun to respond to the direction set by the impending regulation. Investors are looking more closely at the quality of companies’ emissions data and the systems behind it. A predictable regulatory framework supports that work. Repeated changes to the timetable would do the opposite: they would make it harder to judge preparedness, compare performance and distinguish between companies that are acting now and those that are waiting for the rules to move again.

A longer delay would not remove the work needed to implement the regulation. It would postpone it, weaken incentives for companies and suppliers to prepare, and leave investors with less visibility over how methane-related risk will be managed. It could also disadvantage businesses that have already invested in stronger measurement and reporting, while slowing the development of the market for independent verification services needed to support credible implementation. When the requirements eventually return, the adjustment may be sharper and more costly. That uncertainty carries a cost for companies, investors and the wider market.

Practical implementation, not prolonged delay

The practical challenges facing importers are real and should be addressed through consistent implementation. This includes clear guidance from national authorities, practical ways to link relevant methane data to imported fuels, and clear standards for countries outside the EU whose methane rules are recognized as comparable to EU requirements. This approach would preserve market flexibility and help limit unnecessary costs, without weakening the regulation’s purpose.

If a one-year adjustment is judged necessary, ministers should keep it tightly defined, with a clear end date and no reopening of the regulation’s core provisions. They should use the period to provide the guidance that companies, importers and national authorities need to implement the rules consistently.

The choice facing ministers is not whether Europe should address methane emissions, but whether it does so through a stable framework that rewards preparedness and investment. A limited adjustment may be manageable. A prolonged delay risks creating uncertainty, slowing preparation and leaving Europe less competitive.

Stephanie Pfeifer, CEO, Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of all IIGCC members.

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Disclaimer

POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT

• The sponsor is Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC).
• The advertisement relates to EU methane and energy policy and advocates for maintaining the core provisions of the EU Methane Regulation, limiting any implementation delay and preserving a stable regulatory framework for companies and investors.

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Ask European Union leaders what they think of Mark Carney’s climate credentials, and you’ll get a gushing response.

“We see the world with the same eyes: from AI to climate change,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in her State of the Union speech last month, where the Canadian prime minister was the guest of honor.

“Canada and the EU are very, very like-minded,” the bloc’s climate chief, Wopke Hoekstra, told POLITICO in an interview when asked about his hopes for climate collaboration between the two powers ahead of this week’s EU-Canada summit in Montreal.

But this rosy view sidesteps a less comfortable reality: Canada is a major fossil fuel producer whose climate ambitions fall far short of Europe’s.

And under Carney, those ambitions are weakening.

Last year, Canada produced more crude oil than any other country outside the big three producers, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Oil and gas are Canada’s biggest exports by far, and the industry lobby is an influential force in Ottawa.

In his previous life as a central banker, Carney was considered a climate champion. POLITICO even dubbed him an “eco warrior” in 2018. But since taking over as prime minister last year, he has weakened Canada’s climate policies at a rate few predicted, scrapping a national carbon tax and electric vehicle mandate and opening new oil and gas projects.

The list of climate laws Carney has watered down, repealed and canceled makes the EU’s own recent backtracking on green laws look minor. Some environmentalists argue it is comparable to U.S. President Donald Trump’s wholesale dismantling of environmental protections.

“The track the Carney government has taken on climate and environmental regulation has been a decisive move in the direction of the U.S.,” said Tim Gray, executive director of environmental non-profit Environment Defence. Carney, he said, “seems to be all in on fossil fuels.”

Keean Nembhard, a spokesperson for Canada’s Environment Minister Julie Dabrusin, told POLITICO the Carney government is “committed to fighting climate change and reaching net-zero by 2050 by taking a pragmatic and durable approach.”

“This includes building major clean energy projects across the country, driving mass electrification, and making significant investment in the low-carbon economy,” he said.

But Gray argued that Carney’s support for fossil fuels and weakening of environmental standards may complicate Canada’s attempts to forge closer ties with Europe, which has some of the world’s most stringent green laws.

Still, in Europe, Carney’s green image persists.

Last week, Belgian member of the European Parliament Saskia Bricmont gave expression to this faith in Carney’s commitment to climate issues when she called on him to lead a global push to put climate back on the agenda ahead of next month’s U.N. climate summit.

“Mr Carney … relaunch the fight against climate deregulation and for the restoration of biodiversity, and re-mobilize the international community around concrete, coordinated measures,” she said.

Carney’s green aura

Carney’s reputation as a climate champion is well earned. As governor of the Bank of England, he led a push among central bankers to take the economic risks of climate change seriously — memorably captured in his 2015 ‘Tragedy of the Horizon’ speech, in which he warned: “The catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors.”

In 2021, after he’d left the Bank of England, he became a United Nations special envoy on climate action and finance and launched a net-zero financial alliance with some of the world’s biggest banks.

But things changed dramatically when Donald Trump took back the White House, and Carney replaced fellow Liberal Justin Trudeau as Canada’s prime minister in 2025. At the time, Trudeau and his Liberals had been way behind in the polls, battered by Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre’s attacks on his climate policies — in particular an unpopular consumer carbon tax.

Carney’s first act as prime minister was to scrap that tax.

Following his surprise victory in the elections that April, Carney set about promoting Canada as an “energy superpower.” To the dismay of environmental groups, he supported the “Pacific Link,” an oil pipeline costing tens of billions of dollars, designed to carry Alberta crude to Canada’s Pacific coast for export to Asia.

He then pushed for thawing relations with Beijing in January, a not-so-subtle pitch to find a new crude oil client that isn’t the U.S. Germany, rushing to replace its dependence on Russian energy, signed a long-term agreement in July to buy Canadian liquefied natural gas from a proposed port in British Columbia, despite backlash from environmental and indigenous groups.

He also scrapped laws on electric vehicle adoption, dropped plans for an emissions cap on oil and gas companies, watered down an existing industrial carbon price and introduced legislation to weaken environmental permitting rules for big infrastructure projects, which critics dubbed the “bulldoze nature bill.”

A landmark moment, according to Gray, came in November 2025, when Carney signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Alberta, Canada’s biggest oil-producing province. That document, which promised to turn Canada into a “global energy superpower,” contained a string of promises to promote oil and gas and water down federal climate laws.

So why the dramatic shift?

Carney, who has repeatedly positioned energy sovereignty as a bulwark against Trump’s economic aggression, offered his realpolitik response at an event in the heart of Alberta’s oil patch earlier this month.

“There’s a structural challenge of energy security and the existential challenge of climate change, and these challenges are forcing countries to think differently about where their energy comes from and on who they can rely on to supply it,” Carney said in Fort McMurray, Alberta on Oct. 1.

“Even under any plausible net zero scenario, the IEA [International Energy Agency] forecasts the world will still need tens of millions of barrels of crude a day. So the question is: who will emerge as the world’s trusted suppliers? It should be us. It must be Canada.”

Not black and white

Carney, to be sure, is no Trump. Unlike the U.S. president, he has retained his pro-climate rhetoric and promised to develop the country’s mining of critical minerals essential for the clean energy transition.

In May, he unveiled a national electricity strategy which aims to double Canada’s largely clean electricity grid by 2050 to meet soaring demand. “The path to net zero is electrification,” Carney said then.

In August, he announced C$10 billion in federal support for the Churchill Falls hydroelectric project in Newfoundland and Labrador, saying it will be the largest clean energy project in North America, capable of generating enough electricity to light up the equivalent of Canada’s three largest cities.

Nembhard, Environment Minster Dabrusin’s spokesperson, also pointed to new electricity transmission lines, electric vehicle subsidies and a C$2 billion plan to retrofit homes with heat pumps.

Canadian climate activist Alex Cool-Fergus said she does not think Carney “believes that oil and gas is the future,” but is simply being pragmatic about Canada’s economic reality.

“The electricity strategy that came out in May was incredibly important, and actually gives us a better idea of what his thinking is for the future,” she said.

Trudeau’s approach to climate change was “very much values-based, and it was about doing the right thing,” said Cool-Fergus. “I think that’s hit its limits. Carney’s approach makes more sense for the world of 2025-2026.”

The limits of the partnership

Hoekstra, the EU’s commissioner for climate, said he wants to deepen ties with Canada. “Given all the complications the world is facing, it is imperative to team up more closely with your closest partners,” he said. But he’s realistic about how far that relationship can go.

Hoekstra has ambitions of cementing the EU into a global network of economies with carbon pricing regimes. While he conceded nothing is “off the table,” he acknowledged linking the EU’s Emissions Trading System with Canada’s “quite different” version, which varies from province to province: “You’re talking about a completely different horizon, and that is not something we would attempt in the very short run.”

There are, however, other ways Hoekstra believes the EU and Canada can closely link on environmental issues.

“Doubling down, tripling down on electrification, on solar, on wind, on nuclear, on batteries,” he said, adding “that is one area that I think is potentially very fruitful for my portfolio.”

Another is critical raw materials, a key focus of this week’s summit.

Brussels is exploring ways for the European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm, to help finance the mining of Canadian mineral deposits that could supply the bloc with an alternative to Chinese-produced metals, with a framework agreement expected to be signed during the summit. Lithium, copper, nickel, and other key ingredients for electric vehicle batteries and clean energy technologies essential for decarbonizing Europe are abundant but often undeveloped all over Canada.

This week’s summit will also explore investing in infrastructure on Canada’s east coast to liquefy and ship Canadian gas to Europe, a move that could help the EU diversify its supply away from the U.S., which, along with Norway, has become Europe’s dominant supplier since it cut off Russian gas imports following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Many EU member countries will welcome success on these goals. But Gray warns that closer ties with Canada could lead to deeper penetration by the country’s powerful fossil fuel lobby, which he described as a “major, major force.”

“They’ll be spending time trying to make sure the alignment with the EU is in a direction that favors them,” he said.

The EU’s lack of oil and gas resources — and, by extension, the absence of a powerful fossil fuel lobby — has kept climate policy relatively bipartisan in the EU. Could inviting a fossil fuel “superpower” into the fold as an “associate member” change that?

“That would depend very much on what is an ‘associate member,’” Dutch Climate Minister Stientje van Veldhoven-van der Meer said.

LONDON — Andy Burnham’s love affair with beans is well documented.

Asked what items he would stockpile in case of an emergency, the prime minister picked the store-cupboard staple, together with soup and Twiglets.

Now bean producers are screaming betrayal.

As part of a stream of “everyday fixes” aimed at easing the cost of living, Chancellor John Healey said the government would suspend tariffs on more than 100 products, including imported chocolate, marmalade and Burnham’s beloved baked beans.

An analysis of the list — published in full today — reveals that tariffs of 16% will be removed on an array of finished bean products imported from around the world, many of which are also manufactured in the U.K.

While the raw beans used to make products like baked beans are mostly imported, the U.K. boasts a major bean processing industry which food executives fear could now be undermined by exporters such as China and the U.S.

Karen Betts, chief executive of the Food and Drink Federation, said the budget did “nothing to ease the pressures food and drink manufacturers are under.”

“Instead, one of the chancellor’s flagship announcements, removing tariffs from some food and drink products, will have no meaningful impact on consumer prices,” Betts said. “But it will undermine British factories and their workers, grappling with much higher costs, producing the same products.

“The Treasury in particular has persistently failed to recognise the importance of food and drink manufacturing to jobs and prosperity the length and breadth of the U.K.,” Betts added.

Instead of making it easier to import rival products, Betts said the government should be addressing the “acute pressures” the sector is facing, including high energy costs and “overly complex” regulation.

A spokesperson for Princes Group, which produces Branston Baked Beans in the U.K., said removing tariffs on imported finished baked beans was “unlikely to have a meaningful impact on prices, particularly as there are currently no tariffs on the imported haricot beans used by U.K. manufacturers and no tariffs on EU imports.” 

“We believe measures that help address the higher costs of manufacturing food in the UK, particularly energy costs, would have a greater impact for both consumers and British businesses.”

According to the government, the move, together with existing tariff suspensions announced earlier this year, will reduce consumer costs by between £245 million and £595 million a year, saving households up to £21 on their food shop annually.

In response to a consultation on the changes, the government said it had taken the decision to exclude several products from the initial list “due to concerns about the impact on domestic production, developing countries, international considerations and other government policies.”

“The government recognises that for some remaining products, there may be some limited impacts on domestic producers of goods which will be able to be imported tariff-free for the specified period. However, the government considers the benefits of this to consumers, through reduced costs, outweigh those risks.”

The U.K. government did not respond to a request for comment.